Quarterly Journal of Economics
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Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Daron K. Acemoglu, Jörn-Steffen Pischke
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
1998.
Vol. 113.
No. 1.
P. 78-118.
This paper offers a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for the general
training they receive. The superior information of the current employer regarding
its employees' abilities relative to other firms creates ex post monopsony power,
and encourages this employer to provide and pay for training, even if these skills
are general. The model can lead to multiple equlibria. In one equilibrium quits are
endogenously high, and as a result employers have limited monopsony power and provide
little training, while in another equilibrium quits are low and training is high.
Using microdata on German apprentices, we show that the predictions of our model
receive some support from the data.
