Всего статей в данном разделе : 184
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner Comparative Politics. 2007. Vol. 39. No. 4. P. 401-420.
Why do German Social Democrats opt for more corporate governance liberalization than the Christian Democrats, although in terms of the distributional outcomes of such reforms the situation should be reversed? This empirical puzzle seems to contradict insights from comparative political economy and the varieties of capitalism approach, in particular. Social Democrats and trade unions adopted their liberal attitude to company regulation after World War II. In the 1970s competition policy was introduced to make Keynesian macroeconomic policy work. Since the 1990s labor favored shareholder-oriented reforms because they helped employee representatives in conflicts over managerial control. The analysis has implications for partisan theory, institutional complementarity, and conflict models in comparative political economy.
Developing Difference: Social Organization and the Rise of the Auto Industries of South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Argentina [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 22-05-2004Nicole Woolsey Biggart, Mauro F. Guillén American Sociological Review. 1999. Vol. 64. No. 5. P. 722-747.
Theories of economic development as diverse as modernization, dependency, world-system, and market reform take a "critical factor" view. Proponents of each theory argue that countries fail to develop because of an obstacle to economic growth. We argue instead that neither a critical factor nor a single path leads to economic development; viable paths vary. Economic growth depends on linking a country's historically developed patterns of social organization to the opportunities of global markets. We formulate a sociological theory of cross-national comparative advantage including not only economic factor endowments but also institutionalized patterns of authority and organization. Such patterns legitimize certain actors and certain relationships among those actors, which facilitate development success in some activities but not in others. We illustrate this approach to understanding development outcomes with a comparative analysis of the difficult rise of the automobile assembly and components industries in South Korea, Taiwan, Spain, and Argentina.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008Richard Whitley Industrial and Corporate Change. 2002. Vol. 11. No. 3. P. 497-528 .
The recent development of the biotechnology and computer industries has highlighted the variety of ways in which firms in different countries and sectors can develop innovative competences. Four aspects are particularly important: the degree of involvement in the public science system, involvement in industry collaborations, reliance on specialist skills of individuals, and the ability to change collective competences radically. National and regional variations in these result from differences in dominant institutional frameworks. In addition to the organization of capital and labour markets and the structure of inter-firm relations, these frameworks include the nature of the public science system. Particularly important features of these systems include: the organization of research training, the flexibility of researchers and organizations in developing novel goals and approaches, the organization of scientific careers, and the prevalent science and technology policies of the state. Distinct combinations of these institutional features have become established in different market economies and led to contrasting styles of innovative competence development being adopted. These in turn help to explain continuing variations in patterns of technological change between countries.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2007Ronald Philip Dore Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 3. P. 437-446.
There are good reasons for national differences in corporate governance, differences in the distributional outcomes desired and differences in motivational resources; material sticks and carrots are not the only ways of keeping top managers efficient, honest and dynamic. Yet, too often discussions of corporate governance assume the Anglo-Saxon model to be normal and others“deviant”– a notion to be challenged, but nevertheless the dominant assumption among the“reformers” of corporate governance in Japan and Germany. Most of the reforms in those two countries over the past decade have purported to be about making top managers more honest and efficient. In fact their purport has more often been to change distributional outcomes, favouring shareholders at the expense of employees.
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008Wolfgang Streeck, Colin Crouch, Robert Boyer, Bruno Amable, Peter A. Hall, Gregory Jackson Socio-Economic Review. 2005. Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 359-382.
Martin Höpner's paper was written to structure discussions at a workshop of the ‘Complementarity Project’, which was held in Paris, 26–27 September 2003. The project was organized by Bruno Amable and Robert Boyer (CEPREMAP, Paris), Colin Crouch (EUI, Florence), Martin Höpner and Wolfgang Streeck (Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Köln). The subject of the workshop was the complementarity, real or imagined, of financial markets and industrial relations in present-day ‘varieties of capitalism’. Apart from the organizers, participants included Patrick Le Gales, Peter Hall, Gregory Jackson, Bruce Kogut, David Marsden and Pascal Petit. In the following we document short excerpts from five out of nine ‘reaction papers’ written by participants in advance of the workshop. The selections were made by Wolfgang Streeck.
Do Institutions Cause Growth? [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Growth. 2004. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 271-303.
We revisit the debate over whether political institutions cause economic growth, or whether, alternatively, growth and human capital accumulation lead to institutional improvement. We find that most indicators of institutional quality used to establish the proposition that institutions cause growth are constructed to be conceptually unsuitable for that purpose. We also find that some of the instrumental variable techniques used in the literature are flawed. Basic OLS results, as well as a variety of additional evidence, suggest that (a) human capital is a more basic source of growth than are the institutions, (b) poor countries get out of poverty through good policies, often pursued by dictators, and (c) subsequently improve their political institutions.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008Richard Whitley Organization Studies. 1994. Vol. 15. P. 153-182.
The identification of distinctive and effective forms of economic organization in East Asia has emphasized the close connections between dominant social institutions and ways of co-ordinating economic activities as well as the interrelations between firm and market characteristics in separate business systems. Differences in major institutions thus generate significant variations in how firms and markets are structured and operate. These variations suggest that an important element in the analysis of market economies is the comparison of firm-market relations across institutional contexts. This requires their key characteristics to be identified. These can be summarized under three main headings which constitute the components of business systems: the nature of firms as economic actors, the nature of inter-firm relations in markets and the nature of authoritative co-ordination and control systems within firms. Thirteen major characteristics form the basic dimensions of business systems, which vary as the result of differences in state structures, financial systems, cultural conventions and other key institutional features. Interdependences between these characteristics restrict the variety of business systems that become established in market economies and suggest that five major kinds can be identified on the basis of institutionalized patterns of risk-sharing and firm self-sufficiency: centrifugal, partitioned, collaborative, co-ordinated and state-dependent. These types of business system highlight the different patterns of economic organization, and some of their institutional connections, which have developed in Europe and other industrialized societies.
East Asian Enterprise Structures and the Comparative Analysis of Forms of Business Organisation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008Richard Whitley Organization Studies. 1990. Vol. 11. No. 1. P. 47-74.
The economic success of different forms of business organization in East Asian countries emphasizes the variety of viable enterprise structures and suggests the need for a comparative analysis of how they develop and operate in different societal contexts. Major differences between East Asian business 'recipes' include the range of activities that are authoritatively coordinated, their pattems of development, the ways in which they are organized and controlled and the organization of inter enterprise relations. These differences suggest eight major dimensions on which dominant enterprise structures in different societies can be compared and how their development can be linked to major social institutions.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-05-2009Torben Iversen, David Soskice, Thomas R. Cusack American Political Science Review. 2007. Vol. 110. No. 3. P. 373-391 .
The standard explanation for the choice of electoral institutions, building on Rokkan's seminal, is that proportional representation (PR) was adopted by a divided right to defend its class interests against a a rising left. But new evidence shows that PR strengthens the left and redistribution, and we argue the standard view is wrong historically, analytically, and empirically. We offer a radically different explanation. Integrating two opposed interpretations of PR-minimum winning coalitions versus consensus-we propose that the right adopted PR when their support for consensual regulatory frameworks, especially those of labor markets and skill formation where co-specific investments were important, outweighed their opposition to the redistributive consequences; this occurred in countries with previously densely organized local economies. In countries with adversarial industrial relations, and weak coordination of business and unions, keeping majoritarian institutions helped contain the left. This explains the close association between current varieties of capitalism and electoral institutions, and why they persist over time.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007Wolfgang Streeck, Christine Trampusch German Politics. 2005. Vol. 14. No. 2. P. 174-195.
The central problem of the German economy is the high costs of labour, driven up by the burden of funding an extensive welfare state through social insurance contributions that operate as payroll taxes on employment. The study identifies the political causes of the long-term rise in non-wage labour costs. It analyses the reforms of the last decade, showing how the multiplicity of veto points in the German political economy has weakened reform initiatives and reduced the prospect for effective reform in the foreseeable future.
Employee Representation in the Board Compared: A Fuzzy Sets Analysis of Corporate Governance, Unionism, and Political Institutions [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Gregory Jackson Industrielle Beziehungen. 2005. Vol. 23. No. 3. P. 1-28.
Why do employees have rights to representation within corporate boards in some countries, but not in others? Board-level codetermination is widely considered a distinctive feature of coordinated or nonliberal models of capitalism. Existing literature stresses three sets of explanations for codetermination rooted in corporate governance, union strength and political systems. The paper compares data from 22 OECD countries using the QCA method (Qualitative Comparative Analysis) and fuzzy sets approach to explore necessary and sufficient conditions for board-level codetermination. The results show two central pathways toward codetermination both rooted primarily in union coordination and consensual political systems, but with divergent implications for corporate governance systems in Scandinavia and Germany.
Epilogue to ‘Explaining Institutional Complementarity’: What Have We Learnt? Complementarity, Coherence and Institutional Change [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008Martin Höpner Socio-Economic Review. 2005. Vol. 3. No. 2. P. 383-388.
European Integration and the Clash of Capitalisms. Political Cleavages over Takeover Liberalization [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, Helen Callaghan Comparative European Politics. 2005. Vol. 3. No. 3. P. 307-332.
Twenty years after the European Commission’s White Paper on the completion of the internal market, the integration of national markets for corporate control continues to lag behind the removal of barriers to trade in goods and services. To what extent does the protracted political battle over legal harmonization in this area reflect a clash of interests between liberal and coordinated national varieties of capitalism? To find out, we map the distribution of political support for liberal takeover rules within and across countries by analyzing a roll call vote on the takeover directive in the European Parliament in July 2001. Our data shows that, in line with the clash-of-capitalisms hypothesis, nationality did trump party group position on a left-right axis as a predictor of delegates’ attitudes toward takeover regulation. Given the increasing interference of EU-level legislative initiatives with the regulatory pillars of coordinated market economies, and the accession of ten new Eastern European member states, we expect the salience of the clash-of-capitalisms cleavage to increase in the near future.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2009Nicole Woolsey Biggart Theory and Society. 2001. Vol. 20. No. 2. P. 199-232.
Conclusion: Social theorists are challenged to explain an increasingly complex economic order. It is clear that old theories that posited a developmental sequence from undeveloped to industrialized cannot explain the diverse patterns of industrialization that exist. Certainly, Japan is as developed as Western nations but its patterns of development, its economic norms, and its industrial practices are substantially different from the United States and even its Asian neighbors in Taiwan and South Korea. For example, the fact that Japan has the largest banks in the world, and Taiwan relatively few and weak ones (despite the world's largest per capita foreign reserve holdings), cannot be explained only by recourse to market or state factors, although each play a role. Both countries were literally awash in money in the 1980s, and both countries are clearly capitalist societies where banking institutions are assumed to be critical to economic development, as they have been in the West. But more than market and political economy factors are at work here. In Japan, historically developed institutional factors, dating from before the Meiji Restoration and industrial revolution, created conditions for business group self-financing. Modern-day keiretsu, such as Sumitomo and Mitsui, with their huge banks as centerpieces, trace their origins to pre-industrial merchant houses under family ownership. Inheritance practices in Japan are based on primogeniture, inheritance of the entire fortune by the eldest son. This practice allowed merchant family fortunes to remain intact under the stewardship of the heir. Successful families thus had huge sums of money available to finance the businesses of affiliated branches operating under the badge of the mother house. The descendents of the zaibatsu merchant houses, the keiretsu, continue to rely on their own sources of finance, now institutionalized in banks that serve their credit and other financial needs. To see large banks encapsulated within business networks as only the outcome of distorted market conditions, or as only the result of a powerful business class, misses the institutional origins and overlooks the contemporary institutional underpinnings of the Japanese banking system. Ironically, the weakness of Taiwanese banks can also be traced to a strong family system. Chinese societies practice partible inheritance, that is, division of a family estate equally among all sons. As a result, families divide their fortunes every generation, mitigating against the development of large sums of money. Instead, there is great pressure within families to develop multiple businesses so that at the death of the family head, each son can claim an independent enterprise. Because all Chinese families face the problem of setting up children in business (being an employee is not a desirable status in Taiwan as it is in Japan), a range of informal lending arrangements have arisen within families and among friends to generate investment capital. Strong social norms dictate that one assist financially a kin member or close friend. Banks play a relatively minor role in Taiwan because alternative institutional arrangements, also with preindustrial origins, have obviated the need for banks for some financial functions. Again, market factors are important to understanding the strong curb market and weak formal banking system in Taiwan, and political economy factors, notably the absence of a strong central bank, are also significant. But an institutional explanation integrates these factors into an explanation that begins with the character of the society being explained. We need theories that can account for difference without reducing cases to unique instances, that do not presume the individualistic character of Western social orders, and that are sensitive to an array of ideal as well as material factors operating in different locations. Although political economy, market, and culture theories each have contributions to make, an institutional perspective of the type I outline may be especially suited to the comparative analysis of emerging world economic organization. I think, ironically, that a sensitivity to institutional factors may yield better theories of the West. Rather than assume that the United States and Europe are the exemplars of advanced capitalism, the closest empirical instances of the idealized competitive market, Japan and other Asian nations are suggesting that the West is simply one form of capitalist economic development, an expression no doubt, of the West's own institutional heritage. When we relinquish ethnocentric perspectives we can begin to look at ourselves and our own institutional heritage more clearly.
Firms, Institutions and Management Control: the Comparative Analysis of Coordination and Control Systems [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008Richard Whitley Accounting, Organizations and Society. 1999. Vol. 24. No. 5-6. P. 507-524 .
It is becoming increasingly recognized that management accounting and management control procedures and systems vary significantly between organizations, sectors and societies. Four characteristics of control systems, in particular, differ considerably between institutional contexts. These are: the extent to which control is exercised overwhelmingly through formal rules and procedures, the degree of control exercised over how unit activities are carried out, the influence and involvement of unit members in exercising control, and the scope of the information used by the control system in evaluating performance and deciding rewards and sanctions. These four characteristics can be combined to constitute four distinct types of control system: bureaucratic, output, delegated and patriarchal. The relative use of these kinds of control systems-and their effectiveness-reflect major variations in the kinds of organizations and firms that coordinate economic activities through administrative procedures, and their related institutional contexts. The key features of firms here are the diversity of activities coordinated, their rate of change, shareholder lock-in and the degree of owner management. These in turn reflect the nature of the financial system and state structures and policies. Additionally, the ways that skill development is organised in a society and skills are controlled in labour markets affect control techniques and practices, as do the nature of authority and trust relations. Thus, Taylorian control systems are unlikely to be widely used in countries where skill training is highly organised and controlled jointly by employers and unions-as for example in many Central and Northern European states, just as delegated ones are improbable in societies where systemic trust is low and authority patterns are patriarchal.