Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Karl V. Lins Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2003. Vol. 38. No. 1. P. 159-184.
This paper investigates whether management stock ownership and large non-management blockholder share ownership are related to firm value across a sample of 1433 firms from 18 emerging markets. When a management group's controlling exceed its cash flaw rights, I find that firm values are lower. I also find that large non-management control limits blockholdings are positively related to firm value. Both of these effects are significantly more pronounced in countries with low shareholder protection. One interpretation of these results is that external shareholder protection mechanisms play a role in restraining managerial agency costs and that large non-management blockholders can act as a partial substitute for missing institutional governance mechanisms.
The Effect of Forward Markets on the Debt-Equity Mix of Investor Portfolios and the Optimal Capital Structure of Firms. [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Sheridan Titman Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 1985. Vol. 20. No. 1. P. 19-28.
This paper demonstrates that the various market imperfections that have been suggested to explain observed portfolio choices and capital structures can be circumvented if securities (e.g., options) can be traded that simulate forward contracts on stock. It is shown that if the risk-adjusted returns to bondholders exceed the returns to stockholders (to reflect personal tax differences) tax-exempt investors will prefer a combination of these synthetic forward purchases and corporate bonds to purchasing stock directly. They will not, as has been suggested, include stock in their portfolios for diversification purposes when they can alternatively purchase securities that simulate forward contracts. It is also shown that firms that can sell synthetic forward positions on their own stock can essentially guarantee that sufficient funds will be available to meet their bond obligations. This gives firms the opportunity to increase their debt levels without increasing the possibility of bankruptcy and the corresponding administrative and agency costs.