Journal of Financial Intermediation
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2006. Vol. 15. No. 1. P. 1-31.
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-03-2005Xavier Freixas, Bruno Parigi Journal of Financial Intermediation. 1998. Vol. 7. No. 1. P. 3-31.
The increased fragility of the banking industry has generated growing concern about the risks associated with payment systems. Although in most industrial countries different interbank payment systems coexist, little is really known about their properties in terms of risk and efficiency. How should payment systems be designed? We tackle this question by comparing the two main types of payment systems, gross and net, in a framework where uncertainty arises from several sources: the time of consumption, the location of consumption, and the return on investment. Payments across locations can be made either by directly transferring liquidity or by transferring claims against the bank in the other location. The two mechanisms are interpreted as the gross and net settlement systems in interbank payments. We characterize the equilibria in the two systems and identify the trade-off in terms of safety and efficiency