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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 430

Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Maretno Harjoto, John Garen Journal of Corporate Finance. 2005.  Vol. 11. No. 4. P. 661-679. 
This study examines the firm's equity ownership by insiders and blockholders starting right after the firm goes public, its decline thereafter, and what alters the decline. Previous literature has shown the incentive of insiders to let their ownership fall after their initial public offering (IPO). After the IPO, management attains only a fraction of the benefits of good governance, so has an incentive to let inside ownership erode. We verify this, but examine the effect that re-entry into capital market via a seasoned equity offering (SEO) has on insider ownership. The incentive of management to hold stock is restored by a desire to raise additional capital because it implicitly raises management's stake. We show empirically that it raises insider stockholding relative to what it otherwise would have been, thus providing an avenue by which this aspect of corporate governance is improved. This, and other results, is shown with a sample of IPO firms during 1996 and 1997. Our findings indicate that, in expectation, the increased holdings due to re-entry into the capital market almost exactly offsets 1 year's downward trend in management shareholdings. Also, we find an interesting interplay between types of blockholders in that CEOs tend to hold less stock after the IPO if external blockholders initially hold more.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Her-Jiun Sheu, Chi-Yih Yang Corporate Governance. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 2. P. 326–337. 
In the context of agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360), how insider stock ownership relates to firm performance is explored in this paper. The relevant performance measure used is total factor productivity. Insiders are classified into executives, board members and blockholders so as to facilitate a detailed study. Five-year (1996–2000) panel data of 333 Taiwanese listed electronics firms are examined. It is observed that total insider ownership remains steady while the executive-to-insider holding ratio increases significantly. In terms of the effect on total factor productivity, neither the total insider ownership nor the board-to-insider holding ratio shows any influence on productivity. However, productivity first decreases then increases with the executive-to-insider holding ratio, forming a U-shaped relationship. The results indicate that stock ownership of top officers in high-tech firms should be encouraged to enhance productivity.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Raihan Khan, Ravi Dharwadkar, Pamela Brandes Journal of Business Research. 2005.  Vol. 58. No. 8. P. 1078-1088. 
Limited research has looked at how the aspects of institutional ownership affect executive compensation. Using an agency theory approach, we investigate how institutional ownership concentration and dispersion affect levels of CEO compensation, pay mix, and stock option pay sensitivity. We find that the largest owner's concentration is associated with lower levels of compensation, as well as with higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation, but that the number of blockholders does not predict any aspects of CEO compensation. In addition, institutional ownership dispersion is associated with increased levels of compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. Finally, higher levels of CEO ownership lead to a significant reduction in the level of options compensation, as well as higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation.
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-04-2007
Darin G. Clay SSRN Working Papers. 2002. 
Institutional shareholdings have a systematically positive effect on firm value and alter the Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) finding of a nonmonotonic relation between insider ownership and value. The evidence indicates that, on average, a 1% increase in institutional stock ownership translates to a 0.6% increase in the firm's market-to-book ratio, or an increase of $125M for the mean firm in cross-sectional analysis. Controlling for institutional holdings converts the original MSV finding - that firm value first increases with stock ownership by the board, then decreases, and then increases again - to one in which firm value uniformly increases with greater board ownership. These findings support the view that increased incentives for monitoring both by the board and by institutional investors consistently leads to higher company value. The evidence also indicates that the positive relation between institutional holdings and firm value is stronger in firms with higher discretionary cash flows and in the period following the 1992 adoption of proxy rule amendments that increased the bargaining power of institutions.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Darin G. Clay Working Papers (University of Southern California, Marshall School of Business). 2002. 
Institutional shareholdings have a systematically positive effect on firm value and alter the Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) finding of a nonmonotonic relation between insider ownership and value. The evidence indicates that, on average, a 1% increase in institutional stock ownership translates to a 0.6% increase in the firm’s market-to-book ratio, or an increase of $125M for the mean firm in cross-sectional analysis. Controlling for institutional holdings converts the original MSV finding — that firm value first increases with stock ownership by the board, then decreases, and then increases again—to one in which firm value uniformly increases with greater board ownership. These findings support the view that increased incentives for monitoring both by the board and by institutional investors consistently leads to higher company value. The evidence also indicates that the positive relation between institutional holdings and firm value is stronger in firms with higher discretionary cash flows and in the period following the 1992 adoption of proxy rule amendments that increased the bargaining power of institutions.
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Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Diane K. Denis, John J. McConnell ECGI - Finance Working Paper. 2003.  No. 05/2003.
We survey two generations of research on corporate governance systems around the world, concentrating on countries other than the United States. The first generation of international corporate governance research is patterned after the US research that precedes it. These studies examine individual governance mechanisms – particularly board composition and equity ownership – in individual countries. The second generation of international corporate governance research considers the possible impact of differing legal systems on the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance and compares systems across countries.
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Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2006.  Vol. 24. No. 1. P. 125-147. 
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-04-2007
Marion Hutchinsona, Ferdinand A. Gul Journal of Corporate Finance. 2004.  Vol. 10. No. 4. P. 595-614. 
Prior research on the relationship between corporate controls and firm performance is premised on the notion that, in theory, there is direct association between corporate governance and firm performance. However, extensive research has produced mixed and often weak results. In this paper, we posit, as a primary relationship, a negative association between growth and firm performance and then examine whether corporate governance variables moderate this negative relationship. Our results support this notion and show that the role of corporate governance variables in firm performance should be evaluated in the context of the firm’s external environment measured in this study in terms of growth opportunities.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Marion Hutchinsona, Ferdinand A. Gul Journal of Corporate Finance. 2004.  Vol. 10. No. 4. P. 595-614. 
Prior research on the relationship between corporate controls and firm performance is premised on the notion that, in theory, there is direct association between corporate governance and firm performance. However, extensive research has produced mixed and often weak results. In this paper, we posit, as a primary relationship, a negative association between growth and firm performance and then examine whether corporate governance variables moderate this negative relationship. Our results support this notion and show that the role of corporate governance variables in firm performance should be evaluated in the context of the firm’s external environment measured in this study in terms of growth opportunities.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Financial Economics. 2000.  Vol. 58. No. 1-2. P. 3-27. 
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors, are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered financial systems.
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Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny Journal of Finance. 2002.  Vol. 57. No. 3. P. 1147-1170. 
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies. Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow ownership by the controlling shareholder.
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Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Michael S. Gibson Finance and Economics Discussion Series. 2002.  No. 1999-63.
I test whether corporate governance is ineffective in emerging markets by estimating the link between CEO turnover and firm performance for over 1,200 firms in eight emerging markets. While previous papers on corporate governance in emerging markets have studied corporate governance mechanisms, such as concentrated ownership, I study a corporate governance outcome: are poorly performing managers replaced? Others have answered this question in the affirmative for the United States and other developed countries. This paper is the first to address this question for emerging markets. I find two main results. First, CEOs of emerging market firms are more likely to lose their jobs when their firm’s performance is poor, suggesting that corporate governance is not ineffective in emerging markets. The magnitude of the relationship is surprisingly similar to what Kaplan (1994a) found for the United States. Second, for the subset of firms with a large domestic shareholder, there is no link between CEO turnover and firm performance. For this subset of emerging market firms, corporate governance appears to be ineffective.
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Опубликовано на портале: 20-12-2007
Ronald Philip Dore CentrePiece Magazine. 2006.  Vol. 11. No. 3. P. 22-24. 
Over the past decade or so, there has been a fundamental change in what the managers of Japanese companies believe are their key objectives. Ronald Dore traces the country’s conversion to Anglo-Saxon capitalism - and growing concerns about the emergence of a new 'divided society'.
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Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles, Gregg Jarrell Journal of Corporate Finance. 1997.  Vol. 3. No. 3. P. 189-220. 
Shareholder activists and regulators are pressuring U.S. firms to separate the titles of CEO and Chairman of the Board. They argue that separating the titles will reduce agency costs in corporations and improve performance. The existing empirical evidence appears to support this view. We argue that this separation has potential costs, as well as potential benefits. In contrast to most of the previous empirical work, our evidence suggests that the costs of separation are larger than the benefits for most large firms.
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-04-2007
James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. Coles, Gregg Jarrell Journal of Corporate Finance. 1997.  Vol. 3. No. 3. P. 189-220. 
Shareholder activists and regulators are pressuring U.S. firms to separate the titles of CEO and Chairman of the Board. They argue that separating the titles will reduce agency costs in corporations and improve performance. The existing empirical evidence appears to support this view. We argue that this separation has potential costs, as well as potential benefits. In contrast to most of the previous empirical work, our evidence suggests that the costs of separation are larger than the benefits for most large firms.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию