Всего статей в данном разделе : 8
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Hyun-Han Shin, Rene M. Stulz Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. 113. No. 2. P. 531-552.
Using segment information from Compustat, we find that the investment by a segment of a diversified firm depends on the cash flow of the firm's other segments, but significantly less than it depends on its own cash flow. The investment by segments of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment of comparable single-segment firms. The sensitivity of a segment's investment to the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its investment opportunities are better than those of the firm's other segments.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003John S. Howe, Tie Su Journal of Financial Economics. 2001. Vol. 61. No. 2. P. 227-252.
Managers can decide to reduce a warrant's exercise price. A reduction in exercise price can induce exercise (a conversion-forcing reduction) or not (a long-term reduction). Conversion-forcing firms show an abnormal return of -1.53% on the announcement day but they perform well over the three years following the announcement. This finding suggests that the funds raised from warrant exercise are invested in profitable projects. Long-term reductions show an abnormal return of -1.15% on the announcement day. These firms also perform well following the reduction, which suggests that the lower exercise price restores managerial incentives.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Shenghui Tong, Ning Yixi Journal of Investing. 2004. Vol. 13. No. 4. P. 53-66.
The article studies the affect of capital structure on institutional investor choices. Institutional investors play a critical role in supervising the management of the companies. Most of the S&P 500 firms tend to have large institutional holdings. The finding of the study suggests that the capital structure influences stock picking choices of institutional investors. There is a negative relation between dividend yield and institutional ownership. There is limited evidence that institutional investors prefer firms with low debt ratios, high ratios of capital expenditures to assets, and high ratios of cash flow to sales.
Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing, and Financing Constraints: Evidence from Belgian Firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Marc Deloof Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 1998. Vol. 25. No. 7/8. P. 945-968.
Presents information on the interpretation regarding the Belgian firms belonging to a corporate group, where investment is incompletely financed on an internal capital market of the group. How many firms are indirectly controlled; Important role the holding companies and corporate groups play in the financing of Belgian firms; Reference to the tracing of origins of these networks.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Julia Porter Liebeskind Organization Science. 2000. Vol. 11. No. 1. P. 58-77.
Diversification not only internalizes transactions of goods and services, but it also internalizes transactions of capital. Hence, the value of diversification will depend, inter alia, on whether internal capital markets are relatively efficient or inefficient. This essay reviews and discusses the possible benefits and costs of internal capital markets by conducting a careful comparative institutional analysis. The essay concludes that internal capital markets can add value to lines of business only under a limited number of circumstances. Some recent developments in the organization of internal capital markets in diversified firms can be understood as attempts to increase their efficiency.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2006. Vol. 24. No. 1. P. 125-147.
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
Planning in Ambiguous Context: The Dilemma of Meeting Needs for Commitment and Demands for Legitimacy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007Melissa Middleton Stone, Candida Greer Brush Strategic management journal. 1986. Vol. 17. No. 8. P. 633-652.
This paper argues that ambiguity of context manifested in pressures for legitimacy and commitment affect planning processes. Ambiguity arises from multiple conflicting constituencies and the lack of direct control over resources. Using nonprofit and enterpreneurial organizations as examples of organizations facing ambiguous contexts, we examine their planning practices to develop an understanding of the relationship between commitment, legitimacy, and planning.
Опубликовано на портале: 04-05-2005Андрей Валерьевич Лукашов Управление корпоративными финансами. 2004. № 4. С. 21-41.
Первичное публичное размещение акций (Initial Public Offering — IPO) компании является одним из наиболее важных механизмов на рынках капитала. Это одновременно и канал для получения молодыми компаниями нового капитала, а также способ для первоначальных инвесторов выйти из участия в капитале и реализовать прибыли на свои инвестиции. В статье описываются основные способы, этапы и закономерности проведения IPO. Приводятся статистические данные и результаты новейших академических исследований, посвященных IPO.