Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts
Международная экономика является комплексной дисциплиной, изучающей взаимодействие экономических агентов разных стран. Традиционно экономическая дисциплина «Международная экономика» делится на 2 части: международная торговля и международные финансы, однако в раздел науки «Международная экономика» включают также международный бизнес, международные экономические отношения, международная политическая экономия и др. смежные дисциплины. (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 5

Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007
Ralph Chami, Sunil Sharma, Ilhyock Shim Discussion Paper. 2007.  No. 2007-26.
The paper shows that an IMF-like coinsurance arrangement among countries can play a useful role in the global financial system. The operation of the coinsurance arrangement is examined under different loan contracts. It shows that, if the IMFґs objective is to safeguard its resources and be concerned about the welfare of the borrower, an ex ante loan contract is more likely to create the right incentives than an ex post loan contract. Such contracts highlight the need for precommitment to contend with the Samaritanґs dilemma and time inconsistency, and state-contingent repayment schemes to deal with King Learґs dilemma.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007
Patrick A. Imam IMF ,Working Paper. 2007. 
We analyze the effect of IMF programs on economic agents' expectations about the economy in transitional countries using survey data from the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer poll, an annual general public survey monitoring the evolution of public opinion from 1990 to 1997. Previous studies, in contrast, have looked at indirect measures, such as capital flows or yield spreads, to assess the impact of IMF programs on economic expectations. Using a multinomial probit model, we find that IMF loans appear to have a strong effect on agent expectations in the early years, through the inflow of real money, and through the signaling effect. IMF programs during periods of collapsing growth appear to reinforce underlying expectations for the future; they are associated with positive expectations for those with an optimistic outlook and negative expectations for those with a negative outlook. Once recovery is underway, and economic uncertainty diminishes, it appears that IMF programs cease to have a statistically significant effect on the expectations of economic agents. This suggests that IMF programs have the biggest impact on expectations during periods of great uncertainty and less of an impact when countries are subject to minor shocks.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2007
Selim Elekdag IMF ,Working Paper. 2006.  No. 06/239.
The main objective of this paper is to quantify the relationship between the global economic environment and the number of Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs). The results suggest that oil prices, world interest rates, and the global business cycle are the most influential indicators that affect the number of SBAs being requested. In addition, the empirical model seems to have reasonable accuracy when predicting SBAs. Furthermore, when oil prices, interest rates, and the global business cycle are adversely shocked by one standard deviation, the conditional probability of a SBA nearly doubles, implying an increase from about six to 12 SBAs. More critically, the model suggests that even a steady deterioration of the global economic climate would imply increasingly harsher conditions for developing and emerging market countries which may in turn significantly increase the demand for IMF resources.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 28-10-2007
Robert J. Barro, Jong-Wha Lee Australian National University, Economics RSPAS: Departmental Working Papers. 2003.  No. 2003-09.
IMF loans react to economic conditions but are also sensitive to political-economy variables. Loans tend to be larger and more frequent when a country has a bigger quota and more professional staff at the IMF and when a country is more connected politically and economically to the United States and other major shareholding countries of the IMF. These results are of considerable interest for their own sake. More importantly for present purposes, the results provide instrumental variables for estimating the effects of IMF loan programs on economic growth and other variables. This instrumental estimation allows us to sort out the economic effects of the loan programs from the responses of IMF lending to economic conditions. The estimates show that a higher IMF loanparticipation rate reduces economic growth. IMF lending also lowers investment but raises international openness. In addition, greater involvement in IMF programs tends to lower the rule of law and democracy. We conclude that the typical country would be better off economically if it committed itself not to be involved with IMF loan programs.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007
Lev Ratnovski, Aditya Narain IMF ,Working Paper. 2007.  No. 07/227.
While public financial institutions (such as public development banks) are commonly associated with developing countries, in fact they are prevalent in the developed world as well. We study a sample of public financial institutions in industrialized countries and identify dominant trends in their organization and oversight. While practices in developed countries may be a useful reference point, a more nuanced approach, accounting for the disparity of institutional environment, regulatory capacity, and government accountability and effectiveness, may be required in developing countries. Further investment in the accumulation of evidence and formulation of best practices in the organization and oversight of public financial institutions seems warranted and necessary. This paper was prepared while Mr. Ratnovski was working in the Financial Supervision and Regulation Division during January-April 2006. The authors are grateful to Jonathan Fiechter, David Marston, and participants of an MCM seminar in April 2006 for their helpful comments.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию