Всего статей в данном разделе : 35
Activity-based Costing as a Method for Assessing the Economics of Modularization - A Case Study and Beyond [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Jesper Thyssen, Poul Israelsen, Brian Jorgensen International Journal of Production Economics. 2006.
The paper accounts for an Activity-Based Costing (ABC) analysis supporting decision-making concerning product modularity. The ABC analysis carried out is communicated to decision-makers by telling how much higher the variable cost of the multi-purpose module can be compared to the average variable cost for the product-unique modules that it substitutes to break even in total cost. The analysis provides the platform for stating three general rules of cost efficiency of modularization, which in combination identify the highest profit potential of product modularization. Finally the analysis points to problems of using ABC in costing modularity, i.e. handling of R&D costs and identification of product profitability upon an enhanced modularization.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Mike Burkart, Fausto Panunzi Journal of Financial Intermediation. 2006. Vol. 15. No. 1. P. 1-31.
This paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring, and ownership concentration. Legal protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection facilitates monitoring better laws strengthen the monitoring incentives, and ownership concentration and legal protection are inversely related. By contrast, when legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives, and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone. This holds irrespective of whether or not the large shareholder can reap private benefits. Moreover, better legal protection may exacerbate rather than alleviate the conflict of interest between large and small shareholders.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Congsheng Wu Journal of Business & Economic Studies. 2005. Vol. 11. No. 1. P. 19-33.
This study examines the relation between the offer price adjustment, initial return, and subsequent short-run performance for a sample of initial public offerings (IPO's) made by US industrial companies from 1986 to 1996. The IPO's are divided into three categories (cold, cool, and hot issues) based on the offer price relative to the suggested price range revealed in the preliminary prospectus. It is found that the offer price adjustment not only predicts the first-day return, but also predicts subsequent short-run performance in the same direction up to three months after issuance. Moreover, different types of IPO's demonstrate distinct cross-sectional behavior in multivariate regressions of initial returns. Our results suggest that cold IPO's are quite unique and deserve more attention in future studies.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Robert Goldstein, Nengju Ju, Hayne E. Leland Journal of Business. 2001. Vol. 74. No. 4. P. 483-513.
A model of dynamic capital structure is proposed. Even though the optimal strategy is implemented over an arbitrarily large number of restructuring-periods, a scaling feature inherent in the framework permits simple closed-form expressions to be obtained for equity and debt prices. When a firm has the option to increase future debt levels, tax advantages to debt increase significantly, and both the optimal leverage ratio range and predicted credit spreads are more in line with what is observed in practice.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Lyndal Drennan, Michael Kelly Critical Perspectives on Accounting. 2002. Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 311-331.
Research dealing with the implementation of system changes such as activity-based costing (ABC) systems is founded largely on a presumption that the motivation for the innovation is economic. The definition of success or failure then rests on the project’s reaching a stage of implementation where the new data are used in routine and/or unforeseen ways to improve economic efficiency. This paper presents a view of an ABC project where complex motivations, both economic and institutional, are identified, these held in turn by different groups within the organization as well as external groups likely to be affected by the project. Seen in terms of its institutional motivations, the project, documented in an internal review as a failure because it was abandoned without using the data, can be defined as a success by at least some of the affected groups.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Kee H. Chung, Mingsheng Li, Linda Yu Financial Management. 2005. Vol. 34. No. 3. P. 65-88.
We consider a simple model positing that initial public offering price is equal to the present value of an entity's assets in place and growth opportunities. The model predicts that initial return is positively related to both the size and risk of growth opportunities. Consistent with this prediction, we find initial return to be positively related to both the fraction of the offer price that is accounted for by the present value of growth opportunities and various proxies of issue uncertainty. We also find that IPO investors equate one dollar of growth opportunities to approximately three quarters of tangible assets.
Blockholder Ownership: Effects on Firm Value in Market and Control Based Governance Systems [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen, Hans Kurt Kvist Journal of Corporate Finance. 2006. Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 246-269.
In this study, Granger tests are used to examine the relationship between blockholder ownership and the values of the largest companies in the European Union and the US. Previous studies on US data have found that blockholder ownership has no systematic effect on performance. We propose that these results may not apply to Continental Europe, where ownership concentration is typically higher, the level of investor protection is lower, and influential blockholders may have objectives other than shareholder value. In accordance with previous research, we find no significant association between blockholder ownership and prior or subsequent firm value in either the US or the UK. Nonetheless, in Continental Europe we find a negative association between blockholder ownership and firm value or accounting returns in the next period. Further analysis reveals that this association is significant only for companies with high initial levels of blockholder ownership (>10%). We interpret this finding as evidence of conflicts of interest between blockholders and minority investors. The percentage of blockholder ownership in Continental Europe may be too high from a minority shareholder value viewpoint.
BP Amoco: Integrating Competitive and Financial Strategy. Part II: Financial Strategy and Valuation Measurement [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Paul Stonham European Management Journal. 2000. Vol. 18. No. 5.
Part Two of this Case Study of BP Amoco examines the role of finance and financial strategy in BP Amoco between 1990 and 2000 to see where and how far they were supportive and complementary to competitive strategies pursued by the company's senior managers, and if they were ever pro-active. Models of value creation by Damodaran and Rappaport are considered as generic background and the relationship between financial strategies and performance and competitive strategies examined by using a sample of ratios suggested by McKenzie. Part Two concludes with valuation of BP Amoco, applying several metrics: total returns, asset value, earnings multiples and discounted cash flows (specifically, economic value added)
Control Systems in Multibusiness Companies: From Performance Management to Strategic Management [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Fredrik Nilsson, Nils-Goran Olve European Management Journal. 2001. Vol. 19. No. 4. P. 344-358.
This article discusses the role of control systems in multibusiness companies. The focus is on formulation and implementation of corporate and business unit strategies. Three widely used categories of control models are discussed: (1) models for performance management, (2) models for value-based management, and (3) models for strategic management. The discussion is based upon central normative texts and examples from applications in Nordic companies. The description and discussion of the control models and their features should facilitate decision-making on the design and use of control systems in multibusiness companies.
Demystifying the Illusion of the Positive Effects of Ownership Concentration on Corporate Performance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Yoser Gadhoum, Marie-Helene Noiseux, Daniel Zeghal Investment Management & Financial Innovations. 2005. Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 50-68.
Evidence supporting the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has been rather contradictory. In this research, we investigate the effects of ownership structure on business performance on a sample of 600 listed Canadian firms. We used a three-phase analysis of variance in which each phase used a different definition of ownership concentration: i) the overall concentration of the five largest shareholders (CONC); ii) the holdings of the largest shareholder (BLC1); and iii) inside shareholders as either managers or directors (BLCI). For each phase, we used cluster analysis and three other concentration cutoff levels (an even-split into thirds, extreme quartiles, and the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) cutoff) to verify if there is an optimal level of concentration cutoff that may impact the performance. Our results indicate a high level of ownership concentration in Canadian corporations. The Berle-Means widely held corporation is far from universal. Besides, while state control of traded firms is infrequent, family control is common. However, our findings indicate only a weak association between performance measures and ownership concentration levels, except for the return on investment, which shows some improvement with a high level of ownership. Our results confirm those of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Overall, no evidence is found to support the efficient monitoring hypothesis, since performance cannot be improved by blockholders who seem not only to be entrenched but may benefit from perquisites and on-the-job consumption. This might indicate that large shareholders expropriate minority absentee owners.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Francis Declerck Agribusiness. 1995. Vol. 11. No. 6. P. 523-536.
Focuses on the created value of leveraged buyouts (LBO) in the US Food Industries in the 1980s. Value of LBOs in the food industries in 1989; Analysis of objective of private firms in LBO; Analysis of debt and divestitures.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Jan Mouritsen Management Accounting Research. 1998. Vol. 9. No. 4. P. 461-482.
This paper compares and contrasts Economic Value Added (EVATM) and Intellectual Capital (IC) as two technologies of managing oriented towards encouraging growth. The analysis suggests that EVATMand IC contrasts greatly. EVATMis a financial management system based on radical delegation and ‘empowerment’ and which therefore directs attention to the results created by managers. Based on financial micro-theory, EVATMis a performance measure that attempts to account more properly for the cost of capital, but more than that, it is also a management control system which seeks to create radically independent business units and minimize corporate staff. IC is a different control system concerned to encourage endogenous growth implemented via loosely coupled sets of non-financial measurements that become strong via stories and metaphors about the post-modern firm in the post-modern world. Here, based on theories of organizational knowledge and competence development, emphasis is put on mobilizing white collar productivity and creativity based on some form of evolutionary economics or resource-based theory. While EVATMlooks to managers as the movers of change, IC seems more systematically to promote the creativity possessed by employees
EVA and Production Strategy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 27-12-2006Justin Pettit Industrial Management. 2000.
This article outlines ways to improve production strategy and uncover new opportunities for growth. It explains economic value added, an integrated perfomance measurement, management, and reward system.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Maretno Harjoto, John Garen Journal of Corporate Finance. 2005. Vol. 11. No. 4. P. 661-679.
This study examines the firm's equity ownership by insiders and blockholders starting right after the firm goes public, its decline thereafter, and what alters the decline. Previous literature has shown the incentive of insiders to let their ownership fall after their initial public offering (IPO). After the IPO, management attains only a fraction of the benefits of good governance, so has an incentive to let inside ownership erode. We verify this, but examine the effect that re-entry into capital market via a seasoned equity offering (SEO) has on insider ownership. The incentive of management to hold stock is restored by a desire to raise additional capital because it implicitly raises management's stake. We show empirically that it raises insider stockholding relative to what it otherwise would have been, thus providing an avenue by which this aspect of corporate governance is improved. This, and other results, is shown with a sample of IPO firms during 1996 and 1997. Our findings indicate that, in expectation, the increased holdings due to re-entry into the capital market almost exactly offsets 1 year's downward trend in management shareholdings. Also, we find an interesting interplay between types of blockholders in that CEOs tend to hold less stock after the IPO if external blockholders initially hold more.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Raihan Khan, Ravi Dharwadkar, Pamela Brandes Journal of Business Research. 2005. Vol. 58. No. 8. P. 1078-1088.
Limited research has looked at how the aspects of institutional ownership affect executive compensation. Using an agency theory approach, we investigate how institutional ownership concentration and dispersion affect levels of CEO compensation, pay mix, and stock option pay sensitivity. We find that the largest owner's concentration is associated with lower levels of compensation, as well as with higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation, but that the number of blockholders does not predict any aspects of CEO compensation. In addition, institutional ownership dispersion is associated with increased levels of compensation and greater use of incentive compensation. Finally, higher levels of CEO ownership lead to a significant reduction in the level of options compensation, as well as higher ratios of salary to total compensation and lower ratios of options to total compensation.