University of Connecticut, Department of Economics Working Paper
Опубликовано на портале: 15-10-2007
Metin Cosgel
University of Connecticut, Department of Economics Working Paper.
2004.
В данной статье представлены стандартизированные расчеты производительность труда
в области земледелия Османской империи, включая Иерусалим и прилегающие области восточного
средиземноморья. Превоисточником для расчетов является записи о налогах. Результаты
исследования говорят о том, что уровень производительности труда в сельском хозяйстве
Османской империи 15 и 16 веков, может быть сравним с производитльностью труда многих
европейских стран конца 19 века.


Food Protection for Sale [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007
Rigoberto A. Lopez, Xenia Matschke
University of Connecticut, Department of Economics Working Paper.
2005.
No. 2005-13R.
This article tests the Protection for Sale (PFS) model using detailed data
from
U.S. food processing industries from 1978 to 1992 under alternative import demand
specifications. All empirical results support the PFS model predictions and
previous empirical work qualitatively. Although welfare weights are very sensitive
to import demand specification, a surprising result is that we obtain weights
between 2.6 and 3.6 for domestic welfare using import slopes or elasticities derived
from domestic demand and supply functions. In contrast, results based on
import slopes or elasticities from directly specified import demands (including the
Armington model) yield the usual, unrealistically large estimates for the domestic
welfare weight. We contend that the latter empirical paradox arises mainly because
the explanatory variables tend to be extremely large for industries with low
import ratios and/or low estimated elasticities or slopes resulting from relatively
volatile import prices. The results with derived import parameters point to a much
stronger role of campaign contributions within the PFS model than previously
found. They also suggest that the commonly-used Armington estimates may not
be appropriate for estimating the PFS model.


Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003
Thomas J. Miceli, Lanse P. Minkler
University of Connecticut, Department of Economics Working Paper.
1997.
No. 1997-06.
Miceli and Minkler examine the link between social institutions and individuals'
propensity to cooperate in a simple game theoretic framework. They transform the
usual prisoner's dilemma game over material payoffs into one with utility payoffs
by including non-material preferences. By introducing a continuum of types, three
distinct behaviors (not otherwise imposed) emerge: 1) pure defection, (2) pure cooperation,
and (3) behavior contingent on expected partner behavior. All three behaviors emerge
in equilibrium and in a static analysis. As such it represents a synthesis of previous,
disparate efforts. Exogenous social policy can affect cooperation rates by changing
the size of the three groups exhibiting these behaviors if preferences are endogenous.
Repeated play results in "switching" behavior, where formerly cooperative players
now defect (i.e., become cynical), and former defectors cooperate (reform). This
behavior suggests further roles for institutions. Finally, continuing the effort
to analyze community, they add the possibility of interaction with a new "low cost"
player who, it is known, does not make social investments.


