Всего статей в данном разделе : 5
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004David Myatt, Chris C. Wallace Games and Economic Behavior. 2004. Vol. 48. No. 1. P. 124-138.
Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large literature. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) studied dynamic models of aggregate behaviour in which agents choose best responses to observations of population play. Crucially, infrequent mistakes (`mutations`) allow agents to take actions contrary to current trends and prevent initial configurations from determining long run play. An alternative approach is offered here: Harsanyian trembles are added to agents` payoffs so that with some probability it is optimal to act against the flow of play. The long run distribution of population behaviour is characterised - modes correspond to stable Bayesian Nash equilibria. Allowing the variance of payoff trembles to vanish, via a purification process, a single equilibrium is played almost always in the long run. Kandori et al and Young show that the number of contrarian actions required to escape an equilibrium determines selection; here, the likelihood that such actions are taken is of equal importance.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-11-2004Steven Tadelis, Patrick L. Bajari Stanford Law and Economics Working Paper Series. 2003. No. 02007.
Should the buyer of a customized good use competitive bidding or negotiation to select a contractor? To shed light on this question, we offer a framework that compares auctions with negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of private sector building contracts awarded in Northern California during the years 1995-2000. The analysis suggests a number of possible limitations to the use of auctions.Auctions may perform poorly when projects are complex,contractual design is incomplete and there are few available bidders.Furthermore,auctions may still be communication between buyers and sellers,preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor’s expertise when designing the project. Some implications of these results for procurement in the public sector are discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2007Avner Greif Stanford University - Department of Economics: Working Paper. 1997. No. 97-017.
This paper surveys the small, yet growing, literature that employs game theory for economic history analysis. It elaborates on the promise and challenge of integrating game theoretical and economic history analyses and presents the approaches taken in conducting such an integration. Most of the essay, however, is devoted to presenting studies in economic history that utilize game theory as their main analytical framework. Studies are presented based on their substance to highlight the range of potential topics in economic history that can be and had been enriched through a game theoretical analysis.
Опубликовано на портале: 23-11-2004Peter J. Davis
This paper presents a theoretical framework that allows estimation of game theoretic models of quantity competition, including a non-trivial class of differentiated product quantity games. The simplest and yet arguably most important examples of a quantity games are entry games. In entry games the choice firms make is discrete (enter/don’t enter) and as a result I study a su ﬃciently general class of models to allow for either continous or integer quantity choices. The main theoretical results of the paper establish easily verifiable conditions under which an index of market output is uniquely determined within the set of Nash equilibria. The model’s parameters may then be estimated by comparing the predicted index of market output in a cross section of markets. The paper provides both a generalization and an extension of the theoretical results developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) and Berry (1992) which allowed estimation of the homogeneous products entry game. I illustrate one member of the class of models that these results allow us to estimate by developing a model of discrete quantity competition using count data from the supermarket industry.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004Hal R. Varian, James Andreoni Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems Working papers. 1999. No. 18.
We consider a modified Prisoners’ Dilemma game in which each agent can offer to pay the other agent to cooperate. The subgame perfect equilibrium of this two-stage game is Pareto efficient. We examine experimentally whether subjects actually manage to achieve this efficient outcome. We find an encouraging level of support for the mechanism, but also find some evidence that subjects’ tastes for cooperation and equity may have significant interactions with the incentives provided by the mechanism.