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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 430

Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Peter M. Brown Corporate Governance: An International Review. 1997.  Vol. 5. No. 4. P. 232–235. 
In recent years the Top Pay Research Group have produced an annual survey, in co-operation with 3I Plc., in which they approach individual directors and board chairmen, seeking their views on the needs and opportunities facing independent directors as well as obtaining hard data on board related topics.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Rob Bauer, Nadja Guenster, Roger Otten Journal of Asset Management. 2004.  Vol. 5. No. 2. P. 91-104. 
This paper analyses whether good corporate governance leads to higher common stock returns and enhances firm value in Europe. Throughout, this study uses Deminor Corporate Governance Ratings for companies included in the FTSE Eurotop 300. Following the approach of Gompers et al. (2003, ‘Corporate Governance and Equity Prices’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 107–55), portfolios are built consisting of well-governed and poorly governed companies and their performances are compared. The impact of corporate governance on firm valuation is also examined. The results show a positive relationship between these variables and corporate governance. This relationship weakens substantially after adjusting for country differences. Finally, the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is analysed, as approximated by net profit margin and return on equity. Surprisingly, and contrary to Gompers et al. (2003), a negative relationship is found between governance standards and these earnings-based performance ratios for which possible implications are discussed.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael Steven Weisbach The American Economic Review. 1998.  Vol. 88. No. 1. P. 96. 
How can boards be chosen through a process partially controlled by the CEO, yet, in many instances, still be effective monitors of him? We offer an answer based on a model in which board effectiveness is a function of its independence. This, in turn, is a function of negotiations (implicit) between existing directors and the CEO over who will fill vacancies on the board. The CEO's bargaining power over the board-selection process comes from his perceived ability relative to potential successors. Many empirical findings about board structure and performance arise as equilibrium phenomena of this model.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Czes Szarycz, Barry Jeffress, Dr. Jan Szarycz SAS The Power to Know. 2004. 
In recent years, both private and public sectors have been dedicating considerable attention to the issue of corporate governance. No one is surprised that the private sector’s regulators these days demand more transparency when it comes to governance processes. Spectacular corporate collapses and corporate scandals in Australia and abroad have resulted in high level shareholder distrust, as many opinion surveys demonstrate. The purpose of this paper is to present an integrated strategic management system and describe how such a system might work in the public sector environment. It will further argue that the integrity of the relationship between external and internal performance management frameworks is the essential component of effective corporate governance processes. To illustrate these principles, a case study will be presented, illustrating how an Outcome/Output framework can be integrated with the Balanced Scorecard and then cascaded throughout an agency.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Laura G. Thatcher Journal of Deferred Compensation. 2005.  Vol. 10. No. 4. P. 50-71. 
Describes the most common forms of equity-based compensation vehicles. Stock options; Restricted stock; Restricted stock units or deferred stock units; Performance awards.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
L.A.A. van den Berghe, Abigail Levrau Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2004.  Vol. 12. No. 4. P. 461-478. 
This paper is an attempt to identify what constitutes a good board of directors, and this is based on a comparison between academic literature, corporate governance rating systems and our field research into board practices. We observed that “traditional” academic research focused on a limited number of quantifiable board characteristics, while practitioners attach greater importance to “soft” elements, which are nearly absent in the literature and in the governance ratings. These findings highlight the need for a better understanding of all elements that determine board effectiveness. Furthermore, our results identify three areas of improvement for boards of directors.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Hamid Mehran Journal of Financial Economics. 1995.  Vol. 38. No. 2. P. 163-184. 
An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggests that the form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers to increase firm value. Firm performance is positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers and to the percentage of their compensation that is equity-based. Moreover, equity-based compensation is used more extensively in firms with more outside directors. Finally, firms in which a higher percentage of the shares are held by insiders or outside blockholders use less equity-based compensation.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Jun-Koo Kang, Anil Shivdasani Journal of Financial Economics. 1995.  Vol. 38. No. 1. P. 29-58. 
We examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms during top executive turnover in Japanese corporations. Consistent with evidence from U.S. data, the likelihood of nonroutine turnover is significantly related to industry-adjusted return on assets,excess stock returns, and negative operating income, but is not related to industry performance. The sensitivity of nonroutine turnover to earnings performance is higher for firms with ties to a main bank than for firms without such ties. Outside succession in Japan is more likely for firms with large shareholders and a main bank relationship. We document performance improvements subsequent to nonroutine turnover and outside succession.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Wesley Marc Cohen, Steven Klepper Review of Economics and Statistics. 1996.  Vol. 78. No. 2. P. 232-43. 
The effect of firm size on the allocation of R&D effort between process and product innovation is examined. It is hypothesized that, relative to product innovations, process innovations are less saleable in disembodied form and spawn less growth. This implies that the returns to process R&D will depend more on the firm's output at the time it conducts its R&D than the returns to product R&D. Incorporating this distinction in a simple model, the authors derive and test predictions about how the fraction of R&D devoted to process innovation varies with firm size within industries.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Steven Klepper RAND Journal of Economics. 2002.  Vol. 33. No. 1. P. 37-61. 
After their commercial introduction, the number of producers of autos, tires, televisions, and penicillin initially grew and then experienced a sharp decline or shakeout. Guided by an evolutionary model of entry and exit, firm survival patterns in the four products are examined to determine whether there were common forces governing their distinctive evolution. Predictions concerning the effects of pre- and post-entry experience and the timing of entry on firm survival are tested. The findings are used to reflect on why industries experience shakeouts and evolve to be oligopolies.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Sigurt Vitols International Journal of Disclosure and Governance. 2005.  Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 357-367. 
Close links between banks and large companies have been seen as a key component of Germany’s corporate governance system. The recent sale of large shareholdings by banks raises the question of to what extent this system will converge to the US model of dispersed ownership. This paper argues that concentrated ownership will remain a key feature of this system. In addition, board-level representation of employees and the lack of a culture of independent directors are further factors supporting incremental change in Germany’s corporate governance system rather than wholesale convergance to the US model.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 19-04-2007
Alberto Miguel, Julio Pindado, Chabela de la Torre SSRN Working Papers. 2003. 
This paper studies how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. Our study gives rise to the following findings. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and firm value.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Alberto Miguel, Julio Pindado, Chabela de la Torre SSRN Working Papers. 2003. 
This paper studies how the main institutional factors characterizing corporate governance systems around the world affect the relationship between ownership structure and firm value. Our study gives rise to the following findings. First, ownership concentration and insider ownership levels are determined by several institutional features such as investor protection, development of capital markets, activity of the market for corporate control, and effectiveness of boards. Second, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm value is not directly affected by these institutional factors. Third, there is, however, a direct influence of corporate governance characteristics on the relationship between insider ownership and firm value.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
David F. Larcker, Scott A. Richardson SSRN Working Papers. 2005. 
We examine the relation between a broad set of corporate governance indicators and various measures of managerial decision making and organizational performance. Using a sample of 2,106 firms, we distill 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, existence of debt-holders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables into 14 governance constructs using principal components analysis. We find that these 14 constructs are related to future operating performance, have a somewhat mixed association with abnormal accruals, Tobin’s Q, and future excess stock returns, and little relation to class action lawsuit and accounting restatements.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 02-12-2008
М.В. Смирнов Российский журнал менеджмента. 2007.  Т. 5. № 3. С. 181-186. 
С 9 по 20 июля 2007 г. в Санкт-Петербурге прошла II Летняя школа «Российского журнала менеджмента». В работе II Летней школы приняли участие 32 слушателя из вузов и научных центров Москвы, Санкт-Петербурга, Барнаула, Екатеринбурга, Иркутска, Йошкар-Олы, Мелеуза, Набережных Челнов, Нижнего Новгорода, Новосибирска, Омска, Перми, Петрозаводска, Ростова-на-Дону, Ставрополя, Хабаровска, Череповца. Проблематику II Летней школы составили следующие тематические блоки: стратегический менеджмент, теория отраслевых рынков, финансовая экономика.
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