SSRN Working Papers
Выпуск N за 2006 год
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Bernard S. Black, Inessa Love, Andrei Rachinsky SSRN Working Papers. 2006.
There is increasing evidence that broad measures of firm-level corporate governance predict higher share prices. However, almost all prior work relies on cross-sectional data. This work leaves open the possibility that endogeneity or omitted firm-level variables explain the observed correlations. We address the second possibility by offering time-series evidence from Russia for 1999-present, exploiting a number of available governance indices. We find an economically important and statistically strong correlation between governance and market value both in OLS and in fixed effects regressions with firm-index fixed effects. We also find large differences in coefficients and significance levels, including some sign reversals, between OLS and fixed effects specifications. This suggests that cross-sectional results may be unreliable. We also find significant differences in the predictive power of different indices, and in the components of these indices. How one measures governance matters.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Arturo Capasso SSRN Working Papers. 2006.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, a few serious financial scandals and many cases of corporate mismanagement have driven scholars and politicians to devote increasing attention to corporate governance, in a close relation with business ethics issues. In academic literature, as well as in public policy debates, corporate governance is nowadays acknowledged as a critical factor in economic development and financial markets stability. The evolution in the nature of the firm is among the major causes for the crisis of established corporate governance models. The traditional manufacturing companies - vertically integrated and capital intensive - which emerged at the beginning of the last century and had since then prevailed - have been challenged by new organizational structures, based on intangible assets and networks, more appropriate to a dynamically changing environment, where competition is driven by the availability of distinctive competencies, based on firm-specific knowledge. This paper, building on the resource based view of the firm, but also on stakeholder approach to strategic management, explores how the growing importance of intangible assets is reshaping, in many industries, the basic conditions of corporate governance. The aim is twofold: i) to explain logically why intangible assets modifies the allocation of residual claims, as company performance can substantially affect the wealth of other stakeholders ii) to determine which constituencies should be considered as relevant stakeholders and contribute, to some extent, to the corporate governance.
Опубликовано на портале: 01-11-2007Cheng Hua SSRN Working Papers. 2006.
We develop a dynamic model in which traders have differential information about the true value of the risky asset and trade the risky asset with proportional transaction costs. We show that without additional assumption, trading volume can not totally remove the noise in the pricing equation. However, because trading volume increases in the absolute value of noisy per capita supply change, it provides useful information on the asset fundamental value which cannot be inferred from the equilibrium price. We further investigate the relation between trading volume, price autocorrelation, return volatility and proportional transaction costs. Firstly, trading volume decreases in proportional transaction costs and the influence of proportional transaction costs decreases at the margin. Secondly, price autocorrelation can be generated by proportional transaction costs: under no transaction costs, the equilibrium prices at date 1 and 2 are not correlated; however under proportional transaction costs, they are correlated - the higher (lower) the equilibrium price at date 1, the lower (higher) the equilibrium price at date 2. Thirdly, we show that return volatility may be increasing in proportional transaction costs, which is contrary to Stiglitz 1989, Summers & Summers 1989’s reasoning but is consistent with Umlauf 1993 and Jones & Seguin 1997’s empirical results