Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 184
«Колея» Российской модернизации [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-10-2007
Александр Александрович Аузан
Общественные науки и современность.
2007.
№ 6.
С. 54-60.
В центре внимания автора – проблемы зависимости от предшествующего развития России, точнее – «колеи» развития и возможностей выбраться из нее. Рассматриваются пять версий, объясняющих причины зависимости от предшествующего развития, их применимость к ситуации в России и механизмы выхода на новую траекторию. Делается вывод, что в целом следует говорить, скорее, об институциональной инерции, ставящей свои проблемы, которые, по мнению автора, в принципе могут быть преодолены.
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Journal of Finance.
2000.
Vol. 55.
No. 1.
P. 1-33 .
This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the "outcome
model," dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders
to disgorge cash. According to the "substitute model," insiders interested in issuing
equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment
of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder
rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts
the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with
different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model
of dividends.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson
European Management Review.
2008.
Vol. 5.
No. 1.
P. 23-26.
The article 'A New Finance Capitalism?' raises an important paradox. Institutional investors are growing in size and the concentration of their stakes gives them potential influence over managers. Yet we observe an unexpected absence of shareholder activism and voice on the part of institutional investors in contemporary America. Concentration occurs without commitment. This comment further explores some reasons why today's largest investors seem resigned to or even to benefit from their relative passivity and preference of exit over voice. These reasons include conflicts of interest, market failures, lack of organizational capabilities, use of informal voice, and dependence of markets for corporate control. Corporate governance scholars have surprisingly little evidence on these topics, which suggest an important agenda for future research.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Ruth Aguilera, Gregory Jackson, Igor Filatotchev, Howard Gospel
Organization Science.
2008.
Vol. 19.
No. 3.
P. 475-492 .
This paper develops an organizational approach to corporate governance and assesses
the effectiveness of corporate governance and implications for policy. Most corporate
governance research focuses on a universal link between corporate governance practices
(e. g., board structure, shareholder activism) and performance outcomes, but neglects
how interdependencies between the organization and diverse environments lead to variations
in the effectiveness of different governance practices. In contrast to such closed
systems approaches, we propose a framework based on open systems approaches to organizations,
which examines these organizational interdependencies in terms of the costs, contingencies,
and complementarities of different corporate governance practices. These three sets
of organizational factors are useful in analyzing the effectiveness of corporate
governance in diverse organizational environments. We also explore the impact of
costs, contingencies, and complementarities on the effectiveness of different governance
aspects through the use of stylized cases and discuss the implications for different
approaches to policy such as soft law or hard law.
Are German banks different? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols
Small Business Economics.
1998.
Vol. 10.
No. 2.
P. 79-91.
In recent years there has been a vigorous revival of the long-standing debate about the "uniqueness" of German banks. To date little consensus has been reached; while some see few differences between the role of banks in Germany and in other countries, others claim that universal banks' equity shareholdings in and nomination of representatives to the boards of nonfinancial firms are the key institutional features driving the rest of the "German model" of long-term investment in high-quality, internationally competitive manufacturing. This article argues that the uniqueness of the German banking system lies (1) in its unusually high capacity to provide industrial finance in the form of long-term debt capital, and (2) in its avoidance of the "speculative boom-credit crunch" cycle experienced by almost every other advanced industrialized country in the 1980s and early 1990s. These two key characteristics are attributable to a regulatory framework which involves strict prudential regulation, access to long-term refinancing sources, and a federalist form of corporatism. Furthermore, the behavior of German banks must be analyzed within a broader institutional system of economic governance which includes corporatist labor market institutions and a relatively large and modern SME sector.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Steven Casper, Mark Lehrer, David Soskice
Industry and Innovation.
2008.
Vol. 6.
No. 1.
P. 5 - 24.
The paper explores the influence of institutional frameworks on the evolution of the German software and biotechnology sectors. It links institutional constraints to poor performance of German firms in high volume market niches characterized by turbulent technological change and substantial financial risk. However, German firms are prospering in software services and “platform technologies” in biotechnology. The company organizational structures and investment strategies needed to excel in these market segments provide a close “fit” with incentives created within the German economy.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-01-2007
Bob Jessop
Review of International Political Economy.
1997.
Vol. 4.
No. 3.
P. 561-581.
The article relates capitalism's distinctive dynamic to the nature of the wage relation
and self-valorization of capital. Capitalism has no final telos: its future remains
open in the face of structural changes and social struggles. This source of capitalist
dynamism also opens it to external influence. Some key changes in the 'government
and governance' of economics and politics are also discussed. These include: the
denationalization of statehood, a partial de-statization of politics, and the internationalization
of policy regimes. Among counter-trends are the survival of the national state as
an instance of meta-governance.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-01-2007
Geoffrey M. Hodgson
Journal of Economic Issues.
2003.
Vol. 37.
No. 2.
P. 471-478.
Under capitalism there is a potential for increasing socioeconomic complexity and
greater specialization of skills.1 One implication is that there is a potential for increasing
inequalities of wealth, income, and power on both a national and international scale.
What follows is an updated, broad-brush account of possible future developments in a
knowledge-intensive capitalist economy. They can themselves be manifest in different
ways, in a number of quite different institutional frameworks.
Опубликовано на портале: 19-01-2007
Ernesto Screpanti
Review of International Political Economy.
1999.
Vol. 6.
No. 1.
P. 1-26.
This article proposes a classification of capitalist forms on the basis of two concepts,
'property rights regimes' (PRRs) and 'accumulation governance structures' (AGSs).
The former defines the way in which the ownership of wealth and surplus value is
distributed, the latter the institutional systems governing the uses of surplus value
to sustain accumulation. Three PRRs-'concentrated private property', 'diffused private
property' and 'state property'-and four AGSs-'goods markets', 'companies markets',
'external hierarchies' and 'internal hierarchies'-are defined. Various historical
forms of capitalism are described as resulting from particular combinations of PRRs
and AGSs. Then a few ideal types are outlined: 'classical capitalism', 'market-oriented
corporate capitalism' and 'bank-oriented corporate capitalism'. Finally a hypothesis
is advanced as to how capitalism evolves, namely that historical transformations
of PRRs and AGSs tend to pave the way for the emergence of 'autonomous capital':
accumulation is controlled through complex systems of external hierarchies among
firms; the large concerns which are in command of these hierarchical structures are
collectively self-owned and formally controlled by their managers through strategic
cross-shareholding; no external shareholder exerts effective control.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Sigurt Vitols
Corporate Governance: An International Review.
2005.
Vol. 13.
No. 3.
P. 386 - 396.
Coherence, Diversity, and the Evolution of Capitalisms—The Institutional Complementarity Hypothesis [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review.
2005.
Vol. 2.
No. 1.
P. 43-80.
What are the forces that make relatively and transitorily coherent the institutional configurations of capitalism? In response to the literature on the variety of capitalisms, this article investigates the relative explanatory power of various hypotheses: institutional complementarity, institutional hierarchy, coevolution, simple compatibility or isomorphism. Compatibility is too often confused with complementarity and it is frequently an ex-post recognition, rarely an ex ante design. Both hybridization and endometabolism are the driving forces in the transformation of institutional configurations. Uncertainty and the existence of some slack in the coupling of various institutions are key features that call for the mixing of various methodologies in order to detect complementarities. This framework is then used in order to show that three distinct institutional complementarities are at the origin of the more successful national economies since the 90s. Thus, institutional diversity is being recreated and the existence of complementarities plays a role in this process.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson, Richard Deeg
Journal Of International Business Studies.
2008.
Vol. 39.
No. 4.
P. 540-561.
This paper examines the role of institutional analysis within the field of international business (IB) studies. Within IB, institutions matter, but the view of institutions tends to be "thin", utilizing summary indicators rather than detailed description, and thus approaches institutions as unidimensional ''variables" that impact on particular facets of business activity. This paper argues that IB research would be usefully advanced by greater attention to comparing the topography of institutional landscapes and understanding their diversity. A number of alternative case-based approaches are outlined that draw on a growing "comparative capitalisms" literature in sociology and political science. The paper develops a number of empirical examples to show the utility and limits of these approaches for IB scholars.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2009
Gary G. Hamilton
Examines the former attempts to capture the China market, beginning with opium trade
in the middle of the nineteenth century and points out that in each head-to-head
competition, Western merchants lost to their Chinese counterparts. Possibility that
Chinese consumer market will be among the largest in the world in the late 1990s.
Examination of some organizational reasons that give Chinese businesspeople some
comparative advantages in economic competition.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson, A. Moerke
Corporate Governance: An International Review.
2008.
Vol. 13.
No. 3.
P. 2005.
Germany and Japan are often seen deviating from an economic model of shareholder
control
and thereby as being similar by virtue of their mutual contrast with the US. Given
the common
challenges for bank-based and stakeholder-oriented models of corporate governance,
Germany–Japan comparison seems particularly timely. This article provides an
introductory
overview and analysis for the Special Issue by comparing recent developments in corporate
law reform, banking and finance, and employment in Germany and Japan. While rejecting
arguments for international convergence, we discuss this evidence of simultaneous
continuity
and change in corporate governance as a potential form of hybridisation of national
models
or renegotiation of stakeholder coalitions in German and Japanese firms. One consequence
is
the growing diversity of firm-level corporate governance practices within national
systems.
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