Quarterly Journal of Economics
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Hyun-Han Shin, Rene M. Stulz
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
1998.
Vol. 113.
No. 2.
P. 531-552.
Using segment information from Compustat, we find that the investment by a segment
of a diversified firm depends on the cash flow of the firm's other segments, but
significantly less than it depends on its own cash flow. The investment by segments
of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment
of comparable single-segment firms. The sensitivity of a segment's investment to
the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its investment opportunities
are better than those of the firm's other segments.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii, Andrew Metrick
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
2003.
Vol. 118.
No. 1.
P. 107-155.
Shareholder rights vary across firms. Using the incidence of 24 unique governance
rules, we construct a "Governance Index" to proxy for the level of shareholder rights
at about 1500 large firms during the 1990s. An investment strategy that bought firms
in the lowest decile of the index (strongest rights) and sold firms in the highest
decile of the index (weakest rights) would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent
per year during the sample period. We find that firms with stronger shareholder rights
had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures,
and made fewer corporate acquisitions.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Daron K. Acemoglu, Jörn-Steffen Pischke
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
1998.
Vol. 113.
No. 1.
P. 78-118.
This paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general
training they receive. The superior information of the current employer regarding
its employees' abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power,
and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training, even if these skills
are general. The model can lead to multiple equlibria. In one equilibrium quits are
endogenously high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide
little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high.
Using microdata on German apprentices, we show that the predictions of our model
receive some support from the data.
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