Всего статей в данном разделе : 121
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Damien J. Neven, Louis Phlips Journal of Industrial Economics. 1985. Vol. 34. No. 2. P. 133-149.
We analyse the properties of a Cournot-Nash equilibrium which arises when two monopolies, operating each in a separate market, become a duopoly in a common market with two sub-markets (the formerly separated markets) and are allowed to price discriminate across sub-markets. This equilibrium implies "intra-industry" trade (or "crosshauling") of identical commodities and freight absorption (which is an increasing function of the slope of the marginal cost schedule). It also leads to price differences such as those observed in the European car market. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Stan J. Liebowitz American Economic Review. 1982. Vol. 72. No. 4. P. 816-824.
Focuses on the relationship between market structure and monopoly power. Durability models; New-used goods model; Durability and monopoly in the new-used model; Interdependence between market structure and durability. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Gerard R. Buttlers Review of Economic Studies. 1977. Vol. 44. No. 138. P. 465-491.
Focuses on the formulation of equilibrium distributions of sales and advertising prices. Development of a model in which sellers have constant average cost curves; Approach to prove assumptions on consumer preferences; Description of the basic model of consumer pricing. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Arthur Smithies Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1940. Vol. 55. No. 1. P. 95115.
The meaning of an imperfect market, 95.--Assumptions underlying the present analysis, 96.--I. The demand functions, 96.--II. Competitor's expectation of his rivals' behavior, 98.--His estimated demand function, 100.--III. Diagrammatic demonstration of attainment of equilibrium, 100.--IV. Equilibrium conditions for the general case, 103.--Conditions affecting the relative magnitudes of p1 and p2 equilibrium: (1) differences in demand functions, 105; different methods of estimation, 106; (3) cost differences, 106.--V. Conditions under which equilibrium is stable and economically possible, 107.--Cases where the stability conditions are not fulfilled or where equilibrium is economically impossible, 114. (Из JStore)
Опубликовано на портале: 01-10-2003Dilip Abreu Journal of Economic Theory. 1986. Vol. 39. No. 1. P. 191-225.
Establishes a general proposition applied in the analysis of optimal punishments and constrained Pareto optimal paths of symmetric oligopolistic supergames. Two-dimensional characterization of optimal symmetric punishments; Analogous result holding for the general case of asymmetric punishments.
Frank H. Knight as Economic Theorist [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Arthur H. Leigh Journal of Political Economy. 1974. Vol. 82. No. 3. P. 578-586.
Focuses on the contributions of economist Frank H. Knight on improving the economic theory. Significance of Knight's theory of profit and capital; Effectiveness of a perfectly competitive market structure to achieve optimal allocative solutions; Emphasis on the universality of the choice problem imposed by scarcity. (From Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003B. Curtis Eaton, Richard G. Lipsey Economic Journal. 1978. Vol. 88. No. 351. P. 455-69.
We have demonstrated that zero pure profit is not a necessary condition of free-entry equilibrium in a model in which the market is spatially extended and longrun cost curves decline over some initial range. We have shown that neither price competition among existing firms nor the entry of new firms will necessarily drive profits to zero. This is true even when firms assume that they can cut their own price without reaction from their competitors, and when new entrants rationally calculate whether or not their entry will force existing firms to relocate. We have further shown, in a specific example, that rates of return on capital of up to twice the competitive rate are possible in free-entry equilibrium. The model of this paper is formulated in terms of geographical differentiation among firms. There would seem, however, to be significant applications to product differentiation, where firms sell products with different locations in characteristics space, and a new product fitting in between two established ones must expect a market significantly smaller than those obtained by "neighbouring" products before entry. For a discussion of some of the issues involved in handling monopolistic competition in characteristic space see Archibald and Kosenbluth (1975) and for a practical application that uses some of the properties developed in our model see Schmalensee (1977). [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003B. Curtis Eaton Journal of Regional Science. 1976. Vol. 16. No. 1. P. 21-33.
Analyzes the process of spatial competition in a one-dimensional model under conditions of free entry. Solution to avoid the problem of nonexistence of equilibrium in a bounded spatial market; Properties of the model; Advantages of numerical techniques in studying the model. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003David D. Friedman Bell Journal of Economics. 1979. Vol. 10. No. 2. P. 706-708.
Discriminatory pricing by railroads may be better than marginal cost pricing with a subsidy of the resulting losses, since it gives the railroad correct incentives for deciding what rail lines to build. The argument, applied to longhaul/short-haul discrimination, shows that its prohibition may lead to nonoptimal construction decisions. [Авторский текст]
Intertemporal price discrimination [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Nancy L. Stokey Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1979. Vol. 93. No. 3. P. 355-71.
Presents a model that examines the behavior of a monopolist selling a new product. Factors that influence time as a medium for price discrimination; Example that assumes no production costs to illustrate that discrimination is the only motive for selling to different buyers at different dates at different prices; Introduction of positive costs of production to explore an alternative motive for inter temporal price variation. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003Michael Bradfield Canadian Journal of Economics. 1990. Vol. 23. No. 3. P. 700-704.
This note extends the conventional short-run comparison of perfectly competitive and monopsony markets to show that the long-run monopsony equilibrium implies a greater divergence from the competitive results than is true in the short run. The conditions necessary to have a 'pure' monopsony, with power in only the labour market, are developed and generate a constant marginal revenue product of labour equal to the competitive wage. This leads the monopsonist to cut wages and labour inputs further in the long run and also forms the upper bound on the bargaining range for a union negotiating with a pure monopsonist. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Oliver Hart Review of Economic Studies. 1979. Vol. 46. P. 1-30.
Presents a study that clarified and developed the idea of a monopolistic competition in a general equilibrium model with differentiated commodities. Cause of monopolistically competitive behavior; Example illustrating the insignificance of an agent's monopoly power if the agent is small relative to the aggregate economy; Development of the model; Interpretation of the results. (Из Ebsco)
Monopoly and resource allocation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 19-03-2003Arnold C. Harberger American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings. 1954. Vol. 44. No. 2. P. 77-87.
В статье количественно оценивается влияние монополии как рыночной структуры на распределение ресурсов в экономической системе и уровень общественного благосостояния.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Hayne E. Leland, Robert A. Meyer Bell Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 7. No. 2. P. 449-62.
While some firms, such as airlines, may have both the informational and legal capabilities for identifying and segmenting customers into different markets, most firms do not. When only the distribution of characteristics of consumers is known, we characterize the situation as one of imperfect discrimination. Individuals in such markets cannot be identified; thus, all must face the same price structure. Some discrimination is nonetheless possible through the use of nonuniform pricing policies. For optimal nonuniform pricing schedules, we have focused attention on two: profit maximization and welfare maximization, and consider two common forms of nonuniform pricing: two-part and two-block policies. We show that, regardless of the firm's objective, it can always do at least as well with a two-block as with a two-part policy (and at least as well with a two-part policy as with uniform pricing). The two-part and block pricing schemes strictly dominate the uniform scheme for a profit maximizer, and increased profit is not always at the expense of welfare. Under uncertainty we observe it is also possible to obtain an ordering over the uniform, two-part and block pricing strategies on risk-efficiency grounds. Without assuming any specific probability distributions or assuming any specific way in which the random component affects demand, we demonstrate that an expected utility of profit maximizer will find a block pricing policy at least as preferred as a two-part pricing policy, which in turn is strictly preferred to a uniform policy. Our results indicate that optimal regulation of utilities should not rule out block rate structures a priori. Declining block prices are not necessarily antithetical to welfare maximization in a profit-constrained environment. [Авторский текст]
Monopoly Supply and Monopsony Demand [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003A.J. Nichol Journal of Political Economy. 1942. Vol. 50. No. 6. P. 861-879.
В работе развиваются новые подходы к понятиям спроса и предложения применительно к анализу монополии и монопсонии. В статье показывается, что при определенных условиях возможно графическое выражение (в координатах цена-количество) предложения монополии и спроса монопсонии.