Всего статей в данном разделе : 3
The Economic Costs of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years After the Beginning of the Conflict [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 28-10-2007Joseph E. Stiglitz, Linda Bilmes NBER Working Papers. 2006. No. 12054.
This paper attempts to provide a more complete reckoning of the costs of the Iraq War, using standard economic and accounting/ budgetary frameworks. As of December 30, 2005, total spending for combat and support operations in Iraq is $251bn, and the CBO's estimates put the projected total direct costs at around $500bn. These figures, however, greatly underestimate the War's true costs. The authors estimate a range of present and future costs, by including expenditures not in the $500bn CBO projection, such as lifetime healthcare and disability payments to returning veterans, replenishment of military hardware, and increased recruitment costs. They then make adjustments to reflect the social costs of the resources deployed, (e.g. reserve pay is less than the opportunity wage and disability pay is less than forgone earnings). Finally, they estimate the effects of the war on the overall performance of the economy. Even taking a conservative approach and assuming all US troops return by 2010, the authors believe the true costs exceed a trillion dollars. Using the CBO's projection of maintaining troops in Iraq through 2015, the true costs may exceed $2 trillion. In either case, the cost is much larger than the administration's original estimate of $50-$60bn. The costs estimated do not include those borne by other countries, either directly (military expenditures) or indirectly (the increased price of oil). Most importantly, they have not included the costs to Iraq, either in terms of destruction of infrastructure or the loss of lives. These would all clearly raise the costs significantly.
The Relationship between Ownership Structure and Corporate Dividend Policy - Evidence from the Athens Stock Exchange [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006George Karathanassis, Evangelia Chrysanthopoulou Working Paper Series (SSRN). 2005.
Over the past decades extensive research has been carried out regarding the relative importance of the factors determining corporate dividend policy. The large amount of net earnings distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends trouble researchers since in free and competitive markets dividends should, affect fundamentally market values. Moreover, if one takes into account the fact that in many countries dividends are taxed more heavily than retained earnings decisions to adopt liberal dividend policies appears to be a puzzle. The dividend puzzle has been attributed to the existence of capital market imperfections such as the presence of information asymmetries between managers and shareholders. There is ample evidence that corporate dividend policy is used by management for informational reasons and is functioning effectively as a signal for the firm's future prospects. The paper examines the explanatory power of three alternative models of dividend policy, the full adjustment and partial adjustment models and the earnings trend model modified in order to incorporate factors representing ownership by institutional investors and managers. The sample considered of 55 Greek firms the shares of which were quoted on the Athens Stock Exchange which were observed for a number of years. A number of assumptions were made regarding the properties of time-series and cross-section unobservable effects and using appropriate estimating techniques. The empirical finding appear to be in accordance with the efficient monitoring hypothesis but reject the hypothesis of strategic alignments.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-03-2008Андрей Владимирович Верников №7-8, 9.. 2007. С. 40.
В работе рассматриваются особенности российской модели корпоративного управления (corporate governance) и контроля в банковском секторе. Используется парадигма неоинституциональной экономической теории. Исследование опирается на обзор теоретических работ и на прикладной анализ состояния corporate governance в российских коммерческих банках, представляющих различные формы собственности. Особое внимание уделено анализу реальных интересов всех участников corporate governance – банковских и фондовых регуляторов, собственников банков, инвесторов, высших менеджеров и иных инсайдеров. Делается вывод о невысокой релевантности англо-американской концепции corporate governance, основанной на теории агентских издержек и предполагающей контроль внешних акционеров над банками через механизм фондового рынка. Предлагаются способы преодоления разрыва между формальными институтами и реальной жизнью.