Corporate Governance: An International Review
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Eugene Kang, Asghar Zardkoohi Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 6. P. 786-799.
We suggest that the equivocal empirical results of board leadership structure on firm performance have both methodological and conceptual roots. We stress that whether board leadership structure enhances or lowers performance depends on its fit with a firm’s internal and external conditions, a point that has not been comprehensively addressed by the extant literature. To guide future research in this field, we develop five testable propositions and offer some suggestions on how these propositions may be empirically tested.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Yangmin Kim Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 6. P. 800-808.
This paper examines the effects of board of directors’ network characteristics on firm performance using a sample of 199 large, publicly traded Korean companies from 1990 through 1999. Two board network characteristics are discussed, namely: board network density and board external social capital. Board network density is defined as the extensiveness or the cohesiveness of contact among the members of board of directors, and board external social capital refers to the degree to which board members have outside contacts in the external environment. The test results suggest that a moderate level of board network density enhances firm value, while too cohesive a board network destroys it. It is also found that board members’ elite school networks were positively associated with firm performance.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007Sigurt Vitols Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 386 - 396.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Andres de Pablo, Valentin Azofra, Felix Lopez Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 2. P. 197-210.
In recent years, the debate about the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms has focused on the activity of the corporate boards of directors. This paper analyses the effect of the size of the board, its composition and internal functioning on firm value in a sample of 450 non-financial companies from ten countries in Western Europe and North America. The econometric method combines uniequational regression analysis with simultaneous equations in order to control for the possibility of board size and composition endogeneity. The results show a negative relationship between firm value and the size of the board of directors. This relation holds when we control for alternative definitions of firm size and for board composition, the board’s internal functioning, country effect and industry effect. We find no significant relationship between the composition of the board and the value of the firm. These results are consistent with previous relevant papers and show that companies with oversized boards of directors have poorer performance both in countries where internal mechanisms of governance dominate and in countries where external mechanisms are predominant.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Gerhard Cromme Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 362-367.
The term "corporate governance", and all that it implies, is now in everyday use in Germany. This is due to the enormous changes Germany has experienced in recent years, in international business, international finance and in German industrial structures. This contribution deals with recent changes in the German system of corporate governance. After a short historical review, the major elements of the international context that form the background for changes in Germany are discussed. This is followed by an explanation of the German Corporate Governance Code and its role, concluding with a prospectus for further possible developments and a summary of key points.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Pierre-Yves Gomez, Harry Korine Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 739. P. 739–752.
Under what conditions do stakeholders consent to a regime of corporate governance? We propose that consent by the governed in corporate governance cannot be satisfactorily explained without reference to the collective value of procedural fairness that underlies markets. Drawing on the social psychology of justice and the political economy of social choice, we highlight the critical role played by democratic procedures in achieving consent by the governed in modern society. This line of reasoning leads us to suggest that the evolution of corporate governance, too, can be understood in terms of Tocqueville's well-known hypothesis that democracy eventually prevails in all spheres of organised activity. Examining the historical record of institutional reform in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, we find that corporate governance has indeed evolved to make increasing use of democratic procedures. Viewed over the long-term of two centuries of capitalist development, corporate governance is seen to have successively incorporated enfranchisement, separation of powers and representation. In conclusion, we consider the implications of basing the study of corporate governance on the question of stakeholder consent and the practice of corporate governance on the procedures of democracy.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007C.B. Ingley, Nicholas T. van der Walt Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 5. P. 632-653.
Based on British legislation, the duties of directors are stated in the New Zealand Companies Act 1993. However, “good” governance is not defined within the Act. Considering the relative importance attached by boards to a variety of governance tasks, this paper evaluates directors’perceptions of the current contribution of fellow board members to different aspects of governance practice. This evaluation is discussed in relation to the influence of board tasks and functions on actions that may be regarded as being in the interests of the company as defined by the Act. The evaluation illustrates the strategic orientation of the board,highlighting the extent to which individual directors and the board as a whole can actually influence key outcomes and, thereby, their governance contribution. The paper reports responses to findings based on a study involving 3000 directors and presents suggestions for enhancing board processes as well as possible changes in expectations that could be encapsulated in legislation.
Stakeholders under pressure: corporate governance and labour management in Germany and Japan [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 419-428.
A small but significant stream of research has emerged on how changes in corporate governance impact labour management, particularly in countries with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. This paper briefly reviews existing empirical and theoretical literature on the links between corporate governance and labour management. Then it compares recent trends in Germany and Japan in terms of how changes in corporate governance affect the distribution of value-added, employment adjustment, pay systems and employee participation. Germany and Japan have proven able to adapt and modify their stakeholder model of employment and employee participation to changing circumstances. However, the size of the core model is getting smaller.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Caspar Rose Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 5. P. 691-701.
After the emergence of the Cadbury Report in 1992, several countries in the EU, including Denmark, issued their own guidelines of corporate governance. However, whether such recommendations benefit shareholders is a controversial question. This article presents an empirical analysis of financial performance and the composition of semi-two-tier boards using a unique sample of Danish listed firms. It is shown that board size, proportion of insiders and positions held by board members in other firms do not significantly impact performance. Only the average age of the board has a significantly negative impact on performance. Thus, it is argued that board structure only plays crucial role when a firm is in financial trouble or faces a major threat – not under normal circumstances.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Chris Mallin, Andy Mullineux, Clas Wihlborg Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 4. P. 532–541.
Post 1992 Cadbury Committee report developments in UK corporate governance provisions are reviewed. The role of institutional investors, and the financial sector as a whole, in corporate governance is considered. Practices in "Continental Europe", the UK and the US are contrasted, along with the roles of banks, strategic investors ("insiders"), institutional investors ("outsiders") and capital markets. To be effective, capital markets must be efficient and competitive and auditing must be reliable. Current EU and US reform proposals are compared and prospects for convergence in corporate governance procedures assessed.
The Impact of the Roles, Structure and Process of Boards on Firm Performance: evidence from Turkey [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Veysel Kula Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 2. P. 265-276.
This study aims at investigating the impact of the roles, structure and process of boards on performance of Turkish companies. Drawing on the data obtained from a sample of 386 mostly small and non-listed stock ownership companies, it was found that the separation of chairman and general manager positions has significant positive impact on firm performance. From the board roles of control, service and resource acquisition, firm performance was found to be positively related only to the level of adoption of resource acquisition role. It was also found that the effectiveness, information access and performance evaluation attributes of boards are positively and significantly associated with firm performance.