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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 430

Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007
Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang, Woochan Kim ECGI - Finance Working Paper. 2005.  No. 87.
This paper contributes to a new literature on the factors that affect firms' corporate governance practices. We find that regulatory factors are highly important, largely because Korean rules impose special governance requirements on large firms (assets > 2 trillion won). Industry factors, firm size, and firm risk are also important. Other firm-specific factors only modestly affect governance even when they are statistically significant. This suggests that many Korean firms do not choose their governance to maximize share price. Among firm-specific factors, the most significant are size (larger firms are better governed) and firm risk (riskier firms are better governed). Long-term averages of profitability and equity finance need are significant, where short-term averages are not. This is consistent with sticky governance, in which firms alter their governance slowly in response to economic factors. In a companion paper, we report evidence that the corporate governance index used here predicts higher share prices for Korean firms. Black, Jang and Kim, Does Corporate Governance Affect Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea,: Journal of Law, Economics and Organization (forthcoming 2005), http://ssrn.com/abstract=311275
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang, Woochan Kim Journal of Corporate Finance. 2006.  Vol. 12. No. 3. P. 660-691. 
This paper contributes to a new literature on the factors that affect firms’ corporate governance practices. We find that regulatory factors are highly important, largely because Korean rules impose special governance requirements on large fi rms (assets > 2 trillion won). Industry factors, firm size, and firm risk are also important. Other firm-specifi c factorsonly modestly affect governance even when they are statistically signifi cant. This suggests that many Korean fi rms do not choose their governance to maximize share price. Among firm specific factors, the most significant are size (larger firms are better governed) and firm risk (riskier firms are better governed). Long-term averages of profitability and equity finance need are significant, where short-term averages are not. This is consistent with “sticky governance,”in which firms after their governance slowly in response to economic factors.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Harilaos Mertzanis Econometrica. 2001.  Vol. 9. No. 89.
This article presents the reasons which led the business community in Greece to reconsider existing corporate governance practices of listed corporations in the Athens Stock Exchange, outlines the general rationale for the creation and adoption of specific recommendations for best corporate practice, presents the recommendations in full detail and finally provides suggestions for the required corporate legal reform.
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2004
Joseph E. Stiglitz Экономическая наука современной России. 2001.  № 4. С. 108-146. 
Отсутствие в обществе необходимых финансовых и правовых структур, делающих приватизацию эффективной, рассматривается в статье как один из основных факторов, объясняющих неудовлетворительное состояние экономики России в ходе строительства рыночных отношений. Второй важный фактор, как показывается в работе, связан с неадекватной теоретической концепцией фирмы, на которой базировалась идеология реформ, — представлением о фирме как полноправной собственности крупных акционеров при слабом влиянии на деятельность фирмы остальных заинтересованных лиц.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2008
Franklin Allen, Mengxin Zhao PKU Business Review. 2007.  Vol. 36. No. 7. P. 98-102. 
In the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance is concerned with the narrow goal of ensuring that firms maximize the wealth of shareholders. In Japan and some other countries, firms are concerned with a broader group of stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, customers and others as well as shareholders. This article contrasts the Anglo-American system of corporate governance with that in Japan and elsewhere. If markets and institutions are well developed and competitive, Anglo-American corporate governance ensures an efficient allocation of resources. In other circumstances, focusing on a wider range of stakeholders as the Japanese do can be more efficient.
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-04-2007
Elizabeth A. Gordon, Elaine Henry, Darius Palia EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Papers. 2004.  No. 4377.
Recent corporate scandals have raised considerable concern among regulators and stock market participants about related party transactions (RPTs), prompting Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) to prohibit personal loans to executives and non-executive board members. In a representative sample of companies for a period that predates SOX, we find RPTs are wide spread and involve equally executives and non-executive board members; additionally, the proportion of related party loans is smaller than other non-loan related party transactions such as purchases or direct services. When we examine the relationship between RPTs and the extant literature's corporate governance mechanisms (such as board characteristics, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, and outside monitors), we generally find weaker corporate governance mechanisms associated with more and higher dollar amounts of RPTs. We also find that industry-adjusted returns are negatively associated with RPTs. On further examination of loans versus other types of RPTs not considered in SOX, we find a negative relationship between industry-adjusted returns and the number and dollar amount of loans to executives and non-executive directors, and a similar relationship between the number of other types of RPTs with non-executive directors. In summary, our results provide support for the view of RPTs as conflicts of interest between managers/board members and their shareholders, in contrast with the view of RPTs as efficient transactions.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Elizabeth A. Gordon, Elaine Henry, Darius Palia EFA 2004 Maastricht Meetings Papers. 2006.  No. 4377.
Recent corporate scandals have raised considerable concern among regulators and stock market participants about related party transactions (RPTs), prompting Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) to prohibit personal loans to executives and non-executive board members. In a representative sample of companies for a period that predates SOX, we find RPTs are wide spread and involve equally executives and non-executive board members; additionally, the proportion of related party loans is smaller than other non-loan related party transactions such as purchases or direct services. When we examine the relationship between RPTs and the extant literature's corporate governance mechanisms (such as board characteristics, CEO pay-performance sensitivity, and outside monitors), we generally find weaker corporate governance mechanisms associated with more and higher dollar amounts of RPTs. We also find that industry-adjusted returns are negatively associated with RPTs. On further examination of loans versus other types of RPTs not considered in SOX, we find a negative relationship between industry-adjusted returns and the number and dollar amount of loans to executives and non-executive directors, and a similar relationship between the number of other types of RPTs with non-executive directors. In summary, our results provide support for the view of RPTs as conflicts of interest between managers/board members and their shareholders, in contrast with the view of RPTs as efficient transactions.
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Опубликовано на портале: 23-03-2007
Robert Eli Rosen Connecticut Law Review. 2003.  Vol. 35. P. 1157-1184. 
Enron Board's Finance Sub-Committee's approval of the first bankrupting Raptor transaction, Talon, is examined in as much detail as published documents allow. In so doing, this article examines a failure of corporate social responsibility. As not only members of the public were harmed, but also Enron's residual owners, the shareholders, this article examines a failure of corporate governance. The examination reveals that the decision was governed by analyses of the transaction's risks. The examination also reveals that the sub-committee was presented with false risk management information. The article highlights the importance of the risk management function, especially in corporations redesigned, or re-engineered, by strategies of outsourcing and project team management.
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Опубликовано на портале: 11-11-2004
John Donald Roberts, Eric van den Steen Stanford Graduate School of Business Working Papers. 2000.  No. 1631.
Корпорации одновременно утверждают, что человеческий капитал все более важен для их успеха, и что они стремятся максимизировать биржевую стоимость акций. В этой статье исследуется связь между этими двумя обстоятельствами. Мы показываем, что преследование интересов акционеров может потребовать передачи некоторой роли в управлении корпорации трудовому коллективу с целью мотивировать их на инвестирование в специфичный для фирмы человеческий капитал. Такие действия становятся более привлекательными, поскольку важность этих инвестиций возрастает. Этот результат также имеет отношение к спорам о реформировании европейской и японской систем управления в направлении американской системы, где влияние трудового коллектива ниже. В этом контексте мы предлагаем модель оптимального выбора системы управления в духе идей, которые предложил Холмстром.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 419-428. 
A small but significant stream of research has emerged on how changes in corporate governance impact labour management, particularly in countries with stakeholder-oriented corporate governance. This paper briefly reviews existing empirical and theoretical literature on the links between corporate governance and labour management. Then it compares recent trends in Germany and Japan in terms of how changes in corporate governance affect the distribution of value-added, employment adjustment, pay systems and employee participation. Germany and Japan have proven able to adapt and modify their stakeholder model of employment and employee participation to changing circumstances. However, the size of the core model is getting smaller.
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Arturo Capasso SSRN Working Papers. 2006. 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a few serious financial scandals and many cases of corporate mismanagement have driven scholars and politicians to devote increasing attention to corporate governance, in a close relation with business ethics issues. In academic literature, as well as in public policy debates, corporate governance is nowadays acknowledged as a critical factor in economic development and financial markets stability. The evolution in the nature of the firm is among the major causes for the crisis of established corporate governance models. The traditional manufacturing companies - vertically integrated and capital intensive - which emerged at the beginning of the last century and had since then prevailed - have been challenged by new organizational structures, based on intangible assets and networks, more appropriate to a dynamically changing environment, where competition is driven by the availability of distinctive competencies, based on firm-specific knowledge. This paper, building on the resource based view of the firm, but also on stakeholder approach to strategic management, explores how the growing importance of intangible assets is reshaping, in many industries, the basic conditions of corporate governance. The aim is twofold: i) to explain logically why intangible assets modifies the allocation of residual claims, as company performance can substantially affect the wealth of other stakeholders ii) to determine which constituencies should be considered as relevant stakeholders and contribute, to some extent, to the corporate governance.
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Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Caspar Rose Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 5. P. 691-701. 
After the emergence of the Cadbury Report in 1992, several countries in the EU, including Denmark, issued their own guidelines of corporate governance. However, whether such recommendations benefit shareholders is a controversial question. This article presents an empirical analysis of financial performance and the composition of semi-two-tier boards using a unique sample of Danish listed firms. It is shown that board size, proportion of insiders and positions held by board members in other firms do not significantly impact performance. Only the average age of the board has a significantly negative impact on performance. Thus, it is argued that board structure only plays crucial role when a firm is in financial trouble or faces a major threat – not under normal circumstances.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007
Christian Strenger Econometrica. 2004.  Vol. 12. No. 1.
Recent empirical research confirms that companies with demanding governance standards achieve higher market valuations. Due to the complexity of specific corporate governance matters, there is a rising need for a systematic and quantitative evaluation approach for corporate governance. In Germany, a Corporate Governance Scorecard has been developed that fulfils the key goals defined by analysts and investors. It has a standardised format, can be applied efficiently, is available at no cost and enables self-assessments by companies as well as sector-specific comparisons. The German Scorecard has not only found good reception at the national financial community, but has also been adapted around the world, especially in emerging countries.
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Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Ruth Aguilera, Gregory Jackson Academy Of Management Review. 2003.  Vol. 28. No. 3. P. 447-465. 
We develop a theoretical model to describe and explain variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist economies, identifying the social relations and institutional arrangements that shape who controls corporations. what interests corporations serve. and the allocation of rights and responsibilities among corporate stakeholders. Our "actor-centered" institutional approach explains firm-level corporate governance practices in terms of institutional factors that shape how actors' interests are defined ("socially constructed") and represented. Our model has strong implications for studying issues of international convergence.
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-04-2007
Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael Steven Weisbach Rochester Business-Financial Research and Policy Studies. 1991.  No. 91-02.
This paper attempts to measure difference in firm performance caused by broad composition and ownership structure. These two variables are intended to measure the direct incentives and monitoring faced by top management. We also control for a number of otheк variables that are likely to be correlated with corporate performance. We do so to improve the precision of our estimates, as well as to eliminate much of the omitted-variable bias that has undoubtedly affected previous studies of board composition.
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