Всего статей в данном разделе : 121
Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007Jeremy I. Bulow, John Geanakoplos, Paul Klemperer Journal of Political Economy. 1985. Vol. 3. No. 93. P. 488-511.
A firm's actions in one market can change competitors' strategies in a second market by affecting its own marginal costs in that other market. Whether the action provides costs or benefits in the second market depends on (a) whether it increases or decreases marginal costs in the second market and (b) whether competitors' products are strategic substitutes or strategic complements. The latter distinction is determined by whether more "aggressive" play (e.g., lower price or higher quantity) by one firm in a market lowers or raises competing firms' marginal profitabilities in that market. Many recent results in oligopoly theory can be most easily understood in terms of strategic substitutes and complements.
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Michael Spence Review of Economic Studies. 1980. Vol. 47. No. 150. P. 821-841.
Focuses on a study which developed a formulae of optimal quantity-dependent pricing schemes for several products. Description of the single product model; Details on the Pareto optimality; Information on the multi-product pricing. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Dean A. Worcester Southern Economic Journal. 1973. Vol. 40. No. 2. P. 234-245.
The estimates of welfare loss to monopoly reported here are substantially lower than anticipated when this research was undertaken. The cumulative bias introduced to overestimate the size of the welfare loss should, it seemed a priori, produce an estimated welfare loss of at least 5 percent. I can only conclude that there is very little ground for the common belief that a large loss of welfare exists due to the economic impact of monopoly power. It is possible that the fault lies with the measurements and not with the (viscerally sensed) reality, but as a social scientist I believe that the burden of proof now rests on those who believe the loss is large. A reallocation of economists' time toward the public sector may be indicated. Greater welfare losses to misallocation may exist as a consequence of such government activities as oil import quotas, water diversion schemes, standards enforced to safeguard common property resources such as air, water, and fish, and other programs asserted to be in the public rather than the private interest. [Авторский текст]
Nonlinear prices and welfare [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Michael Spence Journal of Public Economics. 1977. Vol. 8. No. 1. P. 8-18.
Focuses on the comparison of price and quantity rationing in terms of their capacities to allocate scarce goods. Effect of the price system on income redistribution; Correlation of quantity rationing with nonlinear price schedule; Factors attributing the quantity of rationing. (Из Ebsco)
On Monopoly Welfare Losses [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003Abram Bergson American Economic Review. 1973. Vol. 63. No. 5. P. 853-870.
Studies welfare losses due to monopolistic pricing in the United States. Evaluation of calculations indicating that welfare losses from monopolistic pricing is inconsequential; Consumer's surplus analysis; Proposed method in deriving coefficient of net compensating variation. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Joseph Hadar Economic Journal. 1969. Vol. 36. No. 1. P. 67-74.
The main results of the analysis can be briefly summarized. It was shown that it is possible to specify the nature of the effects of advertising on the demand function of a monopolistically competitive firm in a fashion which leads to meaningful and testable hypotheses. The approach followed in this paper produced a model in which the effects of changes in the shift parameters on the levels of output and advertising are always determinate. Furthermore, we saw that if the firm is a competitive buyer of advertising, then it turns out that the advertising ratio is invariant to changes in parameters belonging to a certain class, an example of which is an excise tax. Changes in parameters in the latter class also result in a predictable 4 Sufficient conditions for stability of much an adjustment process are given in Hadar . change in the price of the firm's output, since the price always moves in a direction opposite to that of the change in output whenever output and advertising change by the same proportion. [Авторский текст]
Optimal price discrimination [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003John M. Hartwick Journal of Public Economics. 1978. Vol. 9. No. 1. P. 83-89.
Focuses on practice of price discrimination among public utilities. Variations of charges with the user; Approach to maximize profits; Strategies for transferring consumer surplus to the revenues of producers.(Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Richard Schmalensee American Economic Review. 2002. Vol. 71. No. 1. P. 242-247 .
Focuses on output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination. Maximization of profits by charging different prices to different markets or classes for customers; Maldistribution of resources for different uses. (From Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003A. Ross Shepherd American Economic Review. 1971. Vol. 61. No. 1. P. 237-239.
Comments on the article by Milton Kafoglis concerning the output of the restrained firm. Examination of the price and output behavior of the restrained monopoly firm; Implications of private cost saving on output and revenue; Production of optimal output by output and revenue maximizers in the case of increasing cost; Production of optimally large outputs in single markets through monopsony power. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Ariel Rubinstein Econometrica. 1982. Vol. 50. No. 1. P. 97-110.
Focuses on a study which examined perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Overview of the strategic approach adopted for the study; Details of the bargaining situation used; Discussion on perfect equilibrium. (From Ebsco)
Preference revelation and monopsony [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-02-2003G. Fane, E. Sieper Journal of Public Economics. 1983. Vol. 20. No. 3. P. 357-372 .
Presents the formal equivalence between the free-rider problem and monopsony. Elimination on the inefficiencies of monopsony; Mechanisms used in the problem of free-rider; Determination on the consumer with willingness-to-pay for public good. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 02-09-2003Hal R. Varian American Economic Review. 1985. Vol. 75. No. 4. P. 870-875.
Studies the effect of price discrimination on social welfare using methods from duality theory. Features of the reservation model presented; Quasi-linear utility and consumers' surplus; Upper and lower bounds on welfare change; Bounds on welfare change with optimal price discrimination. (From Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Roger W. Koenker, Martin K. Perry Bell Journal of Economics. 1981. Vol. 12. No. 1. P. 217-232.
This paper generalizes a model of monopolistic competition attributable to Spence (1976). Firms produce symmetrically differentiated products with declining or U-shaped average costs. Free entry drives profits to zero in equilibrium. Spence finds that when firms behave "competitively," in a specific sense, the market equilibrium yields too little product diversity. However, when Spence' s "competitive" behavioral assumption is relaxed, we find that the market may produce excessive diversity; this occurs when product differentiation is weak relative to scale economies of production. We also study two second-best regulatory policies and characterize conditions under which they are potentially effective in improving the market outcome. [Авторский текст]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-03-2003Michael Spence Review of Economic Studies. 1976. Vol. 43. No. 134. P. 217-235.
Deals with a study which investigated the effects of fixed costs and monopolistic competition on the selection of products and product characteristics in a set of interacting markets. Price discrimination; Impact of monopolistic competition on complementary products; Approaches to the problems of substitute products. (Из Ebsco)
Опубликовано на портале: 13-03-2003Edward Hustings Chamberlin Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1948. Vol. 1. No. 62. P. 229-262.
В рамках неоклассической экономической теории рассматриваются пропорциональность и делимость факторов, применяемых в процессе производства, их связь с размером производства и влияние этих параметров на существование фирмы.