Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 35
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Jesper Thyssen, Poul Israelsen, Brian Jorgensen
International Journal of Production Economics.
2006.
The paper accounts for an Activity-Based Costing (ABC) analysis supporting decision-making
concerning product modularity. The ABC analysis carried out is communicated to decision-makers
by telling how much higher the variable cost of the multi-purpose module can be compared
to the average variable cost for the product-unique modules that it substitutes to
break even in total cost. The analysis provides the platform for stating three general
rules of cost efficiency of modularization, which in combination identify the highest
profit potential of product modularization. Finally the analysis points to problems
of using ABC in costing modularity, i.e. handling of R&D costs and identification
of product profitability upon an enhanced modularization.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi
Journal of Financial Intermediation.
2006.
Vol. 15.
No. 1.
P. 1-31.
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial
incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the
expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because
monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship
between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates
monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration
and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and
monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the
relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone.
This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private
benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate
the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Congsheng Wu
Journal of Business & Economic Studies.
2005.
Vol. 11.
No. 1.
P. 19-33.
This study examines the relation between the offer price adjustment, initial return,
and subsequent short-run performance for a sample of initial public offerings (IPO's)
made by US industrial companies from 1986 to 1996. The IPO's are divided into three
categories (cold, cool, and hot issues) based on the offer price relative to the
suggested price range revealed in the preliminary prospectus. It is found that the
offer price adjustment not only predicts the first-day return, but also predicts
subsequent short-run performance in the same direction up to three months after issuance.
Moreover, different types of IPO's demonstrate distinct cross-sectional behavior
in multivariate regressions of initial returns. Our results suggest that cold IPO's
are quite unique and deserve more attention in future studies.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Robert Goldstein, Nengju Ju, Hayne E. Leland
Journal of Business.
2001.
Vol. 74.
No. 4.
P. 483-513.
A model of dynamic capital structure is proposed. Even though the optimal strategy
is implemented over an arbitrarily large number of restructuring-periods, a scaling
feature inherent in the framework permits simple closed-form expressions to be obtained
for equity and debt prices. When a firm has the option to increase future debt levels,
tax advantages to debt increase significantly, and both the optimal leverage ratio
range and predicted credit spreads are more in line with what is observed in practice.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Lyndal Drennan, Michael Kelly
Critical Perspectives on Accounting.
2002.
Vol. 13.
No. 3.
P. 311-331.
Research dealing with the implementation of system changes such as activity-based
costing (ABC) systems is founded largely on a presumption that the motivation for
the innovation is economic. The definition of success or failure then rests on the
project’s reaching a stage of implementation where the new data are used in
routine and/or unforeseen ways to improve economic efficiency. This paper presents
a view of an ABC project where complex motivations, both economic and institutional,
are identified, these held in turn by different groups within the organization as
well as external groups likely to be affected by the project. Seen in terms of its
institutional motivations, the project, documented in an internal review as a failure
because it was abandoned without using the data, can be defined as a success by at
least some of the affected groups.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006
Kee H. Chung, Mingsheng Li, Linda Yu
Financial Management.
2005.
Vol. 34.
No. 3.
P. 65-88.
We consider a simple model positing that initial public offering price is equal to
the present value of an entity's assets in place and growth opportunities. The model
predicts that initial return is positively related to both the size and risk of growth
opportunities. Consistent with this prediction, we find initial return to be positively
related to both the fraction of the offer price that is accounted for by the present
value of growth opportunities and various proxies of issue uncertainty. We also find
that IPO investors equate one dollar of growth opportunities to approximately three
quarters of tangible assets.
Blockholder Ownership: Effects on Firm Value in Market and Control Based Governance
Systems [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen, Hans Kurt Kvist
Journal of Corporate Finance.
2006.
Vol. 12.
No. 2.
P. 246-269.
In this study, Granger tests are used to examine the relationship between blockholder
ownership and the values of the largest companies in the European Union and the US.
Previous studies on US data have found that blockholder ownership has no systematic
effect on performance. We propose that these results may not apply to Continental
Europe, where ownership concentration is typically higher, the level of investor
protection is lower, and influential blockholders may have objectives other than
shareholder value. In accordance with previous research, we find no significant association
between blockholder ownership and prior or subsequent firm value in either the US
or the UK. Nonetheless, in Continental Europe we find a negative association between
blockholder ownership and firm value or accounting returns in the next period. Further
analysis reveals that this association is significant only for companies with high
initial levels of blockholder ownership (>10%). We interpret this finding as evidence
of conflicts of interest between blockholders and minority investors. The percentage
of blockholder ownership in Continental Europe may be too high from a minority shareholder
value viewpoint.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Paul Stonham
European Management Journal.
2000.
Vol. 18.
No. 5.
Part Two of this Case Study of BP Amoco examines the role of finance and financial
strategy in BP Amoco between 1990 and 2000 to see where and how far they were supportive
and complementary to competitive strategies pursued by the company's senior managers,
and if they were ever pro-active. Models of value creation by Damodaran and Rappaport
are considered as generic background and the relationship between financial strategies
and performance and competitive strategies examined by using a sample of ratios suggested
by McKenzie. Part Two concludes with valuation of BP Amoco, applying several metrics:
total returns, asset value, earnings multiples and discounted cash flows (specifically,
economic value added)
Control Systems in Multibusiness Companies: From Performance Management to Strategic
Management [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Fredrik Nilsson, Nils-Goran Olve
European Management Journal.
2001.
Vol. 19.
No. 4.
P. 344-358.
This article discusses the role of control systems in multibusiness companies. The
focus is on formulation and implementation of corporate and business unit strategies.
Three widely used categories of control models are discussed: (1) models for performance
management, (2) models for value-based management, and (3) models for strategic management.
The discussion is based upon central normative texts and examples from applications
in Nordic companies. The description and discussion of the control models and their
features should facilitate decision-making on the design and use of control systems
in multibusiness companies.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Yoser Gadhoum, Marie-Helene Noiseux, Daniel Zeghal
Investment Management & Financial Innovations.
2005.
Vol. 2.
No. 4.
P. 50-68.
Evidence supporting the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance
has been rather contradictory. In this research, we investigate the effects of ownership
structure on business performance on a sample of 600 listed Canadian firms. We used
a three-phase analysis of variance in which each phase used a different definition
of ownership concentration: i) the overall concentration of the five largest shareholders
(CONC); ii) the holdings of the largest shareholder (BLC1); and iii) inside shareholders
as either managers or directors (BLCI). For each phase, we used cluster analysis
and three other concentration cutoff levels (an even-split into thirds, extreme quartiles,
and the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) cutoff) to verify if there is an optimal
level of concentration cutoff that may impact the performance. Our results indicate
a high level of ownership concentration in Canadian corporations. The Berle-Means
widely held corporation is far from universal. Besides, while state control of traded
firms is infrequent, family control is common. However, our findings indicate only
a weak association between performance measures and ownership concentration levels,
except for the return on investment, which shows some improvement with a high level
of ownership. Our results confirm those of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Overall, no evidence
is found to support the efficient monitoring hypothesis, since performance cannot
be improved by blockholders who seem not only to be entrenched but may benefit from
perquisites and on-the-job consumption. This might indicate that large shareholders
expropriate minority absentee owners.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Francis Declerck
Agribusiness.
1995.
Vol. 11.
No. 6.
P. 523-536.
Focuses on the created value of leveraged buyouts (LBO) in the US Food Industries
in the 1980s. Value of LBOs in the food industries in 1989; Analysis of objective
of private firms in LBO; Analysis of debt and divestitures.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Jan Mouritsen
Management Accounting Research.
1998.
Vol. 9.
No. 4.
P. 461-482.
This paper compares and contrasts Economic Value Added (EVATM) and Intellectual Capital
(IC) as two technologies of managing oriented towards encouraging growth. The analysis
suggests that EVATMand IC contrasts greatly. EVATMis a financial management system
based on radical delegation and ‘empowerment’ and which therefore directs
attention to the results created by managers. Based on financial micro-theory, EVATMis
a performance measure that attempts to account more properly for the cost of capital,
but more than that, it is also a management control system which seeks to create
radically independent business units and minimize corporate staff. IC is a different
control system concerned to encourage endogenous growth implemented via loosely coupled
sets of non-financial measurements that become strong via stories and metaphors about
the post-modern firm in the post-modern world. Here, based on theories of organizational
knowledge and competence development, emphasis is put on mobilizing white collar
productivity and creativity based on some form of evolutionary economics or resource-based
theory. While EVATMlooks to managers as the movers of change, IC seems more systematically
to promote the creativity possessed by employees
EVA and Production Strategy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 27-12-2006
Justin Pettit
Industrial Management.
2000.
This article outlines ways to improve production strategy and uncover new opportunities
for growth. It explains economic value added, an integrated perfomance measurement,
management, and reward system.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Maretno Harjoto, John Garen
Journal of Corporate Finance.
2005.
Vol. 11.
No. 4.
P. 661-679.
This study examines the firm's equity ownership by insiders and blockholders starting
right after the firm goes public, its decline thereafter, and what alters the decline.
Previous literature has shown the incentive of insiders to let their ownership fall
after their initial public offering (IPO). After the IPO, management attains only
a fraction of the benefits of good governance, so has an incentive to let inside
ownership erode. We verify this, but examine the effect that re-entry into capital
market via a seasoned equity offering (SEO) has on insider ownership. The incentive
of management to hold stock is restored by a desire to raise additional capital because
it implicitly raises management's stake. We show empirically that it raises insider
stockholding relative to what it otherwise would have been, thus providing an avenue
by which this aspect of corporate governance is improved. This, and other results,
is shown with a sample of IPO firms during 1996 and 1997. Our findings indicate that,
in expectation, the increased holdings due to re-entry into the capital market almost
exactly offsets 1 year's downward trend in management shareholdings. Also, we find
an interesting interplay between types of blockholders in that CEOs tend to hold
less stock after the IPO if external blockholders initially hold more.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006
Raihan Khan, Ravi Dharwadkar, Pamela Brandes
Journal of Business Research.
2005.
Vol. 58.
No. 8.
P. 1078-1088.
Limited research has looked at how the aspects of institutional ownership affect
executive compensation. Using an agency theory approach, we investigate how institutional
ownership concentration and dispersion affect levels of CEO compensation, pay mix,
and stock option pay sensitivity. We find that the largest owner's concentration
is associated with lower levels of compensation, as well as with higher ratios of
salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation, but
that the number of blockholders does not predict any aspects of CEO compensation.
In addition, institutional ownership dispersion is associated with increased levels
of compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. Finally, higher levels
of CEO ownership lead to a significant reduction in the level of options compensation,
as well as higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options
to total compensation.
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