Всего статей в данном разделе : 182
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2004Елена Владимировна Устюжанина Экономическая наука современной России. 2001. № 2. С. 74-95.
Статья посвящена исследованию процесса трансформации отношений собственности, происходящего в нашей стране на протяжении последних 15 лет. На основе анализа изменения законодательства и складывающейся практики применения права обсуждаются особенности института собственности, существующего в России в настоящее время. Особое внимание уделяется вопросу взаимоотношений власти и новых собственников.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-09-2007Kai Leitemo European Journal of Political Economy. 2004. Vol. 20. No. 3. P. 709-724.
Interest-rate and exchange-rate dynamics is studied in a game between the monetary and fiscal policymakers where the monetary policymaker targets inflation. In the Nash game, a conflict over the appropriate size of the output gap leads to excessive interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility. For this reason, there are benefits in restricting fiscal policymaking. If the fiscal policymaker, however, is considered to have a first-mover advantage, the fiscal policymaker will internalise its effect on monetary policy, and the conflict is resolved and interest-rate and exchange-rate volatility is reduced.
Analyzing the Interaction of Monetary and Fiscal Policy: Does Fiscal Policy Play a Valuable Role in Stabilisation? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 26-09-2007V. Anton Muscatelli, Patrizio Tirelli CESifo Economic Studies. 2005. Vol. 51. No. 4. P. 549-585.
This paper provides an overview of recent papers which use estimated New Keynesian models to study the extent to which fiscal policy can be used to stabilize the economy. We use a variety of different New Keynesian models, estimated on data for both the US and for the Euro area, and highlight the diverse transmission channels through which fiscal policy acts in these models. Although we find that fiscal policy can provide a useful complement to monetary policy, especially in models where consumers have finite horizons, there are important limitations to the value added of fiscal policy.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007Thomas J. Sargent Journal of Banking & Finance. 1999. Vol. 23. No. 10. P. 1463-1482.
Monetary policy can be constrained by fiscal policy if fiscal deficits grow large enough to require monetization of government debt. That fact implies that the administrative independence of central banks does not by itself imply that monetary policy is independent of the fiscal decisions of governments. This essay describes limitations, possibilities, and suitable goals for monetary policy within the existing pattern of institutional responsibilities. The economic limitations of what can be achieved by monetary policy are summarized in six propositions developed in the paper.
Are Windfalls a Curse? A Non-Representative Agent Model of the Current Account and Fiscal Policy [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 11-01-2003Aaron Tornell, Philip Lane Journal of International Economics. 1998. Vol. 44. P. 83-112.
In several countries temporary terms of trade improvements have led to a deterioration of the current account. Furthermore, many of these countries failed to attain greater post-boom growth rates. The point we make is that the structure of the fiscal process is critical in determining outcomes. If fiscal control is unitary, then the consumption-smoothing effect is operative, and representative-agent models of the current account have predictive power. However, if control is divided among several fiscal claimants, a voracity effect appears which counteracts the consumption-smoothing effect, leading to a deterioration of the current account in response to a positive shock. We model the interaction among fiscal claimants as a dynamic game, and show that in equilibrium aggregate appropriation increases more than the windfall itself. This results in a deterioration of the current account. We also show that all the windfall is dissipated, with the country experiencing no increase in its growth rate. Lastly, we analyze the experiences of seven countries which have enjoyed large windfalls.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Andrew B. Abel, Gregory N. Mankiw, Lawrence H. Summers, Richard J. Zeckhauser Review of Economic Studies. 1989. No. 56. P. 1-20.
The issue of dynamic efficiency is central to analyses of capital accumulation and economic growth. Yet the question of what characteristics should be examined to determine whether actual economies are dynamically efficient is unresolved. This paper develops a criterion for determining whether an economy is dynamically efficient. The criterion, which holds for economies in which technological progress and population growth are stochastic, involves a comparison of the cash flows generated by capital with the level of investment. Its application to the United States economy and the economies of other major OECD nations suggests that they are dynamically efficient.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-11-2007John Y. Campbell, Gregory N. Mankiw NBER Macroeconomics Annual. 1989. P. 185-216.
This paper proposes that the time-series data on consumption, income, and interest rates are best viewed as generated not by a single representative consumer but by two groups of consumers. Half the consumers are forward-looking and consume their permanent income, but are extremely reluctant to substitute consumption temporarily. Half the consumers follow the "rule of thumb" of consuming their current incomeThe paper documents three empirical regularities that, it argues, are best explained by this medal. First, expected changes in income are associated with expected changes in consumption. Second, expected real interest rates are not associated with expected changes in consumption. Third, periods in which consumption is high relative to income are typically followed by high growth in income. The paper concludes by briefly discussing the implications of these findings for economic policy and economic research
Опубликовано на портале: 18-09-2007Torben Andersen, Friedrich Georg Schneider European Journal of Political Economy. 1986. Vol. 2. No. 2. P. 169-191.
The paper analyses the problem of coordinating fiscal and monetary policies within an explicit game theoretic model of the interaction between different policy institutions. Specifically, the question is considered under (i) different institutional arrangements, (ii) different kinds of reaction of the two authorities, and (iii) different macroeconomic frameworks. The implications for inflation and output as well as the gains from cooperative policy decisions are considered.
Costs of Environmentally Motivated Taxes in the Presence of Other Taxes: General Equilibrium Analyses [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 19-10-2004Lans Arij Bovenberg, Lawrence H. Goulder National Tax Journal. 1997. Vol. 50. No. 1.
There has been keen interest in recent years in environmentally motivated or 'green' tax reforms. This paper employs analytical and numerical general equilibrium models to investigate the costs of such reforms, concentrating on the question of whether these costs can be eliminated when revenues from new environmental taxes are devoted to cuts in marginal income tax rates. A distinguishing feature of the analytical model is its attention to the role of pre-existing inefficiencies in the tax treatment of labor and capital and the associated role of tax-shifting. This model indicates how the prospects for a zero- or negative-cost environmental tax reform are enhanced to the extent that environmental tax reforms shift the tax burden toward the less efficient (undertaxed) factor. Results from the numerical model are interpreted in light of the analytical model's findings. These results indicate that the revenue- neutral substitution of Btu or gasoline taxes for typical income taxes usually entails positive gross costs to the economy. In the case of the gasoline tax, a significant tax shifting effect serves to lower the policy's gross costs. This accounts for the lower gross cost of the gasoline tax compared with the Btu tax. Under neither policy is tax-shifting substantial enough to eliminate the overall gross costs.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-09-2004Allan Drazen, Paul R. Masson Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1994. Vol. 09. No. 3. P. 735-754.
Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the role of tough policies in signaling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy. We present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this implication on EMS interest rates and find support for our hypothesis.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007Francesca Castellani, Xavier Debrun International Finance. 2005. Vol. 8. No. 1. P. 87-117.
This paper proposes a simple model illustrating the potential benefits of approaching the design of a macroeconomic framework conducive to low inflation in both its monetary and fiscal dimensions rather than relying exclusively on the merits of central bank independence and other monetary commitment devices such as currency boards or dollarization. The reason is that monetary delegation alone merely ‘relocates’ the timeinconsistency problem stemming from the government’s incentive to address structural output shortfall with a macroeconomic stimulus. This paper also provides a new argument explaining why fiscal deficit rules may be less effective than instrument-specific rules.
Опубликовано на портале: 04-11-2004Michael Woodford Review of Economic Dynamics. 1998. Vol. 1. No. 1. P. 173-219 .
This paper shows that it is possible to analyze equilibrium inflation determination without any reference to either money supply or demand, as long as one specifies policy in terms of a "Wicksellian" interest-rate feedback rule. The paper's central result is an approximation theorem, showing the existence, for a simple monetary model, of a well-behaved "cashless limit" in which the money balances held to facilitate transactions become negligible. Inflation in the cashless limit is shown to be a function of the gap between the "natural rate" of interest, determined by the supply of goods and opportunities for intertemporal substitution, and a time-varying parameter of the interest-rate rule indicating the tightness of monetary policy. Inflation can be completely stabilized, in principle, by adjusting the policy parameter to track variation in the natural rate. Under such a regime, instability of money demand has little effect upon equilibrium inflation and need not be monitored by the central bank.
Effective Tax Rates in Macroeconomics: Cross-Country Estimates of Tax Rates on Factor Incomes and Consumption [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-10-2004Enrique Gabriel Estrada Mendoza, Assaf Razin, Linda L. Tesar Journal of Monetary Economics. 1994. Vol. 34. P. 297-323 .
This paper proposes a method for computing tax rates using national accounts and revenue statistics. Using this method we construct time-series of tax rates for large industrial countries. The method identifies the revenue raised by different taxes at the general government level and defines aggregate measures of the corresponding tax bases. This method yields estimates of effective tax rates on factor incomes and consumption consistent with the tax distortions faced by a representative agent in a general equilibrium framework. These tax rates compare favorably with existing estimates of marginal tax rates, and highlight important international differences in tax policy.
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Interactions: Empirical Evidence and Optimal Policy Using a Structural New-Keynesian Model [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 18-09-2007V. Anton Muscatelli, Patrizio Tirelli, Carmine Trecroci Journal of Macroeconomics. 2004. Vol. 26. No. 2. P. 257-280.
This paper examines the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies using an estimated New-Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model for the US. In contrast to earlier work using VAR models, we show that the strategic complementarity or substitutability of fiscal and monetary policy depends crucially on the types of shocks hitting the economy, and on the assumptions made about the underlying structural model. We also demonstrate that countercyclical fiscal policy can be welfare-reducing if fiscal and monetary policy rules are inertial and not co-ordinated.
Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Is There a Tradeoff between Federalism and Budgetary Restrictions? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003Barry Eichengreen, Jurgen von Hagen American Economic Review. 1996.
The Maastricht Treaty on Europe Union features an Excessive Deficit Procedure limiting the freedom to borrow of governments participating in the European monetary union. One justification is to prevent states from over- borrowing and demanding a bailout which could divert the European Central Bank from its pursuit of price stability. We challenge this rationale. Using data for a cross section of federal states, we find no association between monetary union and restraints on borrowing by subcentral governments. There is, however, an association between fiscal restraints and the share of the tax base under the control of sub-national authorities. Restraints are prevalent where subcentral governments finance a relatively small share of spending with their own taxes. Lacking control of the tax base, such governments cannot be expected to resort to increased taxation to deal with debt crises. Prohibiting borrowing by subcentral governments will not eliminate the demand for tax smoothing and public investment. Governments whose ability to provide such services is limited may therefore pressure the central government to borrow for them. We report evidence that the financial position of central governments is more fragile where subcentral jurisdictions are prevented from borrowing. The implications for the EU are direct. That EU member states control their own taxes should strengthen the hand of authorities seeking to resist pressure for a bailout. But in the longer run, borrowing restraints may weaken the financial position of Brussels, transferring bailout risk from the member states to the EU itself.