Quarterly Journal of Economics
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Hyun-Han Shin, Rene M. Stulz Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. 113. No. 2. P. 531-552.
Using segment information from Compustat, we find that the investment by a segment of a diversified firm depends on the cash flow of the firm's other segments, but significantly less than it depends on its own cash flow. The investment by segments of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment of comparable single-segment firms. The sensitivity of a segment's investment to the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its investment opportunities are better than those of the firm's other segments.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii, Andrew Metrick Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003. Vol. 118. No. 1. P. 107-155.
Shareholder rights vary across firms. Using the incidence of 24 unique governance rules, we construct a "Governance Index" to proxy for the level of shareholder rights at about 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest decile of the index (weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during the sample period. We find that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made fewer corporate acquisitions.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007Daron K. Acemoglu, Jörn-Steffen Pischke Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. 113. No. 1. P. 78-118.
This paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general training they receive. The superior information of the current employer regarding its employees' abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power, and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training, even if these skills are general. The model can lead to multiple equlibria. In one equilibrium quits are endogenously high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high. Using microdata on German apprentices, we show that the predictions of our model receive some support from the data.