Всего статей в данном разделе : 184
Strategy meets institutions: The transformation of management-labor relations at Deutsche Telekom and NTT [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Mari Sako, Gregory Jackson Industrial & Labor Relations Review. 2006. Vol. 59. No. 3. P. 347-366.
This comparison of labor-management relations at Deutsche Telekom (DT) and NTT Group (formerly Nippon Telephone and Telegraph) demonstrates the value of considering both institutions and strategic decision-making to understand the interaction between companies and unions. As corporations diversify, multi-divisional or holding company structures emerge, but the degree of diversity introduced in employment relations within the corporate group depends on the interaction between corporate strategy and the strategy of organized labor. The authors' field research, based on interviews with managers and labor leaders, shows that despite a broadly similar corporate strategy of diversification by DT and NTT after the liberalization of telecommunication markets, employment relations became more decentralized-both for unions and for works councils-within the DT group than within the NTT group. This difference in outcomes is explained by the relative power and strategic choices of labor and management, rather than by constraints and opportunities specific to the existing national institutions.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008Ruth Aguilera, Gregory Jackson Academy Of Management Review. 2003. Vol. 28. No. 3. P. 447-465.
We develop a theoretical model to describe and explain variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist economies, identifying the social relations and institutional arrangements that shape who controls corporations. what interests corporations serve. and the allocation of rights and responsibilities among corporate stakeholders. Our "actor-centered" institutional approach explains firm-level corporate governance practices in terms of institutional factors that shape how actors' interests are defined ("socially constructed") and represented. Our model has strong implications for studying issues of international convergence.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, Jurgen Beyer West European Politics. 2003. Vol. 26. No. 4. P. 179-198.
Assesses corporate governance in Germany in the 1990s. Changes in corporate governance; Role of social responsibility on entrepreneurship; Reorientation towards investment banking.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Economic Literature. 2008. Vol. 46. No. 2. P. 285-332.
In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.
The evolving European system of corporate governance: implications for worker participation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008Sigurt Vitols Transfer. 2008. No. 1. P. 27-43.
This article contributes to the current battle over the character of the evolving European system of corporate governance. The claims of proponents of the shareholder value model, which has been hegemonic in European policy-making circles over the past decade, are subject to a critical examination. In particular, the claims of the governance superiority of private equity, one of the extreme expressions of the shareholder model, are shown not to hold empirically. The concept of the sustainable company is proposed as an alternative to the shareholder value model, both because of its explicit commitment to a multidimensional understanding of welfare, and because of its extension of worker participation beyond traditional trade union concerns.
The Future of Rhenish Capitalism [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 11-03-2008Michel Albert, Rauf Gonenc Political Quarterly. 1996. Vol. 67. No. 3. P. 184-193.
Focuses on the `Rhenish' model of the market economy. Contractual structure underpinning the governance of business corporations; Globalization of capital markets; Model's potential in the global economic circumstances.
The Institutional Structuring of Innovation Strategies: Business Systems, Firm Types and Patterns of Technical Change in Different Market Economies [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008Richard Whitley Organization Studies. 2000. Vol. 21. No. 5. P. 855-886.
Innovation patterns and technological specialization vary considerably between market economies with different institutions because they coordinate economic activities in different ways with different kinds of firms developing contrasting innovation strategies. Six major forms of economic organization, or business systems, with different kinds of firms can be distinguished: fragmented, coordinated industrial district, compartmentalized, collaborative, highly coordinated and state organized. These kinds of business system develop and are reproduced in particular institutional contexts. They are associated with five kinds of innovation strategies: dependent, craft-based responsive, generic, complex and risky, and transformative. These strategies can be distinguished in terms of the following characteristics of innovations: technical and user uncertainty, user differentiation and product quality specialization, organizational competence destruction, use of codified knowledge, and the complexity of the knowledge base. Firms with different kinds of governance structures and organizational capabilities pursue these innovation strategies to varying degrees in different institutional environments. As a result, institutional differences between market economies lead to variations in innovation strategies and patterns of innovative performance.
The Institutional Structuring of Organizational Capabilities: The Role of Authority Sharing and Organizational Careers [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008Richard Whitley Organization Studies. 2003. Vol. 24. No. 5. P. 667-695.
The development of competitive competences in firms involves the generation of core employee commitment to collective problem solving and the development of firm-specific capabilities. Such commitment is often gained through authority sharing and providing organizational careers that reward contributions to organizational problem-solving routines and goals. However, firms vary considerably in how authoritative coordination of economic activities (both within and between companies) is achieved, and in the extent and scope of organizational careers. These differences affect their development of coordinating, learning and reconfigurational organizational capabilities. Owners and managers are encouraged to adopt varying degrees of authority sharing with groups of employees and business partners, and to invest in organizational careers to varying extents, by different institutional frameworks. In particular, variations in states' coordinating roles, the strength of business associations, the market for corporate control and the organization of training systems affect firms' delegation of discretion and career types. As a result, firms in different institutional frameworks develop distinctive kinds of capabilities that influence how they compete in different sectors and technologies.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2008. Vol. 88. No. 3. P. 430-465..
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
The New Comparative Economics [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008Simeon Djankov, Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Comparative Economics. 2003. Vol. 31. No. 4. P. 595-619.
In recent years, the field of comparative economics refocused on the comparison of capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. We argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. We apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2009Gary G. Hamilton, Nicole Woolsey Biggart American Journal of Sociology. 1991. Vol. 96. No. 4. P. 999-1006 .
The Political in the Era of Globalization and Finance: Focus on Some Régulation School Research [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008Robert Boyer International Journal of Urban and Regional Research. 2000. Vol. 24. No. 2. P. 274-322.
This article analyses macroeconomic developments of the 1990s in the light of recent propositions from régulation theory. These are concerned, firstly, with taking into account interdependencies between the political and economic spheres, with notions of the complementary nature and hierarchy of institutions, with the endogeneity of transition from growth to crisis and with the position of the nation-state in a situation of greater international interdependence. Thus, they go on to demonstrate that ‘globalization’ relates, above all, to finance and is more the expression of a political project than of economic determinism. The extension of market adjustments has simply not led to the recovery of dynamic efficiency. The viability of various forms of capitalism depends greatly on the international configuration and on the political strategies of the various governments. Finally, the viability of a finance-dominated or, perhaps, a property-owning growth regime may prove problematic, as much from a theoretical as from an empirical point of view.
The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform. [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, John W Cioffi Politics & Society. 2006. Vol. 34. No. 4. P. 463-502.
A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves as pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties’ established alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance reform.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008Martin Höpner, Lothar Krempel Competition and Change. 2004. Vol. 8. No. 4. P. 339-356.
One of the key features of the German model of capitalism is a dense network of relationships between large companies, often referred to as "Deutschland AG" (Germany Incorporated) in pub-lic discussions. This article analyzes the structure, history of, and current developments in the German company network. What kind of network structure did the largest German companies establish? In which stages did it evolve? Is it eroding? And, if so, why?
The Regulation of Labor [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2004. Vol. 119. No. 4. P. p1339-1382.
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.