# Статьи

**Всего статей в данном разделе :**69

Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2004

*David Myatt*,

*Chris C. Wallace*Games and Economic Behavior. 2004. Vol. 48. No. 1. P. 124-138.

Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large literature. Kandori,
Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) studied dynamic models of aggregate behaviour
in which agents choose best responses to observations of population play. Crucially,
infrequent mistakes (`mutations`) allow agents to take actions contrary to current
trends and prevent initial configurations from determining long run play. An alternative
approach is offered here: Harsanyian trembles are added to agents` payoffs so that
with some probability it is optimal to act against the flow of play. The long run
distribution of population behaviour is characterised - modes correspond to stable
Bayesian Nash equilibria. Allowing the variance of payoff trembles to vanish, via
a purification process, a single equilibrium is played almost always in the long
run. Kandori et al and Young show that the number of contrarian actions required
to escape an equilibrium determines selection; here, the likelihood that such actions
are taken is of equal importance.

**Agreeing to Disagree**[статья]

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007

*Robert J. Aumann*Annals of Statistics. 1976. Vol. 4. No. 6. P. 1236-39.

Aumann (1976) put forward a formal definition of common knowledge and used it to prove that two "like minded" individuals cannot "agree to disagree" in the following sense. If they start from a common prior and update the probability of an event E (using Bayes' rule) on the basis of private information, then it cannot be common knowledge between them that individual 1 assigns probability p to E and individual 2 assigns probability q to E with p, which is not equal to q. In other words, if their posteriors of event E are common knowledge then they must coincide. Aumann's Agreement Theorem has given rise to a large literature which review in this paper. The results are classified according to whether they are probabilistic (Bayesian) or qualitative. Particular attention is paid to the issue of how to interpret the notion of Harsanyi consistency as a (local) property of belief hierarchies.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Lawrence M. Ausubel*American Economic Review. 2004. Vol. 94. No. 5. P. 1452-1475.

When bidders exhibit multi-unit demands, standard auction methods generally yield
inefficient outcomes. This article proposes a new ascending-bid auction for homogeneous
goods, such as Treasury bills or telecommunications spectrum. The auctioneer announces
a price and bidders respond with quantities. Items are awarded at the current price
whenever they are "clinched," and the price is incremented until the market clears.
With private values, this (dynamic) auction yields the same outcome as the (sealed-bid)
Vickrey auction, but has advantages of simplicity and privacy preservation. With
interdependent values, this auction may retain efficiency, whereas the Vickrey auction
suffers from a generalized Winner's Curse.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Debraj Ray*,

*Kaljan Chatterjee*,

*Kunal Sengupta*,

*Bhaskar Dutta*Review of Economic Studies. 1993. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 463-77.

The authors explore a sequential offers model of n-person coalitional bargaining
with transferable utility and with time discounting. Their focus is on the efficiency
properties of stationary equilibria of strictly superadditive games when the discount
factor 'delta' is sufficiently large. It is shown that delay and the formation of
inefficient subcoalitions can occur in equilibrium, the latter for some or all orders
of proposer. However, efficient stationary equilibrium payoffs converge to a point
in the core as 'delta' approaches one. Strict convexity is a sufficient condition
for there to exist an efficient stationary equilibrium payoff vector for sufficiently
high 'delta'.

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007

*Motty Perry*,

*Philip John Reny*Econometrica. 1994. Vol. 62. No. 4. P. 795-817.

A noncooperative implementation of the core is provided for games with transferable
utility. The implementation obtained here is meant to reflect the standard motivation
for the core as closely as possible. In the model proposed, time is continuous. This
idealized treatment of time is most amenable for capturing an essential feature of
the core - there is always time to reject a noncore proposal before it is consumated.

Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007

*Andrew Weiss*Journal of Political Economy. 1983. Vol. 91. No. 3. P. 420-442.

This paper presents a sorting model of education in with individuals are tested in
school. By assuming that higher-ability individuals are more likely to succeed on
a given test one can construct a sorting model of education that does not hinge on
the more able having lower nonpecuniary costs of schooling. Nash equilibria always
exist in this model (even with a continuum of types of individuals); however, some
are "unreasonable." To eliminate these unreasonable Nash equilibria, more restrictive
definitions of equilibrium are proposed. I also show that when schooling affects
productivity - and therefore a worker's probability of passing the test--a sorting
equilibrium may be characterized by too little investment in education. This paper
extends the important work of Spence (1974), Stiglitz (1975), and Riley (1979a, 1979b)
on sorting theories of education by modeling the educational choices of individuals
in game-theoretic terms and making two assumptions: (1) individuals are not perfectly
informed about their own productivity, and (2) individuals are tested upon their
completion of schooling. I also combine the sorting and human capital analyses by
allowing education to increase productivity and show that if education increases
the productivity of workers as well as enabling the more able workers to sort themselves,
these sorting effects may lead to underinvestment in education. This result contradicts
the main normative result of screening models of education: If skills are hierarchical,
so that if Joe is more productive than Jim at any job he is more productive at all
jobs, there is overinvestment in schooling as workers use education to signal their
abilities. Although in a pure sorting model education always leads to overinvestment
in education while human capital models lead to optimal investment, when both effects
are modeled there may be too little investment in education. This result holds even
if the more able learn faster in school.

Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007

*Robert H. Porter*RAND Journal of Economics. 1983. Vol. 14. No. 2. P. 301-314.

This article employs weekly time series data on the Joint Executive Committee railroad
cartel from 1880 to 1886 to test empirically the proposition that observed prices
reflected switches from collusive to noncooperative behavior. An equilibrium model
of dynamic oligopoly with asymmetric firms, together with explicit functional form
assumptions about costs and demand, determines the estimating equations and stochastic
structure of the econometric model. The hypothesis that no switch took place, so
that price and quantity movements were solely attributable to exogenous shifts in
the demand and cost functions, is then tested against this alternative and rejected.

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007

*Debraj Ray*,

*Rakesh V. Vohra*Games and Economic Behavior. 1999. Vol. 26. No. 2. P. 286-336.

Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements
can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds
by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish
the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main
results are concerned with the characterization of equilibrium coalition structures.
We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain conditions) an equilibrium
coalition structure. Our characterization results are especially sharp for symmetric
partition functions. In particular, we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our
results to a Cournot oligopoly.

**Auctions versus Negotiations**[статья]

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Paul D. Klemperer*,

*Jeremy I. Bulow*American Economic Review. 1996. Vol. 86. No. 1. P. 180-94.

Which is the more profitable way to sell a company: an auction with no reserve price
or an optimally structured negotiation with one less bidder? The authors show, under
reasonable assumptions, that the auction is always preferable when bidders' signals
are independent. For affiliated signals, the result holds under certain restrictions
on the seller's choice of negotiating mechanism. The result suggests that the value
of negotiating skill is small relative to the value of additional competition. The
paper also shows how the analogies between monopoly theory and auction theory can
help derive new results in auction theory.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Muhamet Yildiz*Econometrica. 2003. Vol. 71. No. 3. P. 793-811.

In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player's bargaining
power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when. This
paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different
beliefs about which player will make an offer and when. Excessive optimism about
making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement. The main result states
that, despite this, if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently
long future, then in equilibrium they will agree immediately. This result is also
extended to other canonical models of optimism.

Опубликовано на портале: 12-05-2004

*Leo K. Simon*Review of Economic Studies. 1984. Vol. 51. P. 209-230.

Presents a study which developed a game-theoretic model of a pure exchange, monetary
economy in which buyers and sellers announce both quantities and prices. Motivation
and outline of the model; Similarities and differences between the model and that
of Bertrand's; Components of the strategic market game.

**Bidding Rings**[статья]

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007

*John McMillan*,

*R. Preston McAfee*American Economic Review. 1992. Vol. 82. No. 3. P. 579-99.

The authors characterize coordinated bidding strategies in two cases: a weak cartel,
in which the bidders cannot make side-payments; and a strong cartel, in which the
cartel members can exclude new entrants and can make transfer payments. The weak
cartel can do no better than have its members submit identical bids. The strong cartel
in effect reauctions the good among the cartel members.

**Cheap Talk**[статья]

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007

*Joseph Farrel*,

*Matthew Rabin*Journal of Economic Perspectives. 1996. Vol. 10. No. 3. P. 103-118.

Economists often ask how private information is shared through markets, costly signaling,
and other mechanisms. Yet most information sharing is done through ordinary, informal
talk. Economists are inconsistent in their view of such 'cheap talk': sometimes it
is supposed that communication generally leads to efficient equilibria; other times
it is supposed that since 'talk is cheap,' it is never credible. The authors think
both views are wrong. In this paper, they describe what some recent research in game
theory teaches about when people will convey private information by cheap talk.

**Common Agency**[статья]

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007

*B. Douglas Bernheim*,

*Michael D. Whinston*Econometrica. 1986. Vol. 54. No. 4. P. 923-942.

We extend the principal-agent framework with risk-neutral principals to situations
in which several principals simultaneously and independently attempt to influence
a common agent. We show that implementation is, in the aggregate, always efficient
(cost-minimizing), and that noncooperative behavior induces an efficient (potentially
second-best) action choice if and only if collusion among the principals would implement
the first-best action at the first-best level of cost. We also investigate the existence
of equilibria, the distribution of net rewards among principals, the characteristics
of actions chosen in inefficient equilibria, and potential institutional remedies
for welfare losses induced by noncooperative behavior.

**Contracting with Externalities**[статья]

Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007

*Ilya R. Segal*Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1999. Vol. 114. No. 2. P. 337-388.

The paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and
N agents when the utility of each agent depends on all agents' trades with the principal.
When the principal commits to a set of publicly observable bilateral contract offers,
the arising inefficiency is due entirely to the externalities imposed on non-signers.
In contrast, when the principal's offers are privately observed, the distortion is
due to the externalities given agents' equilibrium trades. Comparison of the two
externalities determines the relative efficiency of the two contracting regimes.
In both cases, we show that when N is large, each agent can be treated as non-pivotal,
provided that appropriate continuity assumptions are satisfied. We also study the
case in which the principal can condition each agent's trade on other agents' messages.
We characterize the set of such mechanisms in which each agent's participation is
voluntary. When the principal can commit to any such mechanism, she implements the
first-best outcome, while threatening each deviator with the harshest possible punishment.
However, in the presence of noise that goes to zero slower than N goes to infinity,
in the limit we obtain a (generally inefficient) outcome in which each agent feels
non-pivotal.