Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 182
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2004
Елена Владимировна Устюжанина
Экономическая наука современной России.
2001.
№ 2.
С. 74-95.
Статья посвящена исследованию процесса трансформации отношений собственности, происходящего в нашей стране на протяжении последних 15 лет. На основе анализа изменения законодательства и складывающейся практики применения права обсуждаются особенности института собственности, существующего в России в настоящее время. Особое внимание уделяется вопросу взаимоотношений власти и новых собственников.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-09-2007
Kai Leitemo
European Journal of Political Economy.
2004.
Vol. 20.
No. 3.
P. 709-724.
Interest-rate and exchange-rate dynamics is studied in a game between the monetary
and fiscal policymakers where the monetary policymaker targets inflation. In the
Nash game, a conflict over the appropriate size of the output gap leads to excessive
interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility. For this reason, there are benefits in
restricting fiscal policymaking. If the fiscal policymaker, however, is considered
to have a first-mover advantage, the fiscal policymaker will internalise its effect
on monetary policy, and the conflict is resolved and interest-rate and exchange-rate
volatility is reduced.
Опубликовано на портале: 26-09-2007
V. Anton Muscatelli, Patrizio Tirelli
CESifo Economic Studies.
2005.
Vol. 51.
No. 4.
P. 549-585.
This paper provides an overview of recent papers which use estimated New Keynesian
models to study the extent to which fiscal policy can be used to stabilize the economy.
We use a variety of different New Keynesian models, estimated on data for both the
US and for the Euro area, and highlight the diverse transmission channels through
which fiscal policy acts in these models. Although we find that fiscal policy can
provide a useful complement to monetary policy, especially in models where consumers
have finite horizons, there are important limitations to the value added of fiscal
policy.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Thomas J. Sargent
Journal of Banking & Finance.
1999.
Vol. 23.
No. 10.
P. 1463-1482.
Monetary policy can be constrained by fiscal policy if fiscal deficits grow large
enough to require monetization of government debt. That fact implies that the administrative
independence of central banks does not by itself imply that monetary policy is independent
of the fiscal decisions of governments. This essay describes limitations, possibilities,
and suitable goals for monetary policy within the existing pattern of institutional
responsibilities. The economic limitations of what can be achieved by monetary policy
are summarized in six propositions developed in the paper.
Are Windfalls a Curse? A Non-Representative Agent Model of the Current Account and
Fiscal Policy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003
Aaron Tornell, Philip Lane
Journal of International Economics.
1998.
Vol. 44.
P. 83-112.
In several countries temporary terms of trade improvements have led to a deterioration
of the current account. Furthermore, many of these countries failed to attain greater
post-boom growth rates. The point we make is that the structure of the fiscal process
is critical in determining outcomes. If fiscal control is unitary, then the consumption-smoothing
effect is operative, and representative-agent models of the current account have
predictive power. However, if control is divided among several fiscal claimants,
a voracity effect appears which counteracts the consumption-smoothing effect, leading
to a deterioration of the current account in response to a positive shock. We model
the interaction among fiscal claimants as a dynamic game, and show that in equilibrium
aggregate appropriation increases more than the windfall itself. This results in
a deterioration of the current account. We also show that all the windfall is dissipated,
with the country experiencing no increase in its growth rate. Lastly, we analyze
the experiences of seven countries which have enjoyed large windfalls.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003
Andrew B. Abel, Gregory N. Mankiw, Lawrence H. Summers, Richard J. Zeckhauser
Review of Economic Studies.
1989.
No. 56.
P. 1-20.
The issue of dynamic efficiency is central to analyses of capital accumulation and
economic growth. Yet the question of what characteristics should be examined to determine
whether actual economies are dynamically efficient is unresolved. This paper develops
a criterion for determining whether an economy is dynamically efficient. The criterion,
which holds for economies in which technological progress and population growth are
stochastic, involves a comparison of the cash flows generated by capital with the
level of investment. Its application to the United States economy and the economies
of other major OECD nations suggests that they are dynamically efficient.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-11-2007
John Y. Campbell, Gregory N. Mankiw
NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
1989.
P. 185-216.
This paper proposes that the time-series data on consumption, income, and interest
rates are best viewed as generated not by a single representative consumer but by
two groups of consumers. Half the consumers are forward-looking and consume their
permanent income, but are extremely reluctant to substitute consumption temporarily.
Half the consumers follow the "rule of thumb" of consuming their current incomeThe
paper documents three empirical regularities that, it argues, are best explained
by this medal. First, expected changes in income are associated with expected changes
in consumption. Second, expected real interest rates are not associated with expected
changes in consumption. Third, periods in which consumption is high relative to income
are typically followed by high growth in income. The paper concludes by briefly discussing
the implications of these findings for economic policy and economic research
Опубликовано на портале: 18-09-2007
Torben Andersen, Friedrich Georg Schneider
European Journal of Political Economy.
1986.
Vol. 2.
No. 2.
P. 169-191.
The paper analyses the problem of coordinating fiscal and monetary policies within
an explicit game theoretic model of the interaction between different policy institutions.
Specifically, the question is considered under (i) different institutional arrangements,
(ii) different kinds of reaction of the two authorities, and (iii) different macroeconomic
frameworks. The implications for inflation and output as well as the gains from cooperative
policy decisions are considered.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-10-2004
Lans Arij Bovenberg, Lawrence H. Goulder
National Tax Journal.
1997.
Vol. 50.
No. 1.
There has been keen interest in recent years in environmentally motivated or 'green'
tax reforms. This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models
to investigate the costs of such reforms, concentrating on the question of whether
these costs can be eliminated when revenues from new environmental taxes are devoted
to cuts in marginal income tax rates. A distinguishing feature of the analytical
model is its attention to the role of pre-existing inefficiencies in the tax treatment
of labor and capital and the associated role of tax-shifting. This model indicates
how the prospects for a zero- or negative-cost environmental tax reform are enhanced
to the extent that environmental tax reforms shift the tax burden toward the less
efficient (undertaxed) factor. Results from the numerical model are interpreted in
light of the analytical model's findings. These results indicate that the revenue-
neutral substitution of Btu or gasoline taxes for typical income taxes usually entails
positive gross costs to the economy. In the case of the gasoline tax, a significant
tax shifting effect serves to lower the policy's gross costs. This accounts for the
lower gross cost of the gasoline tax compared with the Btu tax. Under neither policy
is tax-shifting substantial enough to eliminate the overall gross costs.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-09-2004
Allan Drazen, Paul R. Masson
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
1994.
Vol. 09.
No. 3.
P. 735-754.
Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced
policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the
role of tough policies in signaling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a
policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy. We present
a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues
if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence
in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than
raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this
implication on EMS interest rates and find support for our hypothesis.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007
Francesca Castellani, Xavier Debrun
International Finance.
2005.
Vol. 8.
No. 1.
P. 87-117.
This paper proposes a simple model illustrating the potential benefits of approaching
the design of a macroeconomic framework conducive to low inflation in both its monetary
and fiscal dimensions rather than relying exclusively on the merits of central bank
independence and other monetary commitment devices such as currency boards or dollarization.
The reason is that monetary delegation alone merely ‘relocates’ the timeinconsistency
problem stemming from the government’s incentive to address structural output
shortfall with a macroeconomic stimulus. This paper also provides a new argument
explaining why fiscal deficit rules may be less effective than instrument-specific
rules.
Опубликовано на портале: 04-11-2004
Michael Woodford
Review of Economic Dynamics.
1998.
Vol. 1.
No. 1.
P. 173-219 .
This paper shows that it is possible to analyze equilibrium inflation determination
without any reference to either money supply or demand, as long as one specifies
policy in terms of a "Wicksellian" interest-rate feedback rule. The paper's central
result is an approximation theorem, showing the existence, for a simple monetary
model, of a well-behaved "cashless limit" in which the money balances held to facilitate
transactions become negligible. Inflation in the cashless limit is shown to be a
function of the gap between the "natural rate" of interest, determined by the supply
of goods and opportunities for intertemporal substitution, and a time-varying parameter
of the interest-rate rule indicating the tightness of monetary policy. Inflation
can be completely stabilized, in principle, by adjusting the policy parameter to
track variation in the natural rate. Under such a regime, instability of money demand
has little effect upon equilibrium inflation and need not be monitored by the central
bank.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-10-2004
Enrique Gabriel Estrada Mendoza, Assaf Razin, Linda L. Tesar
Journal of Monetary Economics.
1994.
Vol. 34.
P. 297-323 .
This paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and
revenue statistics. Using this method we construct time-series of tax rates for large
industrial countries. The method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes
at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding
tax bases. This method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes
and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent
in a general equilibrium framework. These tax rates compare favorably with existing
estimates of marginal tax rates, and highlight important international differences
in tax policy.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-09-2007
V. Anton Muscatelli, Patrizio Tirelli, Carmine Trecroci
Journal of Macroeconomics.
2004.
Vol. 26.
No. 2.
P. 257-280.
This paper examines the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies using an estimated
New-Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model for the US. In contrast to earlier
work using VAR models, we show that the strategic complementarity or substitutability
of fiscal and monetary policy depends crucially on the types of shocks hitting the
economy, and on the assumptions made about the underlying structural model. We also
demonstrate that countercyclical fiscal policy can be welfare-reducing if fiscal
and monetary policy rules are inertial and not co-ordinated.
Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Is There a Tradeoff between Federalism and Budgetary
Restrictions? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
Barry Eichengreen, Jurgen von Hagen
American Economic Review.
1996.
The Maastricht Treaty on Europe Union features an Excessive Deficit Procedure limiting
the freedom to borrow of governments participating in the European monetary union.
One justification is to prevent states from over- borrowing and demanding a bailout
which could divert the European Central Bank from its pursuit of price stability.
We challenge this rationale. Using data for a cross section of federal states, we
find no association between monetary union and restraints on borrowing by subcentral
governments. There is, however, an association between fiscal restraints and the
share of the tax base under the control of sub-national authorities. Restraints are
prevalent where subcentral governments finance a relatively small share of spending
with their own taxes. Lacking control of the tax base, such governments cannot be
expected to resort to increased taxation to deal with debt crises. Prohibiting borrowing
by subcentral governments will not eliminate the demand for tax smoothing and public
investment. Governments whose ability to provide such services is limited may therefore
pressure the central government to borrow for them. We report evidence that the financial
position of central governments is more fragile where subcentral jurisdictions are
prevented from borrowing. The implications for the EU are direct. That EU member
states control their own taxes should strengthen the hand of authorities seeking
to resist pressure for a bailout. But in the longer run, borrowing restraints may
weaken the financial position of Brussels, transferring bailout risk from the member
states to the EU itself.
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