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Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Domenico Mario Nuti Economic Journal. 1970. Vol. 80. P. 32-57 .
The purpose of this paper is that of considering the choice of production techniques from the point of view of both the capitalist entrepreneur maximising the present value of his firm's assets at a given interest rate and the socialist planner maximising the consumption per head associated with the maintenance of a given growth rate. A model of production is set up, in which output is made of a versatile consumption and production good, called putty, and of the machines which are made of putty and are necessary to assist labour in order to produce putty. It is assumed that technical choice is irreversible, i.e., that putty is moulded and baked into clay machines of given specifications, which cannot be turned back into putty or into machines of different specifications. Also, their use is not affected by technical progress, which improves the design of new machines but not the operation of those already constructed. The assumption of the costless transformation putty into clay and the use of gross measures evade this fundamental issue of capital theory. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003B. Curtis Eaton, Richard G. Lipsey Economic Journal. 1978. Vol. 88. No. 351. P. 455-69.
We have demonstrated that zero pure profit is not a necessary condition of free-entry equilibrium in a model in which the market is spatially extended and longrun cost curves decline over some initial range. We have shown that neither price competition among existing firms nor the entry of new firms will necessarily drive profits to zero. This is true even when firms assume that they can cut their own price without reaction from their competitors, and when new entrants rationally calculate whether or not their entry will force existing firms to relocate. We have further shown, in a specific example, that rates of return on capital of up to twice the competitive rate are possible in free-entry equilibrium. The model of this paper is formulated in terms of geographical differentiation among firms. There would seem, however, to be significant applications to product differentiation, where firms sell products with different locations in characteristics space, and a new product fitting in between two established ones must expect a market significantly smaller than those obtained by "neighbouring" products before entry. For a discussion of some of the issues involved in handling monopolistic competition in characteristic space see Archibald and Kosenbluth (1975) and for a practical application that uses some of the properties developed in our model see Schmalensee (1977). [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Joseph Hadar Economic Journal. 1969. Vol. 36. No. 1. P. 67-74.
The main results of the analysis can be briefly summarized. It was shown that it is possible to specify the nature of the effects of advertising on the demand function of a monopolistically competitive firm in a fashion which leads to meaningful and testable hypotheses. The approach followed in this paper produced a model in which the effects of changes in the shift parameters on the levels of output and advertising are always determinate. Furthermore, we saw that if the firm is a competitive buyer of advertising, then it turns out that the advertising ratio is invariant to changes in parameters belonging to a certain class, an example of which is an excise tax. Changes in parameters in the latter class also result in a predictable 4 Sufficient conditions for stability of much an adjustment process are given in Hadar . change in the price of the firm's output, since the price always moves in a direction opposite to that of the change in output whenever output and advertising change by the same proportion. [Авторский текст]
The social costs of monopoly power [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003Keith Cowling, Dennis C. Mueller Economic Journal. 1978. Vol. 88. No. 352. P. 727-748.
In 1954, Arnold Harberger estimated the welfare losses from monopoly for the United States at o.i of 1% of GNP. Several studies have appeared since, reconfirming Harberger's early low estimates using different assumptions. The present paper levels several objections against the Harberger-type approach. It then calculates estimates of the welfare loss from monopoly using procedures derived to meet these objections, and obtains estimates significantly greater than those of previous studies. Although several of the objections we make have been made by other writers, none has systematically adjusted the basic Harberger technique to take them into account. Thus all previous estimates of monopoly welfare losses suffer in varying degrees from the same biases incorporated in Harberger's original estimates. We present estimates for both the United States and the United Kingdom based on data gathered at the firm level. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 01-10-2003Harold Demsetz Economic Journal. 1964. Vol. 74. No. 295. P. 623-641.
Статья является продолжением статьи Демсеца 1959 года и сосредотачивается на анализе аспектов теории благосостояния применительно к модели монополистической конкуренции, а также на выработке таких характеристик данной модели, которые поддавались бы эмпирической проверке. В рамках статьи доказывается, что положения о неизбежном наличии в ситуации равновесия на рынке монополистической конкуренции "избыточных мощностей", а также о негативном влиянии продуктовой дифференциации на экономическую эффективность являются необоснованными.