Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 13
A Theory of Partnerships [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-11-2004
Steven Tadelis, Jonathan David Levin
Stanford Law and Economics Working Paper Series.
2002.
No. 224.
We compare the costs an benefits of partnerships relative to the corporate form
of organization. We show that organizing as a partnership can be esirable in human-capital
intensive in ustries where pro uct quality is har to observe. The theory
explains the relative scarcity of partnerships outsi e of professional service in
ustries
such as law, accounting, me icine, investment banking, architecture, a vertising,
an
consulting. It also explains features of partnerships such as up-or-out promotion
systems, the use of non-compete clauses, motives for profit sharing as well as recent
tren s in professional service in ustries.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-11-2004
Peter J. Davis
This paper presents a theoretical framework that allows estimation of game theoretic models
of quantity competition, including a non-trivial class of differentiated product
quantity games.
The simplest and yet arguably most important examples of a quantity games are entry
games.
In entry games the choice firms make is discrete (enter/don’t enter) and as
a result I study
a su fficiently general class of models to allow for either continous or integer
quantity choices.
The main theoretical results of the paper establish easily verifiable conditions
under which an
index of market output is uniquely determined within the set of Nash equilibria.
The model’s
parameters may then be estimated by comparing the predicted index of market output
in a
cross section of markets. The paper provides both a generalization and an extension
of the
theoretical results developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992) which
allowed
estimation of the homogeneous products entry game. I illustrate one member of the
class
of models that these results allow us to estimate by developing a model of discrete
quantity
competition using count data from the supermarket industry.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004
Peter J. Davis
Using a large and comprehensive theater level database covering over
$18billion in theater revenues over a five year period, I document the extent and
nature of entry, exit, revenue cannibalization and market expansion that occurred
during the height of the 1990’s boom in movie theater construction. The boom
culminated when four of the six the largest cinema chains in the US went into
bankruptcy protection during 2000. Along the way, I examine industry and
media claims that the construction boom actually caused the bankruptcies. If true,
such claims would raise important questions about the relationship between
private and social returns to investment.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005
Joseph Farrell, Richard J. Gilbert, Michael L. Katz
Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL.
2002.
No. 0303006.
We examine the effects of market structure and the internal organization of firms
on equilibrium R&D projects. We compare a monopolist’s choice of R&D portfolio
to that of a welfare maximizer. We next show that Sah and Stiglitz’s finding
that the market portfolio of R&D is independent of the number of firms under Bertrand
competition extends to neither Cournot oligopoly nor a cartel. We also show that
the ability of firms to pre-empt R&D by rivals along particular research paths can
lead to socially excessive R&D diversification. Lastly, using Sah and Stiglitz’s
definition of hierarchy, we establish conditions under which larger hierarchies invest
in smaller portfolios.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-11-2004
Sidney G. Winter, Yuri M. Kaniovski, Giovanni Dosi
IIASA Working Papers.
1998.
ir98022.
The paper analyzes some generic features of industrial dynamics whereby innovative
change is carried, stochastically, by new entrants. Relying on the formal representation
suggested in Winter et al. (1997), it studies both the asymptotic properties of such
pro-
cesses and their nite time dynamics to account for a few empirical stylized facts,
including
persistent entry and exit, skewed size distributions and turbulence in market shares.
Pricing the Internet [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004
Hal R. Varian, Jerey K. MacKie-Mason
This paper was prepared for the conference ‘‘Public Access to the Internet,’’
JFK
School of Government, May 26--27 , 1993. We describe some of the technology and costs
relevant
to pricing access to and usage of the Internet, and discuss the components of an
efficient pricing
structure. We suggest a possible smart-market mechanism for pricing traffic on the
Internet.
Опубликовано на портале: 28-04-2005
Howard Smith
This paper estimates an oligopoly model of consumer choice and supermarket profitability using a survey of consumer choices and a dataset of store characteristics. The survey data includes expenditure as well as choice of supermarket. Unobserved characteristics associated with the operating firm are incorporated through firm dummies in the utility function. Predicted Nash price–cost markups are close to observed markups. We examine the social e¢ciency of store numbers and store characteristics by making minor changes to the characteristics and solving for new profits and consumer surplus. We find no evidence of excess entry for large stores. There is some excess entry of smaller stores depending on location and operating firm. Increases in store size usually increase welfare. Ownership conversions can increase welfare signi…cantly. Location inefficiencies, in contrast, are small.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-11-2004
Frank A. Wolak
Brookings Papers.
1996.
В статье обсуждается действие американского закона "О телекоммуникациях" 1996 г.,
который налагал определенные ограничения на свободу крупных операторов связи, и вызванные
этим изменения в структуре цен и прибыли крупных и мелких операторов.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005
Peter J. Davis
This article provides empirical evidence on the relationship between local market
structure and the prices charged to consumers in a particular retail market, the
US motion picture exhibition market. I find that there is a statistically significant
relationship between the geographic distribution of movie theaters in a market and
the admission prices that they are able to charge. However, the magnitude of the
price reducing effect of local competition appears to be economically modest. Moreover,
I find no evidence that increases in geographic concentration leads to increased
adult admission prices. The findings are directly relevant to merger policy in the
industry and pertinent because of the dramatic changes in industry structure resulting
from mergers that occurred during
2002. I conclude that popular and governmental concerns about horizontal mergers
in the industry leading to dramatically increased admission prices are likely misplaced.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-04-2005
Julie H. Mortimer
Harvard Institute Research Working Papers.
2000.
No. 1964 .
In this study I analyze the implications of contractual innovation in vertically-separated industries, using the example of the video rental industry. Prior to 1998, video stores obtained inventory from movie distributors using simple linear pricing contracts. In 1998, revenue-sharing contracts, which include inventory restrictions, were widely adopted. I investigate the effect of using revenue-sharing contracts on firms' products and consumer welfare, relative to linear pricing contracts. I analyze a new panel dataset of home video retailers that includes information on individual retailers' contract and inventory choices, weekly rentals and sales, and contract terms (prices and quantity restrictions) for 1,114 movie titles and 6,594 retailers in the U.S during each week of 1998 and 1999. A structural econometric model of rms' behavior is developed and estimated, and counterfactual experiments are performed. The results indicate that total upstream and downstream profits increase by three to six percent, and consumers benet substantially when revenue-sharing contracts are adopted. I also examine the effects of the observed quantity restrictions. I find that these restrictions serve to increase profits for upstream firms and decrease profits for downstream firms, relative to revenue-sharing contracts without inventory restrictions.
Опубликовано на портале: 28-04-2005
Frank A. Wolak, Robert H. Patrick
NBER Working Paper Series.
1997.
No. 8248.
This paper argues that the market rules governing the operation of the England and
Wales electricity market in combination with the structure of this market presents
the two major generators—National Power and PowerGen—with opportunities
to earn revenues substantially in excess of their costs of production for short periods
of time. Generators competing to serve this market have two strategic weapons at
their disposal: (1) the price bid for each generation set and (2) the capacity of
each generation set made available to supply the market each half-hour period during
the day. We argue that because of the rules governing the price determination process
in this market, by the strategic use of capacity availability declarations, when
conditions exogenous to the behavior of the two major generators favor it, these
two generators are able to obtain prices for their output substantially in excess
of their marginal costs of generation. The paper establishes these points in the
following manner. First, we provide a description of the market structure and rules
governing the operation of the England and Wales electricity market, emphasizing
those aspects that are important to the success of the strategy we believe the two
generators use to exercise market power. We then summarize the time series properties
of the price of electricity emerging from this market structure and price-setting
process. By analyzing four fiscal years of actual market prices, quantities and generator
bids into the market, we provide various pieces of evidence in favor of the strategic
use of the market rules by the two major participants. The paper closes with a discussion
of the lessons that the England and Wales experience can provide for the design of
competitive power markets in the US, particularly California, and other countries.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-05-2005
Richard J. Gilbert, Justine Hastings
Economics Working Paper Archive at WUSTL.
2002.
No. 0201001.
This paper explores the relationship between the structure of the market for the reÞning and distribution of gasoline and the wholesale price of unbranded gasoline sold to independent gasoline retailers. Theoretically, the eect of an increase in vertical integration is ambiguous because opposing forces act to increase and decrease wholesale prices. We empirically examine the eects of vertical and horizontal market structures on wholesale prices using both a broad panel and an event analysis. The panel covers twenty-six metropolitan areas from January 1993 through June 1997. The event is a merger of Tosco and Unocal in 1997 that changed the vertical and horizontal structure of thirteen West Coast metropolitan areas. Both data sets show that an increase in the degree of vertical integration is associated with higher wholesale prices.
История теории рыночных структур [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 30-12-2004
Максим Анатольевич Сторчевой
Краткий очерк о развитии теории рыночных структур, рассказывающий об эволюции представлений
о конкуренции и конкурентном поведении от А. Смита до современной теории организациии
отрасли. Упоминаются все основные экономисты, внесшие вклад в развитие этой области.
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