# Статьи

**Всего статей в данном разделе :**69

Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007

*Kee H. Chung*,

*Jeong-Kuk Kim*Journal of Corporate Finance. 1999. Vol. 5. No. 1. P. 35-54.

Empirical evidence suggests that the voting premium in the Korean securities market
is strongly related to the structure of corporate ownership. We find that the premium
attached to voting stock is positively and significantly associated with the control
value of a block of shares held by minority shareholders. We also find that the premium
is negatively related to both the fraction of shares that are voting shares and the
market value of equity. Empirical results indicate that private benefits of control
in Korea are worth about 10% of the value of equity.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Philip John Reny*,

*R. Preston McAfee*Econometrica. 1992. Vol. 60. No. 2. P. 395-421.

In models of asymmetric information, possession of private information leads to rents
for the possessors. This induces mechanism designers to distort away from efficiency.
The authors show that this is an artifact of the presumption that information is
independently distributed. Rent extraction in a large class of mechanism design games
is analyzed, and a necessary and sufficient condition for arbitrarily small rents
to private information is provided. Additionally, the two-person bargaining game
is shown to have an efficient solution under first-order stochastic dominance and
a hazard rate condition. Similar conditions allow full rent extraction in Milgrom-Weber
auctions.

Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2005

*Reinhard Selten*,

*Myrna Wooders*Games and Economic Behavior. 2001. Vol. 34. No. 1. P. 138-152.

We introduce a model of a cyclic game. Designed to take advantage of the recurring nature of certain economic and social situations, a cyclic game differs from an extensive form game in that a cyclic game does not necessarily have an end. The same situations, although with different players, may be repeated infinitely often. We provide an example showing that, even though a cyclic game has, in a sense, perfect information, it may not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. We demonstrate existence of equilibrium and illustrate the application of our model to an oligopolistic industry.

Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007

*Roger B. Myerson*,

*Mark A. Satterthwaite*Journal of Economic Theory. 1981. Vol. 29. No. 2.

We consider bargaining problems between one buyer and one seller for a single object.
The seller's valuation and the buyer's valuation for the object are assumed to be
independent random variables, and each individual's valuation is unknown to the other.
We characterize the set of allocation mechanisms that are Bayesian incentive compatible
and individually rational, and show the general impossibility of ex post efficient
mechanisms without outside subsidies. For a wide class of problems we show how to
compute mechanisms that maximize expected total gains from trade, and mechanisms
that can maximize a broker's expected profit.

Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007

*Robert J. Aumann*,

*Adam Brandenburger*Econometrica. 1995. Vol. 63. No. 5. P. 1161-1180.

Sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium in an n-person game are given in terms
of what the players know and believe - about the game, and about each other's rationality,
actions, knowledge, and beliefs. Mixed strategies are treated not as conscious randomizations,
but as conjectures, on the part of other players, as to what a player will do. Common
knowledge plays a smaller role in characterizing Nash equilibrium than had been supposed.
When n=2, mutual knowledge of the payoff functions, of rationality, and of the
conjectures implies that the conjectures form a Nash equilibrium. When n (greater
than or equal to) 3 and there is a common prior, mutual knowledge of the payoff functions
and of rationality, and common knowledge of the conjectures, imply that the conjectures
form a Nash equilibrium. Examples show the results to be tight.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*George J. Mailath*,

*Larry Samuelson*,

*Jeroen M. Swinkels*Econometrica. 1993. Vol. 61. No. 2. P. 273-302.

Different extensive form games with the same reduced normal form can have different
information sets and subgames. This generates a tension between a belief in the strategic
relevance of information sets and subgames and a belief in the sufficiency of the
reduced normal form. We identify a property of extensive form information sets and
subgames which we term strategic independence. Strategic independence is captured
by the reduced normal form, and can be used to define normal form information sets
and subgames. We prove a close relationship between these normal form structures
and their extensive form namesakes. Using these structures, we are able to motivate
and implement solution concepts corresponding to subgame perfection, sequential equilibrium,
and forward induction entirely in the reduced normal form, and show close relations
between their implications in the normal and extensive form.

**Factor Saving Innovation**[статья]

Опубликовано на портале: 14-02-2005

*Michele Boldrin*,

*David Knudsen Levine*Journal of Economic Theory. 2002. Vol. 105. No. 1. P. 18-41.

It has been argued that concave models exhibit less "endogeneity of growth" than
models with increasing returns to scale. Here we study a simple model of factor saving
technological improvement in a concave framework. Capital can be used either to reproduce
itself, or, at some additional cost, to produce a higher quality of capital, which
requires less labor input. If better quality capital can be produced quickly, we
get a model of exogenous balanced growth as a special case of ours. If, however,
better quality capital can be produced slowly, we get a model of "endogenous growth"
in which the growth rate of the economy and the rate of adoption of new technologies
is determined by preferences, technology and initial conditions. Moreover, in the
latter case, the process of growth is necessarily uneven, exhibiting a natural cycle
with alternating periods of high and slow growth. Growth paths and technological
innovations also exhibit dependence upon initial conditions. The model provides a
step toward a theory of endogenous innovation under conditions of perfect competition.

Опубликовано на портале: 07-07-2005

*Reinhard Selten*European Economic Review. 1998. Vol. 42. No. 3-5. P. 413-436.

On the basis of experimental evidence reported in the literature the paper draws
conclusions about the bounded rationality exhibited by human economic behaviour.
Among the topics discussed are presentation effects caused by superficial analysis,
strategic reasoning and strategy construction based on reciprocity and fairness,
avoidance of circular concepts in step by step strategic reasoning, ex-post rationality
and learning direction theory, presence of both adaptive and analytic approaches
to repeated decision tasks, and the absence of quantitative expectations and optimization
in typical repeated game strategies

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Drew Fudenberg*,

*Eric S. Maskin*Econometrica. 1986. Vol. 54. No. 3. P. 533-554.

When either there are only two players or a "full dimensionality" condition holds,
any individually rational payoff vector of a one-shot game of complete information
can arise in a perfect equilibrium of the infinitely-repeated game if players are
sufficiently patient. In contrast to earlier work, mixed strategies are allowed in
determining the individually rational payoffs (even when only realized actions are
observable). Any individually rational payoffs of a one-shot game can be approximated
by sequential equilibrium payoffs of a long but finite game of incomplete information,
where players' payoffs are almost certainly as in the one-shot game.

**Games Played Through Agents**[статья]

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Aldo Rustichini*,

*Andrea Prat*Econometrica. 2003. Vol. 71. No. 4. P. 989-1026.

We introduce a game of complete information with multiple principals and multiple
common agents. Each agent makes a decision that can affect the payoffs of all principals.
Each principal offers monetary transfers to each agent conditional on the action
taken by the agent. We characterize pure-strategy equilibria and we provide conditions-in
terms of game balancedness-for the existence of an equilibrium with an efficient
outcome. Games played through agents display a type of strategic inefficiency that
is absent when either there is a unique principal or there is a unique agent.

Опубликовано на портале: 30-01-2007

*Eric van Damme*,

*Hans Carlsson*Econometrica. 1993. Vol. 61. No. 5. P. 989-1018.

A global game is an incomplete information game where the actual payoff structure
is determined by a random draw from a given class of games and where each player
makes a noisy observation of the selected game. For 2 x 2 games, it is shown that,
when the noise vanishes, iterated elimination of dominated strategies in the global
game forces the players to conform to J. C. Harsanyi and R. Selten's risk dominance
criterion.

Опубликовано на портале: 07-07-2005

*Reinhard Selten*,

*Klaus Abbink*,

*Joachim Buchta*,

*Abdolkarim Sadrieh*Games and Economic Behavior. 2003. Vol. 45. No. 1. P. 19-37.

Using the strategy method (Selten 1967) we elicit subjects' strategies for playing
any 2-person 3x3-game with integer payoffs between 0 and 99. In each of 5 tournaments,
every strategy pair plays 500000 games. The frequency of pure strategy equilibrium
play increases from 51% in the first to 74% in the last tournament, with the equilibria
that maximize joint payoff being preferred when multiple exist. For games without
pure equilibria, strategies are typically based on elements of the best-reply cascade:
MAP (maximize the expected payoff against uniformly randomizing opponents), BR-MAP
(best reply to MAP), and BR-BR-MAP (best reply to BR-MAP).

Опубликовано на портале: 14-02-2005

*David Knudsen Levine*,

*Michele Boldrin*International Economic Review. 2004. Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 327-350.

In the modern theory of growth, monopoly plays a crucial role both as a cause and
an effect of innovation. Innovative firms, it is argued, would have insufficient
incentive to innovate should the prospect of monopoly power not be present. This
theme of monopoly runs throughout the theory of growth, international trade, and
industrial organization. We argue that monopoly is neither needed for, nor a necessary
consequence of innovation. In particular, intellectual property is not necessary
for, and may hurt more than help, innovation and growth. We argue that, as a practical
matter, it is more likely to hurt.

Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007

*Dilip Abreu*,

*Paul Robert Milgrom*,

*David Pearce*Econometrica. 1991. Vol. 59. No. 6. P. 1713-1734.

In a repeated partnership game with imperfect monitoring, we distinguish among the
effects of (1) reducing the interest rate, (2) shortening the period over which actions
are held fixed, and (3) shortening the lag with which accumulated information is
reported. All three changes are equivalent in games with perfect monitoring. With
imperfect monitoring, reducing the interest rate always increases the possibilities
for cooperation, but the other two changes always have the reverse effect when the
interest rate is small.

Опубликовано на портале: 08-07-2005

*Kenneth Joseph Arrow*Games and Economic Behavior. 2003. Vol. 45. No. 1. P. 15-18.

I give some personal reactions to the development of game theory as it found application
in economic analysis during the last half-century. I discuss which contributions
have in fact found use and, in particular, what was the role of Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior in light of previous and subsequent developments.