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Что такое экономическая социология? Это не "междисциплинарные исследования". Это не "изучение социальных проблем в экономике". Это не проведение опросов населения. Это не маркетинговые исследования. Что же это? (подробнее...)

Статьи

Всего статей в данном разделе : 161

Опубликовано на портале: 15-09-2006
Виктор Борисович Студенцов Социологические исследования. 1993.  № 4. С. 116-126. 
Статья посвящена анализу концепции, которая в Великобритании носит название «демократия собственников». В других странах она выступает под именами «народного капитализма», концепции создания собственности у трудящихся и т. п. Автор рассматривает причины оживления в 1980-х интереса к идеям «демократии собственников». Прежде всего, это желание посредством диффузии капитала снять с повестки дня императив обеспечения масс работой. В статье также дан сравнительный анализ деклараций и достижений неоконсерваторов в политике «обуржуазивания» народа.
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Опубликовано на портале: 19-06-2006
Владимир Ефимович Гимпельсон, Алла Константиновна Назимова Социологические исследования. 1991.  № 8. С. 22-31. 
В качестве догмы в статье рассматривается один из основополагающих идеологических мифов, будто общенародная (а на самом деле государственная) собственность авто¬матически превращает каждого из граждан в ее хозяина. Авторы признают и то, что данное положение не имеет никакого отношения к действительности, и то, что до сих пор не известен ответ ни на один из ключевых вопросов, связанных с преобразованием административной экономики в рыночную. Неизвестно, в какой мере ря¬довые советские работники готовы к изменению своих социальных ролей, к тому, чтобы стать либо настоящими хозяевами-предпринимателями, либо столь же настоящими наемными рабочими. Некоторое представление о ситуации авторы пытаются составить, опираясь на данные опроса, проведенного ими на нескольких предприятиях в крупных промышленных центрах.
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Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2009
Nicole Woolsey Biggart

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Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2007
Ronald Philip Dore Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005.  Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 437-446. 
There are good reasons for national differences in corporate governance, differences in the distributional outcomes desired and differences in motivational resources; material sticks and carrots are not the only ways of keeping top managers efficient, honest and dynamic. Yet, too often discussions of corporate governance assume the Anglo-Saxon model to be normal and others“deviant”– a notion to be challenged, but nevertheless the dominant assumption among the“reformers” of corporate governance in Japan and Germany. Most of the reforms in those two countries over the past decade have purported to be about making top managers more honest and efficient. In fact their purport has more often been to change distributional outcomes, favouring shareholders at the expense of employees.
Опубликовано на портале: 06-08-2003
Neil Fligstein Экономическая социология. 2001.  Т. 2. № 1. С. 4-25. 
"New Institutional" Theories have proliferated across the social sciences. While they have substantial disagreements, they agree that institutions are created to produce local social orders, are social constructions, fundamentally about how powerful groups create rules of interaction and maintain unequal resource distributions, and yet, once in existence, both constrain and enable actors in subsequent institution building. I present a critique of these theories that focuses on their inadequate attention to the role of social power and actors in the creation of institutions. An alternative view of the dynamics of institutions is sketched out based on a more sociological conception of rules, resources, and social skill.
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Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer Competition and Change. 2005.  Vol. 9. No. 1. P. 7–47. 
Why did CEO remuneration explode during the 1990s and persist at high levels, even after the Internet bubble burst? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given of this paradox, mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science, business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy and network analysis. It is argued that the diffusion of stock options and financial market-related incentives, supposed to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration and wealth, both at micro and macro level. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of executives with financiers, who have exploited the long-run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining power. The article also discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability and the adverse consequences of CEO and top-manager opportunism: reputation, business ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or a shift from a shareholder to a stakeholder conception.
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Sigurt Vitols International Journal of Disclosure and Governance. 2005.  Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 357-367. 
Close links between banks and large companies have been seen as a key component of Germany’s corporate governance system. The recent sale of large shareholdings by banks raises the question of to what extent this system will converge to the US model of dispersed ownership. This paper argues that concentrated ownership will remain a key feature of this system. In addition, board-level representation of employees and the lack of a culture of independent directors are further factors supporting incremental change in Germany’s corporate governance system rather than wholesale convergance to the US model.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2009
Wai-Keung Chung, Gary G. Hamilton
This article answers the following question: 'What is the organizational medium that has allowed a few Chinese businesspeople in East and Southeast Asia to accumulate considerable wealth and economic power?' In the course of giving an answer, we show the organizational differences between traditional business networks in the late Qing and early Republican periods and the Chinese business networks in modern capitalist Asia. We argue that, throughout the twentieth century, Chinese business people outside of China proper began to adapt Western corporate structures for their own purposes and that this organizational innovation allowed Chinese to develop and sustain personal networks through which wealth and power could be concentrated.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004
Wayne E. Baker, Robert R. Faulkner, Gene A. Fisher American Sociological Review. 1998.  Vol. 63. No. 2. P. 147-176. 
We propose a theory of the market as an "intertemporal" process that integrates multiple theoretical perspectives. Using event-history methods, we analyze the dissolution of interorganizational market ties between advertising agencies and their clients as a function of three forces-competition, power, and institutional forces. The informal "rules of exchange" institutionalized in the "emergence" phase of the advertising services market include exclusivity (sole-source) and loyalty (infrequent switching). We find that most exchange relationships between advertising agencies and their clients are indeed exclusive, and most last for several years; but competition, power, and institutional forces support or undermine these rules. Most institutional forces reduce the risk of dissolution of agency-client ties. Powerful advertising agencies mobilize resources to increase tie stability, but powerful clients mobilize resources to increase or decrease stability. Competition is the weakest market force, but it has a consistent and substantial effect on tie dissolution: Competition always increases the risk of dissolution. We conclude that the market is institutionalized as imperfectly repeated patterns of exchange, because competition and changing norms about the duration of market ties destabilize market relationships.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-07-2003
Arne L. Kalleberg, Mark E. Van Buren American Sociological Review. 1996.  Vol. 61. No. 1. P. 47-66. 

Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2009
Nicole Woolsey Biggart, Martin Tolich, Martin Kenney Journal of Management Studies. 1999.  Vol. 36. No. 5. P. 587-607. 
One of the greatest difficulties Japanese multinationals have had is managing American managers in their US subsidiaries. The reason for this is fundamental and profound: Americans and Japanese conceive of management very differently and have strikingly different conceptions of themselves as managers and of correct management practice. We do two things in this paper. First, borrowing from social psychology, we explore the idea of the `management self'. Second, we report our research on management self-conception and style in Japanese-owned factories or `transplants' in the USA. The research reports the results of 34 interviews conducted with 19 US and Japanese managers in three electronics transplants. Each factory had adopted different combinations or `hybridizations' of the management styles of the two countries. The three factories had very different characters. One was dominated by Japanese management practice, another by American practice, and the third was a hybrid of the two styles. We found four factors critical determinants of management style: the nationality of the general manager, a stated preference (or lack thereof) for bicultural management, control over the budget-setting process, and the strength of the Japanese assignees
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Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Sigurt Vitols Competition and Change. 2004.  Vol. 8. No. 4. P. 357-374. 
In comparative political economy it has become commonplace to distinguish between two types of corporate governance systems. In shareholder systems, influence over company management is concentrated with institutional investors holding small percentages of companies' shares. In stakeholder systems, influence is shared between large shareholders, employees, the community and suppliers and customers. This paper contributes to the literature addressing recent changes in the German variant of the stake-holder system by proposing a few new concepts. On the level of institutions, it is argued that the stakeholder system is not being replaced by a shareholder system in Germany. Rather, an augmented stakeholder system is emerging through the inclusion of institutional investors in the old stakeholder coalition of interests. On the level of practice, it is argued that negotiated shareholder value is being adopted in Germany. This German variant of shareholder value is distinct from Anglo-American practice because major changes implementing shareholder value must be negotiated within the augmented stakeholder coalition. As a result, performance incentives for employees tend to be less strong than is the case in the USA and UK.
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Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2009
Robert C. Feenstra, W. Choe, Gary G. Hamilton, Eun Mie Lim International Sociology. 2009.  Vol. 15. No. 2. P. 288-305 . 
This article shows that economic organization has independent and direct effects on the course of economic development. Most existing theories of economic development ignore the dynamic role of inter-firm interactions and, instead, stress state policies and macro-economic forces as the decisive factors creating a country's industrial structure. Our research shows that developing economies have emergent organizational dimensions that, once they become going concerns, create momentum and trajectory. Using South Korea and Taiwan as ease studies, this article demonstrates that the divergent economic outcomes of these two countries can best be explained by emerging differences in the organization of economies.
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Опубликовано на портале: 23-09-2003
Stavros Ioannides American Journal of Economics and Sociology. 2003.  Vol. 62. No. 3. P. 533-. 
We explore the relevance to the theory of economic organization of the distinction introduced by Hayek between two kinds of social order: spontaneous orders and organizations. We argue that Hayek's ideas lead to an understanding of the business firm as a process, which comes very close to some of the core notions of the evolutionary theory of the firm, while they still view the firm as the outcome of a contract among asset owners. First of all, we put forth a simple conceptual schema in order to differentiate between contracts that lead to the formation of an organization and ordinary market contracts. We then explore the conditions for an understanding of the firm as a set of interconnected processes, rather than as an end state. Finally, we introduce the concept of purposeful direction as an important condition for the existence of the firm and we show the history-contingent character of the firm's growth.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley Industrial and Corporate Change. 2006.  Vol. 15. No. 1. P. 77-99 . 
The increasing significance of project-based forms of organizing economic activities in many industries has stimulated considerable interest in project-based firms (PBFs) as distinctive kinds of economic actors that are seen by some as heralding a new logic of organizing. In particular, their fluid, temporary nature and membership of multiple networks, alliances, and partnerships have been construed as critical to the generation of radical innovations. However, PBFs differ considerably in a number of respects, notably the singularity of their goals and outputs and the distinctiveness and stability of work roles and task organization. At least four distinct ideal types of PBFs can be distinguished in these terms that can be expected to vary in their prevalence and importance across industrial sectors and in different kinds of societies because of differences in investor and employee commitment and coordination costs.
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