Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 184
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols
Economy and Society.
2001.
Vol. 30.
No. 4.
P. 553-564.
Germany's bank-based financial system has been generally perceived as good at providing long-term debt finance to traditional industry but poor at supplying equity capital to high-tech start-ups. In 1997 a special segment of the Frankfurt stock exchange, the Neuer Markt, was founded to improve the supply of high-risk equity capital in Germany. The subsequent listing of over 300 companies on the Neuer Markt, many of them in technology-intensive sectors, has led to speculation that Germany is rapidly closing the gap with the US, the world leader in high technology. Contrary to this view, this article suggests that these companies have more in common with traditional German small and medium-sized companies (SMEs) than with the Silicon Valley model of governance and innovation.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer
Competition and Change.
2005.
Vol. 9.
No. 1.
P. 7–47.
Why did CEO remuneration explode during the 1990s and persist at high levels, even after the
Internet bubble burst? This article surveys the alternative explanations that have been given
of this paradox, mainly by various economic theories with some extension to political science,
business administration, social psychology, moral philosophy and network analysis. It is
argued that the diffusion of stock options and financial market-related incentives, supposed
to discipline managers, have entitled them to convert their intrinsic power into remuneration
and wealth, both at micro and macro level. This is the outcome of a de facto alliance of
executives with financiers, who have exploited the long-run erosion of wage earners’ bargaining
power. The article also discusses the possible reforms that could reduce the probability
and the adverse consequences of CEO and top-manager opportunism: reputation, business
ethic, legal sanctions, public auditing of companies, or a shift from a shareholder to a
stakeholder conception.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley
Organization.
2003.
Vol. 10.
No. 3.
P. 481-501 .
Organization studies become institutionalized as a distinct research field in North
America in the 1960s as leading universities expanded to include the new behavioural
and management sciences. In keeping with the prevailing image of science, it adopted
an empiricist epistemology and an atomistic ontology that portrayed formal organizations
as isolated, reactive hierarchies adapting to market selection mechanisms. The further
expansion of higher education in North America and Europe in the 1970s and 1980s,
especially in business and management studies, together with the failure of the logical
empiricist research programme in the Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science and the decline
of Fordism, encouraged considerable fragmentation of organization studies around
rival frameworks. Additionally, the success of East Asian firms in many international
markets and continued divergence of many European forms of capitalism from the US
norm led to increasing interest in the role of institutional frameworks in structuring
and reproducing competing forms of economic organization. This involved a radical
reconceptualization of both the nature of formal organizations and their environments,
which complemented developments in evolutionary and institutional economics. As a
result, organizations have come to be seen as key mediating collectivities between
national and international political-economic institutions and economic outcomes
in different kinds of market economy.
German Corporate Governance in Transition: Implications of Bank Exit from Monitoring and Control [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007
Sigurt Vitols
International Journal of Disclosure and Governance.
2005.
Vol. 2.
No. 4.
P. 357-367.
Close links between banks and large companies have been seen as a key component of Germany’s corporate governance system. The recent sale of large shareholdings by banks raises the question of to what extent this system will converge to the US model of dispersed ownership. This paper argues that concentrated ownership will remain a key feature of this system. In addition, board-level representation of employees and the lack of a culture of independent directors are further factors supporting incremental change in Germany’s corporate governance system rather than wholesale convergance to the US model.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols
Industry and Innovation.
1997.
Vol. 4.
No. 1.
P. 15-36.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-12-2007
Ronald Philip Dore
British Journal of Sociology.
1983.
Vol. 34.
No. 4.
P. 459-482.
This article focuses on the predominance of obligated relational contracting in Japanese
business. Consumer goods markets are highly competitive in Japan, but trade in intermediates,
by contrast, is for the most part conducted within long-term trading relations in
which goodwill give-and-take is expected to temper the pursuit of self-interest.
Cultural preferences explain the unusual predominance of these relations in Japan,
but they are in fact more common in Western economies than textbooks usually recognize.
The growth of relational contracting in labour markets especially is, indeed, at
the root of the rigidities supposedly responsible for contemporary stagflation. Japan
shows that to sweep away these rigidities and give markets back their pristine vigor
is not the only prescription for a cure of stagflation. The Japanese economy more
than adequately compensates for the loss of allocative efficiency by achieving high
levels of other kinds of efficiency. Relational contracts are just a way of trading
off the short term loss involved in sacrificing a price advantage, against the insurance.
As for relational contracting between enterprises, there are three things to be said.
First, the relative security of such relations encourages investment in supplying
firms. Second, the relationships of trust and mutual dependency make more for a rapid
flow of information. Third, a by-product of the system is a general emphasis on quality.
How Do Financial Markets Affect Industrial Relations: an Institutional Complementarity Approach [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008
Bruno Amable, Ernst Ekkehard, Stefano Palombarini
Socio-Economic Review.
2005.
Vol. 3.
No. 2.
P. 311-330.
This article presents a simple formal model of institutional complementarity (IC)
applied to industrial relations, and develops two important aspects of IC. We first
develop a formal definition for the static and dynamic aspects of IC and then relate
these to the interaction between financial relations and the outcome of a wage bargaining
between firms and trade unions. Trade unions and firms have the choice between a
cooperative negotiation targeting at the long-term success of the firm and a conflictual
relation targeting at maximizing the current share. One important determinant in
this game will be the time horizon financial investors have as they influence the
realization of future gains of cooperation between workers and firms. When financial
investors are patient, a pareto-superior cooperative equilibrium can be attained.
On the other hand, whenever one of the two bargaining parties gets too weak, the
viability even of the long-term equilibrium is threatened.
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2008
Colin Crouch, Wolfgang Streeck, Richard Whitley, John L. Campbell
Socio-Economic Review.
2007.
Vol. 5.
No. 3.
P. 527-567.
At the 18th Annual Meeting on Socio-Economics in Trier 2006, an ‘Author Meets
Critics’ session, organized by Christel Lane, President of SASE, debated John
Campbell's book, ‘Institutional Change and Globalization’. Critics were
Colin Crouch, Wolfgang Streeck and Richard Whitley; John Campbell responded. Subsequent
to the session, the participants wrote up their statements for publication in Socio-Economic
Review.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley
Review of International Political Economy.
1998.
Vol. 5.
No. 3.
P. 445-481 .
The increasing internationalization of economic activities in the late twentieth
century has encouraged the belief that a new form of cross-national economic organization
is becoming established and replacing existing forms of capitalism. Both the intensification
of international competition and growth of managerial coordination across borders
are seen as generating the convergence of currently separate business systems. However,
the extent of such internationalization is less than often claimed, especially when
compared to the late nineteenth century, and the processes by which it will lead
to such convergence remain obscure. Since the different varieties of capitalist economic
organization in Europe, Asia and the Americas developed over some time interdependently
with dominant societal institutions, the ways in which they change as a result of
internationalization are path dependent and reflect their historical legacies as
well as current institutional linkages. Qualitative changes in central business system
characteristics, such as ownership relations, non-ownership coordination and employment
policies, are therefore unlikely to be rapid or to result solely from internationalization.
Furthermore, the ways in which firms from different business systems internationalize
reflect their varied natures and strategies which are unlikely to alter greatly unless
key institutions alter. If multinational firms do develop different characteristics
from national competitors, their impact on their domestic and host business systems
will likewise depend on a number of strong conditions. Similarly, the establishment
of a distinctive and dominant 'global' business system is only likely in very restrictive
circumstances.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Journal of Financial Economics.
2000.
Vol. 58.
No. 1-2.
P. 3-27.
Recent research has documented large differences among countries in ownership concentration
in publicly traded firms, in the breadth and depth of capital markets, in dividend
policies, and in the access of firms to external finance. A common element to the
explanations of these differences is how well investors, both shareholders and creditors,
are protected by law from expropriation by the managers and controlling shareholders
of firms. We describe the differences in laws and the effectiveness of their enforcement
across countries, discuss the possible origins of these differences, summarize their
consequences, and assess potential strategies of corporate governance reform. We
argue that the legal approach is a more fruitful way to understand corporate governance
and its reform than the conventional distinction between bank-centered and market-centered
financial systems.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny
Journal of Finance.
2002.
Vol. 57.
No. 3.
P. 1147-1170.
We present a model of the effects of legal protection of minority shareholders and
of cash-flow ownership by a controlling shareholder on the valuation of firms. We
then test this model using a sample of 539 large firms from 27 wealthy economies.
Consistent with the model, we find evidence of higher valuation of firms in countries
with better protection of minority shareholders and in firms with higher cash-flow
ownership by the controlling shareholder.
Japan's Shareholder Revolution [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-12-2007
Ronald Philip Dore
CentrePiece Magazine.
2006.
Vol. 11.
No. 3.
P. 22-24.
Over the past decade or so, there has been a fundamental change in what the managers
of Japanese companies believe are their key objectives. Ronald Dore traces the country’s
conversion to Anglo-Saxon capitalism - and growing concerns about the emergence of
a new 'divided society'.
Kapitalismus ohne Arbeit [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 01-02-2007
Ulrich Beck
Der Spiegel.
1996.
No. 20.
P. 140-146.
Статья немецкого социолога Ульриха Бека о будущем труда, которое видится ему как "безработный капитализм".
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008
Martin Höpner, John W Cioffi
Mitbestimmung.
2005.
Vol. 51.
No. 8.
P. 58-61.
In almost all Western industrialised countries, shareholders and supervisory bodies are now being
given greater rights. Company takeovers are becoming easier, minority shareholders are receiving
greater protection and transparency provisions are being enhanced. Why is it the Social Democratic
parties that are championing these pro-shareholder reforms?
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley, Steven Casper
Research Policy.
2004.
Vol. 33.
P. 89-106.
Innovating firms in new industries face a number of technological and market risks, especially appropriability and competence
destruction. However, the relative significance of these varies between different sub-sectors, and so do managerial ways
of dealing with them. These in turn are influenced by institutional frameworks, particularly those governing skill formation
systems and labour markets. Consequently, the relative success of firms in fields with different appropriability and competence
destruction risks is likely to vary between countries with contrasting patterns of labour market organisation. In the biotechnology
and computer software industries, there are major differences in the dominant risks faced by innovating firms such
that we would expect their relative success to differ between Germany, Sweden and the UK. While the UK and, to a limited
extent, Sweden, have developed institutions similar to those found in the US that help govern “radically innovative” firm
competences, Germany has invested in institutional frameworks associated with “competency enhancing” human resource
practices that give its firms an advantage in more generic technologies in which organisational complexity is higher.While the
distribution of public companies across sub-sectors broadly follows these expectations, Sweden has developed considerable
strength in middleware software. This results from changing property rights and personnel policies at Ericsson.
|
|