Всего статей в данном разделе : 430
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Kee H. Chung, Jeong-Kuk Kim Journal of Corporate Finance. 1999. Vol. 5. No. 1. P. 35-54.
Empirical evidence suggests that the voting premium in the Korean securities market is strongly related to the structure of corporate ownership. We find that the premium attached to voting stock is positively and significantly associated with the control value of a block of shares held by minority shareholders. We also find that the premium is negatively related to both the fraction of shares that are voting shares and the market value of equity. Empirical results indicate that private benefits of control in Korea are worth about 10% of the value of equity.
Corporate Reputation in Professional Services Firms: 'Reputation Management Based on Intellectual Capital Management' [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Ignacio Zabala, Goyo Panadero, Luis M. Gallardo, Carlos Martín Amate, Miguel Sanchez-Galindo, Ignacio Tena, Ignacio Villalba Corporate Reputation Review. 2005. Vol. 8. No. 1. P. 59-71.
There is a gap between the market price of a listed company and its book value and the difference between the two values relates in part to the value of the company's intangible assets. Accordingly, proper management of intellectual capital represents a significant improvement in the company's value. At professional services firms, corporate reputation is very closely linked to knowledge management, which is the management of the intangible assets that go to make up its intellectual capital. Deloitte Spain's Corporate Reputation Team has developed a theoretical approach based on the 'tangible treatment' of companies intangible assets, which lays down the following ideas for determining a company's corporate reputation: -- Corporate reputation is determined by the stakeholders 'recognition of a company, ie through their representations that they are aware of and agree with the status and management of the company's intangible assets. -- A company is only interested in what its stakeholders perceive it to be. Accordingly, it must avoid rankings based on the perceptions held by audiences that are not important to it. --The ultimate aim is to control (through a Reputation Score Card) and report on the status and management of intellectual capital in order to obtain recognition from stakeholders. -- The key to a company obtaining a good reputation lies in making its internal and external behavior the same and ensuring that its mission, vision and values are shared by the company and its stakeholders. The most important aspects of the theoretical development are shown in the graphic representation of corporate reputation. Additionally, mathematical formulas are used, not in an attempt to achieve numerical accuracy, but rather to assist comprehension of the reasoning involved.
Corporate reputation management: "living the brand"/Корпоративное управление репутацией: жизнь бренда [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2004Alan Wilson Management Decisions. 2001. No. 2. P. 99-104.
It is recognised that an organization's corporate reputation is affected by the actions of every business unit, department and employee that comes into contact with another stakeholder. However, the means by which employees can be directed or encouraged to "live the brand" is an area which has received relatively limited coverage. This article explores the management actions that are required if employees are to support and enhance the organization's corporate reputation. The study illustrates the pivotal role of staff in the corporate reputation management process and presents ways through which organizations can encourage commitment, enthusiasm and consistent staff behaviour in delivering the brand values.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007Mark Billings Business and Economic History. 2007. Vol. 5.
In this paper, I explore a hitherto largely neglected area of business history: the corporate treasury. Most business or corporate historians consider the corporate treasury function a specialized aspect of the finance function and give it little explicit attention. I argue that this neglect is undeserved, and consider how and why treasury has evolved as a discipline distinct from other aspects of the finance function. We can attribute the rise of the professional corporate treasurer to a number of factors: changes in the organization and financing of companies, including change and innovation in financial markets; the wider professionalization of management; and the internationalization of business. These factors affected different countries at different times. In Europe, economic and financial uncertainties in the 1970s acted as a major stimulus, whereas treasury, in common with other aspects of the "managerial revolution," developed earlier in the United States.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-12-2005Светлана Гудкова Банковское обозрение. 2005. № 3(69).
С появлением на рынке «коробочных» CRM-продуктов системы управления отношениями с клиентами стали доступнее. Теперь у любого дистрибутора Вы можете приобрести «коробку» и установить у себя данный продукт. Почему же тогда компании-консультанты всерьез занимаются внедрением продуктов, изучая бизнес-процессы клиентов, применяя методологию внедрения, ставя в один ряд «коробочный» продукт и CRM-системы?
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Marco Becht Background Note prepared for the Euro 50 Group Meeting on Corporate Governance (European Investment Bank). 2003.
After the recent scandals in the United States, corporate governance was added to the agenda of Heads of State and might be there to stay, at least for a while. This development marks the peak of a recent scandal driven policy programme that goes back to the early 1990s at the national level and hit the international scene with the 1998 Russia/Asia/Brazil crisis. The remainder of this note is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a stylised map of corporate control arrangements in Europe. Section 3 sets out the theoretical merits of each model. Section 4 discusses the potential of various policies that have been proposed in the context of each model. Section 5 provides a brief outline of the policies that are currently debated in Europe and the United States. Section 6 gives hyperlinks to a survey of the scientific evidence on corporate governance and to key policy documents that have been put out by the European Commission and by various institutions in the United States.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Pierre-Yves Gomez, Harry Korine Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 739. P. 739–752.
Under what conditions do stakeholders consent to a regime of corporate governance? We propose that consent by the governed in corporate governance cannot be satisfactorily explained without reference to the collective value of procedural fairness that underlies markets. Drawing on the social psychology of justice and the political economy of social choice, we highlight the critical role played by democratic procedures in achieving consent by the governed in modern society. This line of reasoning leads us to suggest that the evolution of corporate governance, too, can be understood in terms of Tocqueville's well-known hypothesis that democracy eventually prevails in all spheres of organised activity. Examining the historical record of institutional reform in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, we find that corporate governance has indeed evolved to make increasing use of democratic procedures. Viewed over the long-term of two centuries of capitalist development, corporate governance is seen to have successively incorporated enfranchisement, separation of powers and representation. In conclusion, we consider the implications of basing the study of corporate governance on the question of stakeholder consent and the practice of corporate governance on the procedures of democracy.
Demystifying the Illusion of the Positive Effects of Ownership Concentration on Corporate Performance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Yoser Gadhoum, Marie-Helene Noiseux, Daniel Zeghal Investment Management & Financial Innovations. 2005. Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 50-68.
Evidence supporting the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has been rather contradictory. In this research, we investigate the effects of ownership structure on business performance on a sample of 600 listed Canadian firms. We used a three-phase analysis of variance in which each phase used a different definition of ownership concentration: i) the overall concentration of the five largest shareholders (CONC); ii) the holdings of the largest shareholder (BLC1); and iii) inside shareholders as either managers or directors (BLCI). For each phase, we used cluster analysis and three other concentration cutoff levels (an even-split into thirds, extreme quartiles, and the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) cutoff) to verify if there is an optimal level of concentration cutoff that may impact the performance. Our results indicate a high level of ownership concentration in Canadian corporations. The Berle-Means widely held corporation is far from universal. Besides, while state control of traded firms is infrequent, family control is common. However, our findings indicate only a weak association between performance measures and ownership concentration levels, except for the return on investment, which shows some improvement with a high level of ownership. Our results confirm those of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Overall, no evidence is found to support the efficient monitoring hypothesis, since performance cannot be improved by blockholders who seem not only to be entrenched but may benefit from perquisites and on-the-job consumption. This might indicate that large shareholders expropriate minority absentee owners.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Francis Declerck Agribusiness. 1995. Vol. 11. No. 6. P. 523-536.
Focuses on the created value of leveraged buyouts (LBO) in the US Food Industries in the 1980s. Value of LBOs in the food industries in 1989; Analysis of objective of private firms in LBO; Analysis of debt and divestitures.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007C.B. Ingley, Nicholas T. van der Walt Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 5. P. 632-653.
Based on British legislation, the duties of directors are stated in the New Zealand Companies Act 1993. However, “good” governance is not defined within the Act. Considering the relative importance attached by boards to a variety of governance tasks, this paper evaluates directors’perceptions of the current contribution of fellow board members to different aspects of governance practice. This evaluation is discussed in relation to the influence of board tasks and functions on actions that may be regarded as being in the interests of the company as defined by the Act. The evaluation illustrates the strategic orientation of the board,highlighting the extent to which individual directors and the board as a whole can actually influence key outcomes and, thereby, their governance contribution. The paper reports responses to findings based on a study involving 3000 directors and presents suggestions for enhancing board processes as well as possible changes in expectations that could be encapsulated in legislation.
Do Corporate Control and Product Market Competition Lead to Stronger Productivity Growth? Evidence from Market-Oriented and Blockholderbased Governance Regimes [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Jens Koke, Luc Renneboog ECGI - Finance Working Paper. 2003. No. 14/2003.
This study investigates the impact of corporate governance and product market competition on total factor productivity growth for two large samples of German and UK firms. In poorly performing UK firms, the presence of strong outside blockholders lead to substantial increases in productivity. Contrarily, for German poorly performing and distressed firms, it is bank debt concentration which stimulates productivity growth. Whereas high bank debt concentration also supports productivity growth in German profitable firms, leverage is unrelated to productivity growth in UK firms. Weak product market competition in the UK has a negative impact on productivity growth of in both widely-held firms and concentrated firms with the exception of firms controlled insiders (directors). These seem able to generate productivity increases in firms subject to little market discipline. For profitable German firms, the relation between strong blockholder control and productivity growth is limited. Only control by banks, insurance firms and the government can somewhat reduce the negative effect of weak product market competition.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang, Woochan Kim Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 2006. Vol. 22. No. 2. P. 366-413.
We report strong OLS and instrumental variable evidence that an overall corporate governance index is an important and likely causal factor in explaining the market value of Korean public companies. We construct a corporate governance index (KCGI, 0~100) for 515 Korean companies based on a 2001 Korea Stock Exchange survey. In OLS, a worst-to-best change in KCGI predicts a 0.47 increase in Tobin's q (about a 160% increase in share price). This effect is statistically strong (t = 6.12) and robust to choice of market value variable (Tobin's q, market/book, and market/sales), specification of the governance index, and inclusion of extensive control variables. We rely on unique features of Korean legal rules to construct an instrument for KCGI. Good instruments are not available in other comparable studies. Two-stage and three-stage least squares coefficients are larger than OLS coefficients and are highly significant. Thus, this paper offers evidence consistent with a causal relationship between an overall governance index and higher share prices in emerging markets. We also find that Korean firms with 50% outside directors have 0.13 higher Tobin's q (roughly 40% higher share price), after controlling for the rest of KCGI. This effect, too, is likely causal. Thus, we report the first evidence consistent with greater board independence causally predicting higher share prices in emerging markets.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Mehmet Ugur, Melsa Ararat Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2006. Vol. 14. No. 4. P. 325–348.
Recent work on corporate governance has highlighted the effects of corporate governance quality on macroeconomic crises, especially in the context of South-East Asian economies. However, the possibility of reverse causation from macroeconomic performance to corporate governance has been overlooked. This paper aims to address this issue by examining the relationship between macroeconomic stabilisation and corporate governance reforms in Turkey since the 1999 and 2001 crises. We demonstrate that the prospect of macroeconomic stability has led to extensive corporate governance reforms for two reasons. First, recent return to macroeconomic stability has been underpinned by public governance reforms, which spilled over to the area of corporate governance. We call this the statutory reform effect. Second, macroeconomic stability tended to have a positive effect on firms' investment in corporate governance quality. We call this the voluntary reform effect. To substantiate these findings, we examine the post-1999 developments in the following areas: (i) the effectiveness of regulatory authorities; (ii) disclosure and transparency rules; and (iii) the quality of the enforcement regime.
Does Ownership Structure Matter? Governance Structures and the Market for Corporate Control in Germany [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Jurgen Weigand, Erik Lehmann Working Paper (Institute for Development Strategies, Indiana University). 1999.
This paper investigates the impact of corporate governance on the performance of 361 German firms over the period 1991 to 1996. In contrast to previous studies, we report systematic influences of corporate governance indicators on the profitability of German firms. In particular,ownership concentration affects firm performance in significantly negative fashion. This relationship depends on who commands the control rights over a firm. Firms owned by another industrial firm or controlled by banks have significantly lower rates of return than firms governed by families or foreign owners. Representation of owners on the board of directors tends to improve performance. These findings support the view that tighter governance curbs managerial discretion and expands shareholders' wealth. However, we also find that stock corporations with widely dispersed outside shareholdings outperformed stock corporations in which another industrial firm, banks, or different large shareholders had at least a blocking minority. These results imply that the presence of large shareholders does not necessarily enhance profitability.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Ivor Francis Corporate Governance: An International Review. 1997. Vol. 5. No. 4. P. 239–244.
This long and discursive book results from a research commission by the Australian Institute of Company Directors (AICD) given to an experienced consultant and academic, Ivor Francis. Francis, a New Zealander, worked closely with the late Edwards Deming, who was internationally respected for his work on quality management, and is himself an acknowledged expert in corporate performance measurement. After eighteen years as a business school professor at Cornell and New York Universities, Francis moved to Australia, where he is now Chairman of the Deming Centre International in Sydney. The fascinating part of the book, for readers of this journal, comes in the final few pages and an appendix, which report the findings of a survey of directors' views on the effectiveness of Australian directors. According to the Australian press, the AICD sought to distance itself from these findings