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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 430

Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Tomas Jandik, Craig G. Rennie ECGI - Finance Working Paper. 2005.  No. 59/2004.
This paper investigates the evolution of corporate governance and firm performance in emerging markets. It focuses on Czech ammunition manufacturer Sellier and Bellot (S&B) following voucher privatization in 1993. Exogenously imposed diffuse ownership, combined with legal, capital market, and accounting defi ciencies, contributed to poor corporate governance and weak fi rm performance. It also impeded corporate governance change toward optimal concentrated ownership structure. Five years of dismal accounting and stock return performance, default, and a failed attempt to sell the company passed before a single blockholder acquired control, installed new management, and dramatically improved profi tability. This study is one of the fi rst todescribe the path of evolution from a suboptimal to an optimal governance structure. Turnaround was accomplished through the adoption of monitoring and incentive mechanisms known to mitigate owner-manager agency confl icts in developed countries. The S&B experience has policy implications for emerging countries undergoing mass privatization.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Chris Mallin, Andy Mullineux, Clas Wihlborg Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 4. P. 532–541. 
Post 1992 Cadbury Committee report developments in UK corporate governance provisions are reviewed. The role of institutional investors, and the financial sector as a whole, in corporate governance is considered. Practices in "Continental Europe", the UK and the US are contrasted, along with the roles of banks, strategic investors ("insiders"), institutional investors ("outsiders") and capital markets. To be effective, capital markets must be efficient and competitive and auditing must be reliable. Current EU and US reform proposals are compared and prospects for convergence in corporate governance procedures assessed.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
YiLin Wu Journal of Corporate Finance. 2004.  Vol. 10. No. 1. P. 199-227. 
Extant research investigates the effects of legal mechanisms and shareholder activism on corporate governance. Zingales [Journal of Finance 55 (2000) 1623] calls for research concerning the effects of public opinion on corporate governance. The California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) influences public opinion by publicly naming the companies having poor corporate governance. This study hypothesizes that public naming by CalPERS damages the reputations of management and directors at these companies, and these companies respond by improving their corporate governance. This hypothesis is supported by three findings. First, companies are more likely to decrease the number of inside directors after being named publicly by CalPERS. A large proportion of departing inside directors remains full-time employees in the named companies. Second, departing inside directors are less likely to take up future directorships after their companies are named publicly by CalPERS. Finally, the likelihood of CEO dismissal increases and the relation between performance and CEO dismissal becomes stronger after companies are named publicly by CalPERS. These three findings are consistent with the hypothesis that CalPERS influences public opinion and that reputation concerns are effective in compelling companies to improve their corporate governance system.
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Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Veysel Kula Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 2. P. 265-276. 
This study aims at investigating the impact of the roles, structure and process of boards on performance of Turkish companies. Drawing on the data obtained from a sample of 386 mostly small and non-listed stock ownership companies, it was found that the separation of chairman and general manager positions has significant positive impact on firm performance. From the board roles of control, service and resource acquisition, firm performance was found to be positively related only to the level of adoption of resource acquisition role. It was also found that the effectiveness, information access and performance evaluation attributes of boards are positively and significantly associated with firm performance.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Phillippe Desbrières, Alain Schatt Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 2002.  Vol. 29. No. 5/6. P. 695-730. 
This paper investigates the financial characteristics and changes in performance of French companies involved in a leveraged buyout. The empirical study covers a sample of 161 MBOs in France from 1988 to 1994. The acquired firms outperform their counterparts in the same sector of activity before and after the buyout. However, unlike findings concerning LBOs in the USA and the UK, the performance of French firms falls after the operation is completed. This downturn in performance seems to be less detrimental to former subsidiaries of groups than to former family businesses.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Bruce Seifert, Halit Gonenc, Jim Wright Journal of Multinational Financial Management. 2005.  Vol. 15. No. 2. P. 171-191. 
This paper examines the effects of equity ownership by insiders and equity ownership by blockholders and institutions on performance using samples of firms from four countries (United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan). While there are no consistent relationships between insider ownership or blockholder/institutional ownership on performance across the four countries, there are nevertheless significant associations between ownership of these groups and performance within the four countries. Our results may indicate that the effects of insider ownership and/or blockholders/institutions depend very much on local laws or the local business environment. In contrast, the effects of the control factors on performance are much more consistent. Leverage, for example, tends to have a negative effect while capital expenditures and sales growth both generally have a positive effect.
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007
Dimitry Anastakis Business and Economic History. 2007.  Vol. 5.
This paper attempts to situate Lee Iacocca's role in the Chrysler bailout within a broader automotive entrepreneurial community, and to understand how his actions in helping Chrysler stave off bankruptcy in the 1979-1981 period helped to reshape not only the automotive industry, but business-government relations, and the very nature of "brink management" in a post-industrial America. In short, the paper attempts to answer the question of whether Iacocca fundamentally changed how automotive management operated in Detroit, or whether his actions in saving Chrysler remain an isolated, unique case within auto business history. It argues that one cannot understand Iacocca without understanding the changing pre-1980 milieu and its impact on the wider automotive industry and economy of the post-1980, post-Chrysler bailout period. Iacocca and the Chrysler situation were unique, yet they remain essential to understanding the direction of the US auto industry, and the end of American industrial hegemony more broadly.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2008.  Vol. 88. No. 3. P. 430-465.. 
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Ronald C. Lease, John J. McConnell, Wayne H. Mikkelson Journal of Financial Economics. 1983.  Vol. 11. No. 1-4. P. 439-471. 
This paper tests the hypothesis that the future distribution of payoffs provided by a common stock depends upon whether ownership of the stock also conveys control over the firm's activities. For 26 firms that had two classes of common stock outstanding, the class with superior voting rights traded at a premium relative to the other class. However, in four firms where the ownership structure of the firm also included a class of voting preferred stock, the class of common with superior voting rights traded at a significant discount relative to the class of common with inferior voting rights. The analysis suggests that there are both benefits and costs of corporate control.
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Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Amir N. Licht Delaware Journal of Corporate Law. 2004.  Vol. 29. No. 3. P. 649-746. 
This paper considers the raison d’être of corporations as it is refl ected in the maximands of corporate governance. The debate over stockholders’ versus stakeholders’ interests as such maximands has been raging for decades. Advances in economic theory have not only failed to resolve this debate but have established that the problem is graver than what many may have estimated. This paper turns this debate on its head: Instead of asking What or Whose interests should corporations maximize, the real question is Why is this debate taking place at all? Aiming to extend current economic analyses of the maximands issue, this paper puts forward a new theory about the factors that determine these maximands. Recent advances in psychological research point to value emphases at the individual and societal levels and to the need for cognitive closure as such factors. The theory proposes the notion of value complexity as an organizing element that may associate certain value emphases with cognitive style. Overall, this theory provides explanations for various sticky points in the stockholder-stakeholder debate in the United States and in international settings, identifi es gaps in other theoretical accounts, and generates testable hypotheses for empirical research. Extant evidence supports this theory.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Huimin Cui, Y.T. Mak Journal of Corporate Finance. 2002.  Vol. 8. No. 4. P. 313-336. 
Several studies have examined the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance/value (e.g., [Journal of Financial Economics 20 (1988) 293; Journal of Financial Economics 27 (1990) 595; Journal of Corporate Finance 5 (1999) 79]). Using different samples, these studies provide general support for the argument that increases in managerial ownership create countervailing interest alignment and entrenchment effects, leading to a nonlinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance. However, the actual form of this nonlinear relationship differs across the studies. The present paper examines the relationship between managerial ownership and performance for high R&D firms that are listed on the NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ. We find that Tobin’s Q initially declines with managerial ownership, then increases, then declines again and, finally, increases again—a W-shaped relationship. The findings from our study point to the importance of industry effects in the relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Bruce Burton, Christine Helliar, David Power Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2004.  Vol. 12. No. 3. P. 353-360. 
Corporate governance as a coherent notion and independent topic of academic and practitioner interest has developed rapidly in the last ten years. In particular, most countries have seen the publication of vast numbers of regulatory reports outlining best practice in handling the issues that arise from the increased prominence of the governance concept. Although a vast literature exists on the implications of an Initial Public Offering (IPO) for financial performance and ownership structure, few investigations have communicated directly with issuing firms and analysed the practical difficulties encountered on a day-to-day basis when a company decides to float. In particular, very few studies have sought to examine what corporate governance changes, if any, are made in the process. This note reports the findings of a questionnaire survey and a series of interviews with practitioners about the changes that are made before and after a sample of IPOs in the UK.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
David Manry, David Stangeland Journal of Corporate Finance. 2003.  Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 353-375. 
From 1989 through 1993, the United Shareholders Association (USA) published its Shareholder 1000 report, which ranked 1000 firms on several dimensions of corporate performance, including shareholder rights and management compensation. We examine two measures reported by the USA of the alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests: a shareholder rights score and a management compensation rating. The associations between these measures and measures of operating performance and investment levels are analyzed. We find evidence that the USA shareholder rights and management compensation scores are significantly and positively associated with measures of operating performance and investment spending. Further tests indicate that USA management compensation scores proxy for aspects of corporate behavior that have significant valuation implications not reflected in financial statements.
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-04-2007
David Manry, David Stangeland Journal of Corporate Finance. 2003.  Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 353-375. 
From 1989 through 1993, the United Shareholders Association (USA) published its Shareholder 1000 report, which ranked 1000 firms on several dimensions of corporate performance, including shareholder rights and management compensation. We examine two measures reported by the USA of the alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ interests: a shareholder rights score and a management compensation rating. The associations between these measures and measures of operating performance and investment levels are analyzed. We find evidence that the USA shareholder rights and management compensation scores are significantly and positively associated with measures of operating performance and investment spending. Further tests indicate that USA management compensation scores proxy for aspects of corporate behavior that have significant valuation implications not reflected in financial statements.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Tatiana Nenova Journal of Financial Economics. 2003.  Vol. 68. No. 3. P. 325-351. 
This paper measures the value of corporate voting rights, specifically of the control block of votes, in a sample of 661 dual-class firms in 18 countries, in 1997. A consistent measure across countries is proposed. The measure is adjusted for takeover probability, block-holding costs, and dividend and liquidity differences between the share classes. The value of controlblock votes varies widely across countries. It is close to half of firm market value in South Korea, and close to zero in Finland. The value of control-block votes is interpreted as a lower bound for actual private benefits of the controlling shareholder. The legal environment, law enforcement, investor protection, takeover regulations, andpower-concentrating corporate charter provisions explain 68% of the cross-country variation in the value of control-block votes.
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