Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 8
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Hyun-Han Shin, Rene M. Stulz
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
1998.
Vol. 113.
No. 2.
P. 531-552.
Using segment information from Compustat, we find that the investment by a segment
of a diversified firm depends on the cash flow of the firm's other segments, but
significantly less than it depends on its own cash flow. The investment by segments
of highly diversified firms is less sensitive to their cash flow than the investment
of comparable single-segment firms. The sensitivity of a segment's investment to
the cash flow of other segments does not depend on whether its investment opportunities
are better than those of the firm's other segments.


Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
John S. Howe, Tie Su
Journal of Financial Economics.
2001.
Vol. 61.
No. 2.
P. 227-252.
Managers can decide to reduce a warrant's exercise price. A reduction in exercise
price can induce exercise (a conversion-forcing reduction) or not (a long-term reduction).
Conversion-forcing firms show an abnormal return of -1.53% on the announcement day
but they perform well over the three years following the announcement. This finding
suggests that the funds raised from warrant exercise are invested in profitable projects.
Long-term reductions show an abnormal return of -1.15% on the announcement day. These
firms also perform well following the reduction, which suggests that the lower exercise
price restores managerial incentives.


Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Shenghui Tong, Ning Yixi
Journal of Investing.
2004.
Vol. 13.
No. 4.
P. 53-66.
The article studies the affect of capital structure on institutional investor choices.
Institutional investors play a critical role in supervising the management of the
companies. Most of the S&P 500 firms tend to have large institutional holdings. The
finding of the study suggests that the capital structure influences stock picking
choices of institutional investors. There is a negative relation between dividend
yield and institutional ownership. There is limited evidence that institutional investors
prefer firms with low debt ratios, high ratios of capital expenditures to assets,
and high ratios of cash flow to sales.


Internal Capital Markets, Bank Borrowing, and Financing Constraints: Evidence from
Belgian Firms [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Marc Deloof
Journal of Business Finance & Accounting.
1998.
Vol. 25.
No. 7/8.
P. 945-968.
Presents information on the interpretation regarding the Belgian firms belonging
to a corporate group, where investment is incompletely financed on an internal capital
market of the group. How many firms are indirectly controlled; Important role the
holding companies and corporate groups play in the financing of Belgian firms; Reference
to the tracing of origins of these networks.


Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Julia Porter Liebeskind
Organization Science.
2000.
Vol. 11.
No. 1.
P. 58-77.
Diversification not only internalizes transactions of goods and services, but it
also internalizes transactions of capital. Hence, the value of diversification will
depend, inter alia, on whether internal capital markets are relatively efficient
or inefficient. This essay reviews and discusses the possible benefits and costs
of internal capital markets by conducting a careful comparative institutional analysis.
The essay concludes that internal capital markets can add value to lines of business
only under a limited number of circumstances. Some recent developments in the organization
of internal capital markets in diversified firms can be understood as attempts to
increase their efficiency.


Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Hans Degryse, Abe de Jong
International Journal of Industrial Organization.
2006.
Vol. 24.
No. 1.
P. 125-147.
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial
incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the
expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because
monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship
between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates
monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration
and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and
monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the
relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone.
This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private
benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate
the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.


Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007
Melissa Middleton Stone, Candida Greer Brush
Strategic management journal.
1986.
Vol. 17.
No. 8.
P. 633-652.
This paper argues that ambiguity of context manifested in pressures for legitimacy
and commitment affect planning processes. Ambiguity arises from multiple conflicting
constituencies and the lack of direct control over resources. Using nonprofit and
enterpreneurial organizations as examples of organizations facing ambiguous contexts,
we examine their planning practices to develop an understanding of the relationship
between commitment, legitimacy, and planning.

Опубликовано на портале: 04-05-2005
Андрей Валерьевич Лукашов
Управление корпоративными финансами.
2004.
№ 4.
С. 21-41.
Первичное публичное размещение акций (Initial Public Offering — IPO) компании
является одним из наиболее важных механизмов на рынках капитала. Это одновременно
и канал для получения молодыми компаниями нового капитала, а также способ для первоначальных
инвесторов выйти из участия в капитале и реализовать прибыли на свои инвестиции.
В статье описываются основные способы, этапы и закономерности проведения IPO. Приводятся
статистические данные и результаты новейших академических исследований, посвященных
IPO.


