Journal of Economic Theory
Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007Roger B. Myerson, Mark A. Satterthwaite Journal of Economic Theory. 1981. Vol. 29. No. 2.
We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object. The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other. We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational, and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient mechanisms without outside subsidies. For a wide class of problems we show how to compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade, and mechanisms that can maximize a broker's expected profit.
Factor Saving Innovation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-02-2005Michele Boldrin, David Knudsen Levine Journal of Economic Theory. 2002. Vol. 105. No. 1. P. 18-41.
It has been argued that concave models exhibit less "endogeneity of growth" than models with increasing returns to scale. Here we study a simple model of factor saving technological improvement in a concave framework. Capital can be used either to reproduce itself, or, at some additional cost, to produce a higher quality of capital, which requires less labor input. If better quality capital can be produced quickly, we get a model of exogenous balanced growth as a special case of ours. If, however, better quality capital can be produced slowly, we get a model of "endogenous growth" in which the growth rate of the economy and the rate of adoption of new technologies is determined by preferences, technology and initial conditions. Moreover, in the latter case, the process of growth is necessarily uneven, exhibiting a natural cycle with alternating periods of high and slow growth. Growth paths and technological innovations also exhibit dependence upon initial conditions. The model provides a step toward a theory of endogenous innovation under conditions of perfect competition.
Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole Journal of Economic Theory. 1991. Vol. 53. No. 2. P. 236-260.
We introduce a formal definition of perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) for multi-period games with observed actions. In a PBE, (P) the strategies form a Bayesian equilibrium for each continuation game, given the specified beliefs, and (B) beliefs are updated from period to period in accordance with Bayes rule whenever possible, and satisfy a “no-signaling-what-you-don't-know” condition. PBE is equivalent to sequential equilibrium if each player has only two types, or there are only two periods, but differs otherwise. Equivalence is restored by requiring that (B) apply to the relative probabilities of types with posterior probability zero.
Reputation and Imperfect Information [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 31-01-2007David M. Kreps, Robert B. Wilson Journal of Economic Theory. 1982. Vol. 27. No. 2. P. 253-279.
A common observation in the informal literature of economics (and elsewhere) is that is multistage games, players may seek early in the game to acquire a reputation for being tough or benevolent or something else. But this phenomenon is not observed in some formal game-theoretic analyses of finite games, such as Selten's finitely repeated chain-store game or in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma. We reexamine Selten's model, adding to it a small amount of imperfect (or incomplete) information about players' payoffs, and we find that this addition is sufficient to give rise to the reputation effect that one intuitively expects.