Всего статей в данном разделе : 430
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Vidhi Chhaochharia, Yaniv Grinstein Johnson School Research Paper Series. 2005. No. 23-06 .
The 2001-2002 corporate scandals led to rules that affect the governance structure of public U.S. firms. We study the announcement effect of the rules on firm value. On average, the rules have a positive effect on firm value. Firms that need to make more changes to comply with the rules outperform firms that need to make fewer changes. We also find some evidence that the result is concentrated in large firms. Small firms that need to make more changes underperform small firms that need to make fewer changes, suggesting that the costs of the rules outweigh their benefits in small firms.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-02-2007Varouj Aivazian, Ying Ge, Jiaping Qiu Journal of Banking & Finance. 2005. No. 29. P. 1459-1481.
This paper examines empirically the quality of the governance mechanisms of Chinese state-owned enterprises from 1994–1999, a period marked by substantial changes in policies affecting the governance structure of these firms. It shows that the restructuring of these enterprises according to corporate law improved the effectiveness of their governance system. Specifically, restructuring strengthened the links between manager turnover and firm performance. The results indicate that firm performance was significantly and negatively related to manager demotion for incorporated state-owned enterprises, while this relationship was insignificant for unincorporated enterprises. They also indicate that manager turnover was a viable incentive mechanism for improving future enterprise performance.
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007Charles P. Oman OECD Working Papers. 2001. No. 180.
Corporate governance matters for national development. Case studies of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Malaysia and South Africa suggest that it has a role of growing importance to play in helping to increase the flow of financial capital to firms in developing countries. Equally important are the potential benefits of improved corporate governance for overcoming barriers, including the actions of vested interest groups, to achieving sustained productivity growth. Improved corporate governance, however, cannot be considered in isolation. In the financial sector, attention must also be given to measures to strengthen the banking sector, and a country’s financial institutions as a whole. In the “real” sector, close attention must be given to competition policy and sector–specific regulatory reform. Forces working in favour of improved corporate governance in developing countries include those operating both on the demand and on the supply side of domestic and international portfolio equity flows to corporations in those countries. Forces working against significantly improved corporate governance (which may nonetheless give lip service to the need for such improvement) include many dominant shareholders and other corporate insiders — in the private and public sectors — in entrenched distributional cartels. The heightened risk of regulatory capture in countries with clientelistic relationship–based (as opposed to rules–based) systems of governance reinforces the fact that good corporate governance requires good political governance, and vice–versa.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Rienk Goodijk Corporate Ownership & Control. 2003. Vol. 1. No. 1. P. 149-155.
In the highly competitive environment management builds relationships with very different kinds of stakeholders, acting more transparently, providing opportunities for dialogue and involvement and being accountable to all the stakeholders. The paper considers implementation of one of the most challenging instrument to build those relationships named "stakeholdermanagement". Improvements on corporate governance and stakeholder-management already have been found: in the further professionalising of the Supervisory Board by updating the board-profile, setting up audit- and remuneration-committees, introducing self-assessment (internal board-evaluations) etcetera; more openness and transparency in the annual reports, making mention of board members’ remuneration; increasing the influence of shareholders by providing opportunities to certificate-holders for more actively participating and voting at the General Meeting, and intensifying the relationships with investors; developing international employee participation, based on the European Directive on information and consultation and the implementation in Dutch law; intensifying customer relationships by developing a Customer Relationship Management system world-wide, using internet-opportunities (ING Direct), converting call centres to Customer Contact Centres, introducing customer-panels, etcetera; introducing HR-plans on inspiring leadership, performance management and diversity worldwide.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Hollis Ashbaugh, Daniel W. Collins, Ryan LaFond SSRN Working Papers. 2004.
Separation of ownership and control in firms creates information asymmetry problems between shareholders and managers that expose shareholders to a variety of agency risks. This paper investigates the extent to which governance attributes that are intended to mitigate agency risk affect firms' cost of equity capital. We examine governance attributes along four dimensions: (1) financial information quality, (2) ownership structure, (3) shareholder rights, and (4) board structure. We find that firms reporting larger abnormal accruals and less transparent earnings have a higher cost of equity, whereas firms with more independent audit committees have a lower cost of equity. We also find that firms with a greater proportion of their shares held by activist institutions receive a lower cost of equity, whereas firms with more blockholders have a higher cost of equity. Moreover, we find a negative relation between the cost of equity and the independence of the board and the percentage of the board that owns stock. Collectively, the governance attributes we examine explain roughly 8% of the cross-sectional variation in firms' cost of capital and 14 % of the variation in firms' beta. The results support the general hypothesis that firms with better governance present less agency risk to shareholders resulting in lower cost of equity capital.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Ricardo P. C. Leal, Andre L. Carvalhal-da-Silva SSRN Working Papers. 2005.
We construct a corporate governance practices index (CGI) from a set of 24 questions that can be objectively answered from publicly available information. Our goal was to measure the overall quality of corporate governance practices of the largest possible number of firms without the biases and low response ratios typical of qualitative surveys. CGI levels have improved over time in Brazil. CGI components demonstrate that Brazilian firms perform much better in disclosure than in other aspects of corporate governance. We find very high concentration levels of voting rights leveraged by the widespread use of indirect control structures and non-voting shares. Control has concentrated between 1998 and 2002. We do not find evidence for either entrenchment or incentives in Brazil using ownership percentages but find that the separation of control from cash flow rights destroys value. The CGI maintains a positive, significant, and robust relationship with corporate value. A worst-to-best improvement in the CGI in 2002 would lead to a .38 increase in Tobin's q. This represents a 95% rise in the stock value of a company with the average leverage and Tobin's q ratios. Considering our lowest CGI coefficient, a one point increase in the CGI score would lead to a 6.8% rise in the stock price of the average firm in 2002. We found no significant relationship between governance and the dividend payout but there are indications that dividend payments are greater when control and cash flow rights concentration are greater. We place our results in context by offering a comparative analysis with Chile. We would offer a sound "yes" if asked whether good corporate governance practices increase corporate value in Brazil.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Jorge Farinha Universidade do Porto Economia Discussion Paper. 2003. No. 2003-06.
This paper reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on the nature and consequences of the corporate governance problem, providing some guidance on the major points of consensus and dissent among researchers on this issue. Also analysed is the effectiveness of a set of external and internal disciplining mechanisms in providing a solution for the corporate governance problem. Apart from this, particular emphases are given to the special conflicts arising from the relationship between managers and shareholders in companies with large ownership diffusion, the issue of managerial entrenchment and the link between firm value and corporate governance.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007David Carter, Betty J. Simkins, W. Gary Simpson The Financial Review. 2003. Vol. 38. No. 1. P. 33-53.
This study examines the relationship between board diversity and firm value for Fortune 1000 firms. Board diversity is defined as the percentage of women, African-Americans, Asians, and Hispanics on the board of directors. This research is important because it presents the first empirical evidence examining whether board diversity is associated with improved financial value. After controlling for size, industry, and other corporate governance measures, we find significant positive relationships between the fraction of women or minorities on the board and firm value. We also find that the proportion of women and minorities on boards increases with firm size and board size but decreases as the number of insiders increases.
Corporate Governance, Business Group Affiliation, and Firm Performance: Descriptive Evidence from Pakistan [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007WaQar I. Ghani, Junaid Ashraf CMER Working Paper. 2004. No. 05-35.
This study examines business groups and their impact on corporate governance in Pakistan. We use non-financial firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange of Pakistan for 1998-2002 periods in order to select group and non-group samples. Our analysis find that group firms have higher liquidity/short-term debt paying ability, and lower financial leverage than those of the non-group firms in each of the five years and when averaged over five-years. More importantly, we find that for the group firms, the five-year mean values of revenues and the five-year mean values of total assets grew faster than those of the non-group firms. Based on mean values of ROA, we find that group firms are more profitable than non-group firms in each year and over all five-years combined. In contrast, Tobin’s Q results (a market valuation measure) show that the mean values for each year and for all five-years combined are lower than those of the non-group firms. Our industry-level results are roughly consistent with those of the full samples. The divergence between ROA and Tobin’s Q suggests that external shareholders perceive firms affiliated with business groups to have relatively lower transparency and weaker corporate governance mechanisms than firms not affiliated with business groups. As a consequence, the market participants appear to discount the value of group firms even though these firms are more profitable than non-group firms. We interpret this evidence to indicate that investors view the business-group as a mechanism to expropriate minority shareholders. On the other hand, the comparative financial performance results suggest that business groups in Pakistan are efficient economic arrangements that substitute for missing or inefficient outside institutions and markets. We feel that our preliminary work substantially contributes to our understanding of business groups and their relationship to corporate governance and economic development in Pakistan
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2007John E. Core, Robert W. Holthausen, David F. Larcker Journal of Financial Economics. 1999. No. 51. P. 371-406.
We find that measures of board and ownership structure explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in CEO compensation, after controlling for standard economic determinants of pay. Moreover, the signs of the coefficients on the board and ownership structure variables suggest that CEOs earn greater compensation when governance structures are less effective. We also find that the predicted component of compensation arising from these characteristics of board and ownership structure has a statistically signifficant negative relation with subsequent firm operating and stock return performance. Overall, our results suggest that firms with weaker governance structures have greater agency problems; that CEOs at firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with greater agency problems perform worse.
Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of Institutional Investors:A Global Perspective [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Stuart L. Gillan, Laura T. Starks Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance Working Papers. 2003. No. 2003-01.
We examine the relation between corporate governance and ownership structure, focusing on the role of institutional investors. In many countries, institutional investors have become dominant players in the financial markets. We discuss the theoretical basis for, history of, and empirical evidence on institutional investor involvement in shareholder monitoring. We examine cross-country differences in ownership structures and the implications of these differences for institutional investor involvement in corporate governance. Although there may be some convergence in governance practices across countries over time, the endogenous nature of the interrelation among governance factors suggests that variation in governance structures will persist.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Maria Maher, Thomas Andersson OECD Working Papers. 1999.
This paper examines some of the strengths, weaknesses, and economic implications associated with various corporate governance systems in OECD countries. Each country has through time developed a wide variety of mechanisms to overcome the agency problems arising from the separation of ownership and control. We discuss the various mechanisms employed in different systems (e.g. the market for corporate control, executive remuneration schemes, concentrated ownership, cross-shareholdings amongst firms) and assess the evidence on whether or not they are conducive to firm performance and economic growth. For example, we show how the corporate governance framework can impinge upon the development of equity markets, R&D and innovative activity, and the development of an active SME sector, and thus impinge upon economic growth. Several policy implications are identified.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Oren Fuerst, Sok-Hyon Kang Yale School of Management Working Papers. 2004. ysm108.
We examine whether ownership and governance characteristics are associated with the firm s operating performance and stock price. We hypothesize that while ownership structure and governance mechanisms impact the firm's operating performance, they can also impact stakeholders abilities to expropriate rents from other stakeholders. We use a two-step estimation approach to assess whether the benefits of a better governance system manifest as higher operating performance, or as a premium on share price. To mitigate potential problems from using conventional accounting performance measures, we use Ohlson s (1995) expected residual income (ERI) valuation metric, which is conceptually superior to conventional measures. Results suggest that (1) higher share ownership of the CEO, corporate insiders, and outside directors has a strong positive impact on both firm performance (measured by the ERI metric) and market value; (2) large ownership of outside shareholders has a negative impact on the firm s operating performance; (3) presence of a controlling shareholder has an adverse distributive effects for other shareholders; (4) after controlling for ownership, there is no improvement in operating performance or share value from having greater representation of outside directors, or having a larger board; and (5) variables representing the CEO s stature the CEO s tenure and the board chairmanship have a negative impact on the firm.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2008Igor Filatotchev, David E. Guest, Jenifer Piesse, Gregory Jackson, Howard Gospel DTI Economics Working Paper. 2005. No. 13.
This collection of short papers examines the role of corporate governance with regard to human resource management and corporate strategy over the course of the firm life cycle, as well as in diverse institutional environments such as the UK, Germany and Japan.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Franklin Allen Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 2005. Vol. 21. No. 2. P. 164-177 .
Most of the literature on corporate governance emphasizes that firms should be run in the interests of shareholders. This is an appropriate objective function when markets are perfect and complete. In many emerging economies this is not the case: markets are imperfect and incomplete. The first theme of the paper is that alternative firm objective functions, such as pursuing the interests of all stakeholders, may help overcome market failures. The second theme is that it is not necessarily optimal to use the law to ensure good corporate governance. Other mechanisms such as competition, trust, and reputation may be preferable.