Labour
Выпуск N2 за 2002 год
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003
Gerasimos T. Soldatos
Labour.
2002.
Vol. 13.
No. 2.
P. 433-443(11) .
An argument connecting human capital theory with the weak version of the signaling
hypothesis, is advanced initially. It is an argument that helps methodologically
the derivation of a work-incentives view of the complementarity between human capital
theory and the strong version of the signaling theory. This view implies in turn
that work incentives have only an income effect, which emerges as the solution to
a moral hazard problem concerning the disclosure of productivity-augmenting capabilities
to the employer. Thus, it is concluded that policy-induced disincentives, working
against this effect and involving perhaps a substitution effect, too, would have
serious repercussions on the productivity of labor unless employees and employers
take measures to counteract the disincentives.
