University of Connecticut, Department of Economics Working Paper
Опубликовано на портале: 15-10-2007Metin Cosgel University of Connecticut, Department of Economics Working Paper. 2004.
В данной статье представлены стандартизированные расчеты производительность труда в области земледелия Османской империи, включая Иерусалим и прилегающие области восточного средиземноморья. Превоисточником для расчетов является записи о налогах. Результаты исследования говорят о том, что уровень производительности труда в сельском хозяйстве Османской империи 15 и 16 веков, может быть сравним с производитльностью труда многих европейских стран конца 19 века.
Food Protection for Sale [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007Rigoberto A. Lopez, Xenia Matschke University of Connecticut, Department of Economics Working Paper. 2005. No. 2005-13R.
This article tests the Protection for Sale (PFS) model using detailed data from U.S. food processing industries from 1978 to 1992 under alternative import demand specifications. All empirical results support the PFS model predictions and previous empirical work qualitatively. Although welfare weights are very sensitive to import demand specification, a surprising result is that we obtain weights between 2.6 and 3.6 for domestic welfare using import slopes or elasticities derived from domestic demand and supply functions. In contrast, results based on import slopes or elasticities from directly specified import demands (including the Armington model) yield the usual, unrealistically large estimates for the domestic welfare weight. We contend that the latter empirical paradox arises mainly because the explanatory variables tend to be extremely large for industries with low import ratios and/or low estimated elasticities or slopes resulting from relatively volatile import prices. The results with derived import parameters point to a much stronger role of campaign contributions within the PFS model than previously found. They also suggest that the commonly-used Armington estimates may not be appropriate for estimating the PFS model.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-02-2003Thomas J. Miceli, Lanse P. Minkler University of Connecticut, Department of Economics Working Paper. 1997. No. 1997-06.
Miceli and Minkler examine the link between social institutions and individuals' propensity to cooperate in a simple game theoretic framework. They transform the usual prisoner's dilemma game over material payoffs into one with utility payoffs by including non-material preferences. By introducing a continuum of types, three distinct behaviors (not otherwise imposed) emerge: 1) pure defection, (2) pure cooperation, and (3) behavior contingent on expected partner behavior. All three behaviors emerge in equilibrium and in a static analysis. As such it represents a synthesis of previous, disparate efforts. Exogenous social policy can affect cooperation rates by changing the size of the three groups exhibiting these behaviors if preferences are endogenous. Repeated play results in "switching" behavior, where formerly cooperative players now defect (i.e., become cynical), and former defectors cooperate (reform). This behavior suggests further roles for institutions. Finally, continuing the effort to analyze community, they add the possibility of interaction with a new "low cost" player who, it is known, does not make social investments.