Всего статей в данном разделе : 63
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007Mary R. Hardy, Harry H. Panjer Astin Bulletin. 1998. Vol. 28. No. 2. P. 269-283.
Bühlmann-Straub credibility is used to find an estimate of the mortality loss ratio for a company, relative to a standard table, for use in the statutory valuation of life insurance business. A method for calculating the margin for adverse deviation to be added to the mortality rate (in accordance with the general principle of Canadian statutory valuation) is derived. Applying credibility further to the variance of the mortality loss ratio gives a methodology for calculating the amount of the surplus (i.e. capital) required to cover annual fluctuations in mortality experience. The necessary structural parameters are calculated from industry statistics; the methodology is illustrated using Canadian life insurance data.
Activity-based Costing as a Method for Assessing the Economics of Modularization - A Case Study and Beyond [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Jesper Thyssen, Poul Israelsen, Brian Jorgensen International Journal of Production Economics. 2006.
The paper accounts for an Activity-Based Costing (ABC) analysis supporting decision-making concerning product modularity. The ABC analysis carried out is communicated to decision-makers by telling how much higher the variable cost of the multi-purpose module can be compared to the average variable cost for the product-unique modules that it substitutes to break even in total cost. The analysis provides the platform for stating three general rules of cost efficiency of modularization, which in combination identify the highest profit potential of product modularization. Finally the analysis points to problems of using ABC in costing modularity, i.e. handling of R&D costs and identification of product profitability upon an enhanced modularization.
A Model of the U.K. Equity Premium [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Mirko Cardinale Watson Wyatt Technical Paper. 2002. No. 2002-TR-25 .
The paper analyses the behaviour of the equity premium in the UK. We find that lagged dividend ratios, bill returns and time series factors all play a statistically significant role in explaining the historical variation of the equity premium. Our analysis finds that the conditional variance of the equity premium also changes over time. A time series model which includes GARCH effects leads to a significant improvement in model fit.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007Wolfgang Lemke Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies. 2007. No. 13/2007.
A joint model of macroeconomic and term structure dynamics is specified and estimated for the euro area. The model comprises a backward-looking Phillips curve, a dynamic IS equation, a monetary policy rule as well as a specification of the dynamics of trend growth and the natural real interest rate. Under the condition of no arbitrage, yields of all maturities are affine functions of the macroeconomic driving forces. With the exception of a shock to potential output growth, the response of short-term yields to macroeconomic shocks is generally stronger than that of long-term yields. Impulse responses of all bond yields are fairly persistent, which reflects the persistence of their macroeconomic driving forces. Across the whole maturity spectrum, about ninety percent of the variation in yields is explained jointly by monetary policy shocks and shocks to the natural real rate of interest; the relative contribution of the latter shock increases with time to maturity. Cost-push shocks explain at most eight percent, while shocks to the output gap play an even less important role.
Analysis of the Russian Stock Market Performance at the Pre-Crisis Period October 1997 - August 1998 [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-10-2004Илья Захарьевич Гробман, Анатолий Абрамович Пересецкий
Целью работы является анализ российского финансового рынка (ГКО, фондовый рынок - РТС) в предкризисный период. Анализируется связь однодневных доходностей сегментов Российского финансового рынка и международного финансового рынка (Индекс Доу-Джонса). Показано, что рынок корпоративных ценных бумаг в значительной степени влиял на рынок ГКО. С другой стороны, международный финансовый рынок оказывал влияние на рынок корпоративных ценных бумаг. Из анализа модели однодневных доходностей рынка ГКО в зависимости от рынка рынок корпоративных ценных бумаг и индекса Доу-Джонса показано, что в середине июня 1998 г. произошла структурная перестройка рынка, что можно интерпретировать, как сигнал будущего кризиса 18 августа 1998 г.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007Carolyn Sissoko Economics Discussion Papers. 2007. No. 2007-16.
Using the monetary model developed in Sissoko (2007), where the general equilibrium assumption that every agent buys and sells simultaneously is relaxed, we observe that in this environment fiat money can implement a Pareto optimum only if taxes are type-specific. We then consider intermediated money by assuming that financial intermediaries whose liabilities circulate as money have an important identifying characteristic: they are widely viewed as default-free. The paper demonstrates that default-free intermediaries who issue credit lines to consumers can resolve the monetary problem and make it possible for the economy to reach a Pareto optimum. We argue that our idealized concept of financial intermediation is a starting point for studying the monetary use of credit.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Qing Li, Maria Vassalou, Yuhang Xing AFA 2002 Atlanta Meetings. 2001.
In this paper we present a simple model where asset returns are functions of multiple investment growth rates. The model is tested for its ability to price the 25 Fama-French portfolios using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) methodology, as well as Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions. Comparisons on the basis of several metrics with other models, such as the CAPM, the Fama-French (1993) model and Cochrane's (1996) model, reveal that it consistently outperforms the CAPM and Cochrane's model. It also outperforms the Fama-French model in several tests. Our model can explain a significantly larger proportion of the cross-sectional variation in the 25 Fama-French portfolios than the Fama-French model does. Specification tests in the context of GMM and the Fama-MacBeth regressions show that in the presence of the investment growth factors included in our model, the size and book-to-market characteristics lose their ability to explain asset returns. Our model is successful in pricing size- and book-to-market- sorted portfolios, although it includes exclusively macroeconomic variables as factors.
Another Attempt to Explain an Illiquid Banking System: The Diamond and Dybvig Model With Sequential Service Taken Seriously [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-03-2005Neil Wallace Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review. 1988. Vol. 12. No. 4.
To help readers understand Diamond and Dybvig's explanation of an illiquid banking system and my explanation of the sequential service constraint, I descrbe my model twice. First I describe the model in a more-or-less way and summarize its results. Although some of the results that distinguish my model from Diamond and Dybving's cannot be fully described in this context, the main ingredients of our models can. A more complete and necessarily more technical description of my model and results follows. This requires previous exposure to economic theory at the level of a rigorous intermediate microeconomics theory course and to calculus.
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006Nikolay Halov, Florian Heider Working Paper Series (SSRN). 2005.
This paper argues that firms may not issue debt in order to avoid the adverse selection cost of debt. Theory suggests that since debt is a concave claim, it may be mispriced when outside investors are uninformed about firms’ risk. The empirical literature has however paid little attention the caveat that the “lemons” problem of external financing first identified by Myers (1984) only leads to debt issuance, i.e. a pecking order, if debt is risk free or, if it is risky, that it is not mispriced. This paper therefore examines whether and for what firms the adverse selection cost of debt is more than a theoretical possibility? And how does this cost relate to other costs of debt such as bankruptcy? Absent any direct measure of something that is unknown to investors and thus cannot be in the econometrician’s information set, we present an extensive collage of strong and robust evidence in a large unbalanced panel of publicly traded US firms from 1971 to 2001 that firms avoid issuing debt when the outside market is likely to know little about their risk.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Vidhi Chhaochharia, Yaniv Grinstein Johnson School Research Paper Series. 2005. No. 23-06 .
The 2001-2002 corporate scandals led to rules that affect the governance structure of public U.S. firms. We study the announcement effect of the rules on firm value. On average, the rules have a positive effect on firm value. Firms that need to make more changes to comply with the rules outperform firms that need to make fewer changes. We also find some evidence that the result is concentrated in large firms. Small firms that need to make more changes underperform small firms that need to make fewer changes, suggesting that the costs of the rules outweigh their benefits in small firms.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Ricardo P. C. Leal, Andre L. Carvalhal-da-Silva SSRN Working Papers. 2005.
We construct a corporate governance practices index (CGI) from a set of 24 questions that can be objectively answered from publicly available information. Our goal was to measure the overall quality of corporate governance practices of the largest possible number of firms without the biases and low response ratios typical of qualitative surveys. CGI levels have improved over time in Brazil. CGI components demonstrate that Brazilian firms perform much better in disclosure than in other aspects of corporate governance. We find very high concentration levels of voting rights leveraged by the widespread use of indirect control structures and non-voting shares. Control has concentrated between 1998 and 2002. We do not find evidence for either entrenchment or incentives in Brazil using ownership percentages but find that the separation of control from cash flow rights destroys value. The CGI maintains a positive, significant, and robust relationship with corporate value. A worst-to-best improvement in the CGI in 2002 would lead to a .38 increase in Tobin's q. This represents a 95% rise in the stock value of a company with the average leverage and Tobin's q ratios. Considering our lowest CGI coefficient, a one point increase in the CGI score would lead to a 6.8% rise in the stock price of the average firm in 2002. We found no significant relationship between governance and the dividend payout but there are indications that dividend payments are greater when control and cash flow rights concentration are greater. We place our results in context by offering a comparative analysis with Chile. We would offer a sound "yes" if asked whether good corporate governance practices increase corporate value in Brazil.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Franck Bancel, Usha R. Mittoo, Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya Working Paper Series (SSRN). 2005.
We survey managers from 16 European countries to examine cross-country determinants of payout policy. We find that European managers' views on dividend policy are driven largely by factors similar to that of their U.S. peers. They strongly agree with Lintner's findings that dividends are smoothed out and are difficult to cut, although they follow different dividend targets than a fixed payout ratio. A majority of European managers, however, consider repurchases as a tool of flexibility rather than a substitute for dividends. Our cross-country analysis does not support La Porta, Lopez, Shielfer and Vishny's (2000) contention that dividend policy is influenced primarily by the quality of legal system. Instead, we find that dividend policy is determined by a complex interaction of the firm's ownership structure of the firm and the legal and institutional structure of its home country. Repurchase policy, on the other hand, is influenced primarily by tax and institutional ownership variables.
Day of the Week Effect and Market Efficiency - Evidence from Indian Equity Market Using High Frequency Data of National Stock Exchange [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-10-2007Manoj Dalvi, Golaka C. Nath
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2006Eugene F. Fama, Kenneth R. French AFA 2001 New Orleans; CRSP Working Paper No. 509. 2000.
The percent of firms paying cash dividends falls from 66.5 in 1978 to 20.8 in 1999. The decline is due in part to the changing characteristics of publicly traded firms. Fed by new lists, the population of publicly traded firms tilts increasingly toward small firms with low profitability and strong growth opportunities characteristics typical of firms that have never paid dividends. More interesting, we also show that controlling for characteristics, firms become less likely to pay dividends. This lower propensity to pay is at least as important as changing characteristics in the declining incidence of dividend payers.
Dividends and Politics (Revised) [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-06-2006Steven A. Bank, Brian R. Cheffins, Marc Goergen ECGI - Law Working Paper. 2006. No. 24/2004 .
Influential contributors to debates concerning corporate governance assert that it is impossible to understand key trends without taking politics into account. This proposition has, however, remained largely untested. This paper therefore offers an empirical study of the relation between politics and corporate governance, with the focus being on the determinants of dividend policy in publicly quoted United Kingdom (U.K.) companies between 1950 and the present. The departure point is the well-known partial adjustment model of dividend policy, which we augment to take into account the ideological orientation of the party in power and other potentially salient proxies for politics (e.g. tax policy and dividend controls). The model is tested by reference to aggregate annual data on earnings and dividends. The results indicate that the political placement of the party in office lacks explanatory power. Moreover, even when politics manifests itself in regulation explicitly designed to regulate corporate behaviour, political variables generally do not correlate in the predicted direction with dividend pay-outs. The evidence therefore is inconsistent with the proposition that politics shape corporate governance.