Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 184
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008
Martin Höpner
Comparative Politics.
2007.
Vol. 39.
No. 4.
P. 401-420.
Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than
the Christian Democrats, although in terms of the distributional outcomes of such
reforms the situation should be reversed? This empirical puzzle seems to contradict
insights from comparative political economy and the varieties of capitalism approach,
in particular. Social Democrats and trade unions adopted their liberal attitude to
company regulation after World War II. In the 1970s competition policy was introduced
to make Keynesian macroeconomic policy work. Since the 1990s labor favored shareholder-oriented
reforms because they helped employee representatives in conflicts over managerial
control. The analysis has implications for partisan theory, institutional complementarity,
and conflict models in comparative political economy.


Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004
Nicole Woolsey Biggart, Mauro F. Guillén
American Sociological Review.
1999.
Vol. 64.
No. 5.
P. 722-747.
Theories of economic development as diverse as modernization, dependency, world-system,
and market reform take a "critical factor" view. Proponents of each theory argue
that countries fail to develop because of an obstacle to economic growth. We argue
instead that neither a critical factor nor a single path leads to economic development;
viable paths vary. Economic growth depends on linking a country's historically developed
patterns of social organization to the opportunities of global markets. We formulate
a sociological theory of cross-national comparative advantage including not only
economic factor endowments but also institutionalized patterns of authority and organization.
Such patterns legitimize certain actors and certain relationships among those actors,
which facilitate development success in some activities but not in others. We illustrate
this approach to understanding development outcomes with a comparative analysis of
the difficult rise of the automobile assembly and components industries in South
Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Argentina.


Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley
Industrial and Corporate Change.
2002.
Vol. 11.
No. 3.
P. 497-528 .
The recent development of the biotechnology and computer industries has highlighted
the variety of ways in which firms in different countries and sectors can develop
innovative competences. Four aspects are particularly important: the degree of involvement
in the public science system, involvement in industry collaborations, reliance on
specialist skills of individuals, and the ability to change collective competences
radically. National and regional variations in these result from differences in dominant
institutional frameworks. In addition to the organization of capital and labour markets
and the structure of inter-firm relations, these frameworks include the nature of
the public science system. Particularly important features of these systems include:
the organization of research training, the flexibility of researchers and organizations
in developing novel goals and approaches, the organization of scientific careers,
and the prevalent science and technology policies of the state. Distinct combinations
of these institutional features have become established in different market economies
and led to contrasting styles of innovative competence development being adopted.
These in turn help to explain continuing variations in patterns of technological
change between countries.


Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2007
Ronald Philip Dore
Corporate Governance: An International Review.
2005.
Vol. 13.
No. 3.
P. 437-446.
There are good reasons for national differences in corporate governance, differences in the distributional outcomes desired and differences in motivational resources; material sticks and carrots are not the only ways of keeping top managers efficient, honest and dynamic. Yet, too often discussions of corporate governance assume the Anglo-Saxon model to be normal and others“deviant”– a notion to be challenged, but nevertheless the dominant assumption among the“reformers” of corporate governance in Japan and Germany. Most of the reforms in those two countries over the past decade have purported to be about making top managers more honest and efficient. In fact their purport has more often been to change distributional outcomes, favouring shareholders at the expense of employees.

Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008
Wolfgang Streeck, Colin Crouch, Robert Boyer, Bruno Amable, Peter A. Hall, Gregory Jackson
Socio-Economic Review.
2005.
Vol. 3.
No. 2.
P. 359-382.
Martin Höpner's paper was written to structure discussions at a workshop of
the ‘Complementarity Project’, which was held in Paris, 26–27 September
2003. The project was organized by Bruno Amable and Robert Boyer (CEPREMAP, Paris),
Colin Crouch (EUI, Florence), Martin Höpner and Wolfgang Streeck (Max Planck
Institute for the Study of Societies, Köln). The subject of the workshop was
the complementarity, real or imagined, of financial markets and industrial relations
in present-day ‘varieties of capitalism’. Apart from the organizers,
participants included Patrick Le Gales, Peter Hall, Gregory Jackson, Bruce Kogut,
David Marsden and Pascal Petit. In the following we document short excerpts from
five out of nine ‘reaction papers’ written by participants in advance
of the workshop. The selections were made by Wolfgang Streeck.


Do Institutions Cause Growth? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
Journal of Economic Growth.
2004.
Vol. 9.
No. 3.
P. 271-303.
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.


Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley
Organization Studies.
1994.
Vol. 15.
P. 153-182.
The identification of distinctive and effective forms of economic organization in
East Asia has emphasized the close connections between dominant social institutions
and ways of co-ordinating economic activities as well as the interrelations between
firm and market characteristics in separate business systems. Differences in major
institutions thus generate significant variations in how firms and markets are structured
and operate. These variations suggest that an important element in the analysis of
market economies is the comparison of firm-market relations across institutional
contexts. This requires their key characteristics to be identified. These can be
summarized under three main headings which constitute the components of business
systems: the nature of firms as economic actors, the nature of inter-firm relations
in markets and the nature of authoritative co-ordination and control systems within
firms. Thirteen major characteristics form the basic dimensions of business systems,
which vary as the result of differences in state structures, financial systems, cultural
conventions and other key institutional features. Interdependences between these
characteristics restrict the variety of business systems that become established
in market economies and suggest that five major kinds can be identified on the basis
of institutionalized patterns of risk-sharing and firm self-sufficiency: centrifugal,
partitioned, collaborative, co-ordinated and state-dependent. These types of business
system highlight the different patterns of economic organization, and some of their
institutional connections, which have developed in Europe and other industrialized
societies.


East Asian Enterprise Structures and the Comparative Analysis of Forms of Business
Organisation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley
Organization Studies.
1990.
Vol. 11.
No. 1.
P. 47-74.
The economic success of different forms of business organization in East Asian
countries emphasizes the variety of viable enterprise structures and suggests the
need for a comparative analysis of how they develop and operate in different
societal contexts. Major differences between East Asian business 'recipes' include
the range of activities that are authoritatively coordinated, their pattems of
development, the ways in which they are organized and controlled and the
organization of inter enterprise relations. These differences suggest eight major
dimensions on which dominant enterprise structures in different societies can be
compared and how their development can be linked to major social institutions.

Опубликовано на портале: 25-05-2009
Torben Iversen, David Soskice, Thomas R. Cusack
American Political Science Review.
2007.
Vol. 110.
No. 3.
P. 373-391 .
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR-minimum winning coalitions versus consensus-we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.


Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Wolfgang Streeck, Christine Trampusch
German Politics.
2005.
Vol. 14.
No. 2.
P. 174-195.
The central problem of the German economy is the high costs of labour, driven up
by the burden of funding an extensive welfare state through social insurance contributions
that operate as payroll taxes on employment. The study identifies the political causes
of the long-term rise in non-wage labour costs. It analyses the reforms of the last
decade, showing how the multiplicity of veto points in the German political economy
has weakened reform initiatives and reduced the prospect for effective reform in
the foreseeable future.


Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Gregory Jackson
Industrielle Beziehungen.
2005.
Vol. 23.
No. 3.
P. 1-28.
Why do employees have rights to representation within corporate boards in some countries,
but not in others? Board-level codetermination is widely considered a distinctive
feature of coordinated or nonliberal models of capitalism. Existing literature stresses
three sets of explanations for codetermination rooted in corporate governance, union
strength and political systems. The paper compares data from 22 OECD countries using
the QCA method (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) and fuzzy sets approach to explore
necessary and sufficient conditions for board-level codetermination. The results
show two central pathways toward codetermination both rooted primarily in union coordination
and consensual political systems, but with divergent implications for corporate governance
systems in Scandinavia and Germany.


Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008
Martin Höpner
Socio-Economic Review.
2005.
Vol. 3.
No. 2.
P. 383-388.


European Integration and the Clash of Capitalisms. Political Cleavages over Takeover Liberalization [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008
Martin Höpner, Helen Callaghan
Comparative European Politics.
2005.
Vol. 3.
No. 3.
P. 307-332.
Twenty years after the European Commission’s White Paper on the completion of
the internal market, the integration of national markets for corporate control continues to
lag behind the removal of barriers to trade in goods and services. To what extent does the
protracted political battle over legal harmonization in this area reflect a clash of interests
between liberal and coordinated national varieties of capitalism? To find out, we map the
distribution of political support for liberal takeover rules within and across countries by
analyzing a roll call vote on the takeover directive in the European Parliament in July
2001. Our data shows that, in line with the clash-of-capitalisms hypothesis, nationality did
trump party group position on a left-right axis as a predictor of delegates’ attitudes toward
takeover regulation. Given the increasing interference of EU-level legislative initiatives
with the regulatory pillars of coordinated market economies, and the accession of ten new
Eastern European member states, we expect the salience of the clash-of-capitalisms cleavage
to increase in the near future.


Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2009
Nicole Woolsey Biggart
Theory and Society.
2001.
Vol. 20.
No. 2.
P. 199-232.
Conclusion: Social theorists are challenged to explain an increasingly complex economic
order. It is clear that old theories that posited a developmental sequence from undeveloped
to industrialized cannot explain the diverse patterns of industrialization that exist.
Certainly, Japan is as developed as Western nations but its patterns of development,
its economic norms, and its industrial practices are substantially different from
the United States and even its Asian neighbors in Taiwan and South Korea. For example,
the fact that Japan has the largest banks in the world, and Taiwan relatively few
and weak ones (despite the world's largest per capita foreign reserve holdings),
cannot be explained only by recourse to market or state factors, although each play
a role. Both countries were literally awash in money in the 1980s, and both countries
are clearly capitalist societies where banking institutions are assumed to be critical
to economic development, as they have been in the West. But more than market and
political economy factors are at work here.
In Japan, historically developed institutional factors, dating from before the Meiji
Restoration and industrial revolution, created conditions for business group self-financing.
Modern-day keiretsu, such as Sumitomo and Mitsui, with their huge banks as centerpieces,
trace their origins to pre-industrial merchant houses under family ownership. Inheritance
practices in Japan are based on primogeniture, inheritance of the entire fortune
by the eldest son. This practice allowed merchant family fortunes to remain intact
under the stewardship of the heir. Successful families thus had huge sums of money
available to finance the businesses of affiliated branches operating under the badge
of the mother house. The descendents of the zaibatsu merchant houses, the keiretsu,
continue to rely on their own sources of finance, now institutionalized in banks
that serve their credit and other financial needs. To see large banks encapsulated
within business networks as only the outcome of distorted market conditions, or as
only the result of a powerful business class, misses the institutional origins and
overlooks the contemporary institutional underpinnings of the Japanese banking system.
Ironically, the weakness of Taiwanese banks can also be traced to a strong family
system. Chinese societies practice partible inheritance, that is, division of a family
estate equally among all sons. As a result, families divide their fortunes every
generation, mitigating against the development of large sums of money. Instead, there
is great pressure within families to develop multiple businesses so that at the death
of the family head, each son can claim an independent enterprise. Because all Chinese
families face the problem of setting up children in business (being an employee is
not a desirable status in Taiwan as it is in Japan), a range of informal lending
arrangements have arisen within families and among friends to generate investment
capital. Strong social norms dictate that one assist financially a kin member or
close friend. Banks play a relatively minor role in Taiwan because alternative institutional
arrangements, also with preindustrial origins, have obviated the need for banks for
some financial functions. Again, market factors are important to understanding the
strong curb market and weak formal banking system in Taiwan, and political economy
factors, notably the absence of a strong central bank, are also significant. But
an institutional explanation integrates these factors into an explanation that begins
with the character of the society being explained. We need theories that can account
for difference without reducing cases to unique instances, that do not presume the
individualistic character of Western social orders, and that are sensitive to an
array of ideal as well as material factors operating in different locations. Although
political economy, market, and culture theories each have contributions to make,
an institutional perspective of the type I outline may be especially suited to the
comparative analysis of emerging world economic organization. I think, ironically,
that a sensitivity to institutional factors may yield better theories of the West.
Rather than assume that the United States and Europe are the exemplars of advanced
capitalism, the closest empirical instances of the idealized competitive market,
Japan and other Asian nations are suggesting that the West is simply one form of
capitalist economic development, an expression no doubt, of the West's own institutional
heritage. When we relinquish ethnocentric perspectives we can begin to look at ourselves
and our own institutional heritage more clearly.


Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley
Accounting, Organizations and Society.
1999.
Vol. 24.
No. 5-6.
P. 507-524 .
It is becoming increasingly recognized that management accounting and management
control procedures and systems vary significantly between organizations, sectors
and societies. Four characteristics of control systems, in particular, differ considerably
between institutional contexts. These are: the extent to which control is exercised
overwhelmingly through formal rules and procedures, the degree of control exercised
over how unit activities are carried out, the influence and involvement of unit members
in exercising control, and the scope of the information used by the control system
in evaluating performance and deciding rewards and sanctions. These four characteristics
can be combined to constitute four distinct types of control system: bureaucratic,
output, delegated and patriarchal. The relative use of these kinds of control systems-and
their effectiveness-reflect major variations in the kinds of organizations and firms
that coordinate economic activities through administrative procedures, and their
related institutional contexts. The key features of firms here are the diversity
of activities coordinated, their rate of change, shareholder lock-in and the degree
of owner management. These in turn reflect the nature of the financial system and
state structures and policies. Additionally, the ways that skill development is organised
in a society and skills are controlled in labour markets affect control techniques
and practices, as do the nature of authority and trust relations. Thus, Taylorian
control systems are unlikely to be widely used in countries where skill training
is highly organised and controlled jointly by employers and unions-as for example
in many Central and Northern European states, just as delegated ones are improbable
in societies where systemic trust is low and authority patterns are patriarchal.

