Всего статей в данном разделе : 30
An Emerging Market for Corporate Control? The Mannesmann Takeover and German Corporate Governance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Martin Höpner, Gregory Jackson MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2001. No. 01/4 .
Corporate governance in Germany is often described as a bank-oriented, block-holder or stakeholder model where markets for corporate control have not played a significant role. This case study of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone in 2000 demonstrates how systemic changes during the 1990s have eroded past institutional barriers to takeovers. These changes include the strategic reorientation of German banks from the "house bank" to investment banking, the growing consensus and productivity orientation of employee co-determination and corporate law reform. A significant segment of German corporations are now subjected to a market for corporate control. The implications for the German model are examined in light of both claims by agency theory for the efficiency of takeover markets, as well as the institutional complementarities within Germany's specific "variety" of capitalism. While the efficiency effects are questionable, the growing pressures for German corporations to achieve the higher stock market valuations of their Anglo-American competitors threaten the distributional compromises underlying the German model.
An Epochal Change... but Uncertain Futures: The Japanese Capitalism in Crisis. A "Regulationist" Interpretation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer, Toshio Yamada CEPREMAP Working Papers. 2000. No. 2000-05.
This research summarizes the main findings of "Regulation" theory about the evolution of the Japanese economy since WWII and proposes an institutional interpretation of the crisis of the 90s. The company-ist compromise is the core of the whole institutional architecture via an original wage labour nexus, largely different from the American Fordist one. There is a clear hierarchy between the large corportation and sub-contractors. One observers a complementarity between the mode of governance of the firm and the main bank and finallybetween the industrial wselfare and the management of employment. A highly original "regulation" mode has allowed the implementation of a mass production and consumption economy, but this regime enters into crisis by its very success and this crisis is exacerbated by the impact of the financial bubble of the 90s. The paper surveys the transformation of the main institutional firms since the 90s and builds three scenarios based respectively upon: a large inertia of Japanese economic and political institutions; a quick adoption of typical market-led institutions under the pressure of financial market; or a new hybridization process that would concern banking and finance and not only the manufacturing industries, as was the case after WWII.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2008Gregory Jackson RIETI Discussion Paper. 2004. No. 04-E-022 .
This article examines the role of ambiguity in processes of institutional change. One challenge for understanding institutional change is to overcome the rather "oversocialized" view of action within Institutional theory. Drawing upon recent work in sociology, the paper introduces a non-teleological model of action that stresses the ambiguity of institutionalized beliefs. Ambiguity is then applied to Masahiko Aoki's concept of institutions as "summary representation" of a strategic game. Rather than institutional break down, ambiguity is associated with incremental modes of institutional change through creative reinterpretation and redeployment of old institutions for new purposes. Empirically, the paper applies these considerations to understanding the historical evolution of employee codetermination in Germany. The continuity in formal legal rules of codetermination contrasts with remarkable diversity as an organizational practice-over time, across industrial sectors and between individual firms. Codetermination illustrates how ambiguity originated in political compromise, but also how ambiguous agreement allows scope for institutional innovation. Ambiguity is, thus, central for understanding how codetermination was partially reproduced and partially changed over time.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2007. No. 7/12.
This paper suggests a two-dimensional concept of nonliberal capitalism: coordinated capitalism (as described in the varieties of capitalism framework) and organized capitalism. While the coordination function of institutions canalizes individual maximization strategies of firms in order to adjust for collective action problems, the organization function transcends maximization strategies and adjusts them to collective interests beyond maximization. Political economies are highly organized when firms are not only the private business of owners and insiders but, in addition, quasi-public infrastructures and, therefore, highly constrained in their economic decisions by institutionally sanctioned collective interests (such as sectoral interests, class interests, or political interests). I construct an index on organized capitalism by combining data on ownership structures, board level codetermination, the density of employers’ associations and trade union density in order to allow for comparison between varying extents of coordination and organization in 20 OECD countries. The German example is used to demonstrate the analytical usefulness of the coordination–organization distinction in qualitative terms. The distinction allows for differentiation between two forms of liberalization: declining coordination and disorganization.
Corporate Governance and Employees in Germany: Changing Linkages, Complementarities, and Tensions [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, Gregory Jackson, Antje Kurdelbusch RIETI Discussion Paper. 2004. No. 04-E-008.
This article examines institutional linkages between corporate governance and labour management in Germany. German corporate governance was characterised by the importance of banks, ownership concentration, long-term investment, and stable corporate networks. This system displayed important complementarities with stable long-term employment, investment in worker training, flexible quality production, low variability and dispersion in pay, and cooperative industrial relations during the post-war period. Since the mid-1990s, corporate governance has changed dramatically – a decline in the role of banks, the unwinding of corporate networks, the rise of foreign and institutional investors, en emerging market for corporate control, and changing careers and compensation of top managers. The paper investigates the resulting introduction of shareholder-value management practices and their impact on employees in large German companies. The findings show that these changes are related to the shrinking of stable core employment and the growth of variable pay. However, such tensions with shareholder value management have not undermined employee codetermination and collective bargaining institutions. Both play an important mediating role between capital market pressures and employment outcomes. The implications for the German “model” of corporate governance are discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2008Igor Filatotchev, David E. Guest, Jenifer Piesse, Gregory Jackson, Howard Gospel DTI Economics Working Paper. 2005. No. 13.
This collection of short papers examines the role of corporate governance with regard to human resource management and corporate strategy over the course of the firm life cycle, as well as in diverse institutional environments such as the UK, Germany and Japan.
Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations in Germany. [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2001. No. 01/5.
Within the context of debates over national “varieties” of capitalism, this paper discusses the shareholder value orientation of the 40 largest listed German companies. Three dimensions of shareholder value are distinguished: the communicative dimension, the operative dimension and the dimension of managerial compensation. A shareholder value index compiling data on accounting, investor relations, variable top-management compensation and the implementation of profitability goals makes it possible to compare the shareholder orientations of the companies. The shareholder value phenomenon is explained first by the exposure to markets – the international product market, capital market pressures and the market for corporate control – and, secondly, by internal developments – changing management careers, increasing management compensation and reduced monitoring by banks and corporate networks – which cause external impulses to increase shareholder value to fall on fertile ground. Conflicts over shareholder orientation result in changing coalitions between shareholders, management, and employees. Shareholder value does not make companies opt out of central collective agreements or endanger the existence of employees’ codetermination, but it does lead to more market-driven industrial relations.
Corporate Governance versus Economic Governance: Banks and Industrial Restructuring in the U.S. and Germany [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 1995. No. 95-310 .
This paper critically examines the debate on corporate governance and the claim (often made in Anglo-American companies) that the close links between German banks and industry are primarily responsible for the longer-term investment strategies and greater quality competitiveness of German manufacturing. Instead, it is argued here that manufacturing investment and bank behavior must be examined within a broader system of economic governance. In particular, the regulation of labor markets is a key factor influencing company choices between price and quality-competitive strategies. The corporatist regulation of German labor markets has encouraged quality-competitive strategies by keeping labor costs out of competition to a greater extent than in the US, where a collapse in pattern bargaining in core manufacturing industries and the strategic use of bankruptcy was motivated by companies' attempts to gain a comparative price advantage on the basis of lower labor costs. This argument is supported through a case study of the restructuring of the steel industry in Germany and the US in the 1980s.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer PSE Working Papers. 2006. No. 2006-21.
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that the dynamism of employment is always contradictory to the enforcement of some forms of security for workers. Contemporary theorizing now recognizes the specificity of the wage-labour nexus. Consequently, minimum security is required for good economic performance by firms and national economies. A comparative analysis of OECD countries shows that the extended security promoted by welfare systems has not been detrimental to innovation, growth and job creation. Developing countries cannot immediately catch up with the emerging standards of flexicurity but the methodology of employment diagnosis might help them in designing security/flexibility configurations tailored according to their domestic economic specialization, social values and political choices.
Financial Systems and Industrial Policy in Germany and Great Britain: The Limits of Convergence [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 1995. No. 95 – 311.
A widely held view is that, since the 1970s, the nation-state has suffered a significant reduction in its capacity to achieve national economic policy goals through the regulation of the financial system; as a result, national political economies are now characterized by a market-driven convergence towards financial systems dominated by privately-owned, internationally-active “financial supermarkets” with weak links to both industry and government. Through a comparison of Germany and Great Britain, this paper critically examines this thesis and poses the following two questions: (1) What implications do the lifting of capital and exchange controls and the reorientation of monetary policy to anti-inflationary policies have for the state’s capacity to regulate financial systems? and (2) What implications does this regulatory discretion (if any) have for industrial finance and the state's capacity to utilize the financial system to achieve microeconomic industrial policy goals? In response to these questions, it is demonstrated how the state has retained significant regulatory autonomy in ways which have significant consequences for industrial finance and industrial policy.
German Banks and the Modernization of the Small Firm Sector: Long-Term Finance in Comparative Perspective [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2008Sigurt Vitols WZB Discussion Paper. 1995. No. 95 – 309.
This paper analyzes the contribution of the German banking system to the modernization of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in industry. The simultaneous greater relative importance of and relatively high wages in German SMEs appear to be paradoxical in terms of dual labor market theory, which claims that lower wages and greater flexibility in the use of labor are important for helping small firms compensate for their constrained access to capital, R&D and skills resources relative to large firms. This paper suggests that the successful modernization of the German small firm sector despite pressure from below from industry-level wage bargaining and strong job protection can be attributed to support from above in terms of an institutional infrastructure helping small firms overcome the organizational deficiencies they face relative to large firms. The decentralized provision of long-term finance and sophisticated financial services for the modernization of SMEs is enabled by a three-tiered federalist form of corporatist organization in the cooperative and savings banks sectors, in which smaller banks at the bottom tier of the organization receive access to refinancing on capital markets and specialized services -- normally only available to large banks -- through the upper tiers of the banking organization.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer PSE Working Papers. 2007. No. 2007-43.
This article starts from the limits of the policies that assume a significant de-connection between antipoverty strategies and the logic of the growth regime and that mainly rely upon market mechanisms. By contrast, a branch of the new institutional economics argues that a complete set of coordinating mechanisms is constitutive of really existing economies and that they are more complementary than substitute. The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis (ICH) may be useful for analyzing simultaneously the antipoverty policies and the viability of growth regimes. The different brands of capitalism are the outcome of complementary institutions concerning competition, labor market institutions, welfare and innovation systems. Generally, such configurations cannot be emulated by poor developing countries, but reviewing the preliminary findings of the UNRISD country case studies suggests some common features to all successful experiments. Basically, antipoverty policies are efficient when they create the equivalent of virtuous circles within which growth entitles antipoverty programs and conversely these programs sustain the speed and stability of growth. Two methods are proposed in order to detect possible complementarities and design accordingly economic policies: the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) on one side, national growth diagnosis on the other side. A special attention is devoted to the timing of policies and the role of policy regimes. A brief conclusion wraps up the major findings and proposes a research agenda.
How and Why Capitalisms Differ [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 18-03-2008Robert Boyer Economy and Society. 2005. Vol. 34. No. 4. P. 509-557.
The variety of capitalism school (VOC) and regulation theory (TR) are both analyses of the diversity of contemporary national economies. If VOC challenges the primacy of liberal market economies (LME) and stresses the existence of an alternative form, i.e. coordinated market economies (CME), TR starts from a long-term analysis of the transformation of capitalism in order to search for alternatives to the Fordist regime that emerged after the post-Second World War era. Both approaches make intensive use of international comparisons, challenge the role of market as the exclusive coordinating mechanism, and raise doubts about the existence of a ‘one best way’ for capitalism. Finally, they stress that globalization does deepen the competitive advantage associated with each institutional architecture. Nevertheless, their methodology differs: VOC stresses private firm governance, whereas TR considers the primacy of systemic and macroeconomic coherence. Whereas for VOC there exist only LME and CME, TR recurrently finds at least four brands of capitalism: market-led, meso-corporatist, social democrat and State-led. VOC seems to consider that the long-term stability of each capitalism can be challenged only by external shocks, but TR stresses the fact that the very success of a regulation mode ends up in a structural crisis, largely endogenous.
How Many Varieties of Capitalism? Comparing the Comparative Institutional Analyses of Capitalist Diversity [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg MPIfG, Discussion Paper. 2006. No. 06/2 .
This essay reviews the development of approaches within the comparative capitalisms(CC) literature and points to three theoretical innovations which, taken together, define and distinguish these approaches as a group. First, national economies are characterized by distinct institutional configurations that generate a particular systemic logic of economic action. Second, the CC literature suggests a theory of comparative institutional advantage in which different institutional arrangements have distinct strengths and weaknesses for different kinds of economic activity. Third, the literature has been interpreted to imply a theory of institutional path dependence. Behind these unifying characteristics of the literature, however, lie a variety of analytical frameworks and typologies of capitalism. This paper reviews and compares these different frameworks by highlighting the fundamental distinctions among them and drawing out their respective contributions and limitations in explaining economic performance and institutional dynamics. The paper concludes that the way forward for this literature lies in developing a more dynamic view of individual institutions, the linkages between domains, and the role of politics and power.
How to Control and Reward Managers? The Paradox of the 90s. From Optimal Contract Theory to a Political Economy Approach [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer Research & Regulation Working Papers. 2005. No. 2005-1.
Why did CEOs remuneration exploded during the 90s and persisted to high levels, even after the bursting out of the Internet bubble? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy, network analysis. Basically, it is argued that the diffusion of stock-options and financial market related incentives, that were supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at the micro and macro levels. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have thus exploited the long run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining power. At the company level, the power of top-managers derives from their control over financial information, and from a better knowledge than outsiders of the sources of company profitability. This power of top-managers is directly linked to the ability for a company to generate profits, via the complementarity of specific assets, at odds with the conventional neoclassical theory that assumes a cybernetic approach concerning the substitution of factors of production in response to the price signal of markets. Insider trading, the low sensitivity of CEOs compensation with respect to performance in large companies, the contradictory impact of mergers and acquisitions upon managers on one side shareholder on the other side, and the rarity of indexed stock-options are relevant empirical evidences of this intrinsic, micro founded, power of managers. Why financial scandals about excessive CEOs compensation took place at the end of the 90s and not before? A political economy approach complements the previous one and conveys the hypothesis that CEOs and CFOs have converted a part of their economic power into a political power, expressed at the society wide level. Generous stock-options grants derive from the impact of financial liberalisation, contemporary societies seem to accept more easily the widening of inequalities, whereas many governments tend to be pro-business: they lower the taxation of capital but they increase households taxation and weaken the redistributive role of tax and welfare systems. The article finally discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEOs and top-managers opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception).