Статьи
Всего статей в данном разделе : 184
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Mari Sako, Gregory Jackson
Industrial & Labor Relations Review.
2006.
Vol. 59.
No. 3.
P. 347-366.
This comparison of labor-management relations at Deutsche Telekom (DT) and NTT Group (formerly Nippon Telephone and Telegraph) demonstrates the value of considering both institutions and strategic decision-making to understand the interaction between companies and unions. As corporations diversify, multi-divisional or holding company structures emerge, but the degree of diversity introduced in employment relations within the corporate group depends on the interaction between corporate strategy and the strategy of organized labor. The authors' field research, based on interviews with managers and labor leaders, shows that despite a broadly similar corporate strategy of diversification by DT and NTT after the liberalization of telecommunication markets, employment relations became more decentralized-both for unions and for works councils-within the DT group than within the NTT group. This difference in outcomes is explained by the relative power and strategic choices of labor and management, rather than by constraints and opportunities specific to the existing national institutions.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-11-2008
Ruth Aguilera, Gregory Jackson
Academy Of Management Review.
2003.
Vol. 28.
No. 3.
P. 447-465.
We develop a theoretical model to describe and explain variation in corporate governance among advanced capitalist economies, identifying the social relations and institutional arrangements that shape who controls corporations. what interests corporations serve. and the allocation of rights and responsibilities among corporate stakeholders. Our "actor-centered" institutional approach explains firm-level corporate governance practices in terms of institutional factors that shape how actors' interests are defined ("socially constructed") and represented. Our model has strong implications for studying issues of international convergence.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008
Martin Höpner, Jurgen Beyer
West European Politics.
2003.
Vol. 26.
No. 4.
P. 179-198.
Assesses corporate governance in Germany in the 1990s. Changes in corporate governance; Role of social responsibility on entrepreneurship; Reorientation towards investment banking.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
Journal of Economic Literature.
2008.
Vol. 46.
No. 2.
P. 285-332.
In the last decade, economists have produced a considerable body of research suggesting that the historical origin of a country's laws is highly correlated with a broad range of its legal rules and regulations, as well as with economic outcomes. We summarize this evidence and attempt a unified interpretation. We also address several objections to the empirical claim that legal origins matter. Finally, we assess the implications of this research for economic reform.
The evolving European system of corporate governance: implications for worker participation [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2008
Sigurt Vitols
Transfer.
2008.
No. 1.
P. 27-43.
This article contributes to the current battle over the character of the evolving
European system of corporate governance. The claims of proponents of the
shareholder value model, which has been hegemonic in European policy-making
circles over the past decade, are subject to a critical examination. In particular,
the
claims of the governance superiority of private equity, one of the extreme expressions
of the shareholder model, are shown not to hold empirically. The concept of the
sustainable company is proposed as an alternative to the shareholder value model,
both because of its explicit commitment to a multidimensional understanding of
welfare, and because of its extension of worker participation beyond traditional
trade
union concerns.
The Future of Rhenish Capitalism [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 11-03-2008
Michel Albert, Rauf Gonenc
Political Quarterly.
1996.
Vol. 67.
No. 3.
P. 184-193.
Focuses on the `Rhenish' model of the market economy. Contractual structure underpinning the governance of business corporations; Globalization of capital markets; Model's potential in the global economic circumstances.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley
Organization Studies.
2000.
Vol. 21.
No. 5.
P. 855-886.
Innovation patterns and technological specialization vary considerably between market economies with different institutions because they coordinate economic activities in different ways with different kinds of firms developing contrasting innovation strategies. Six major forms of economic organization, or business systems, with different kinds of firms can be distinguished: fragmented, coordinated industrial district, compartmentalized, collaborative, highly coordinated and state organized. These kinds of business system develop and are reproduced in particular institutional contexts. They are associated with five kinds of innovation strategies: dependent, craft-based responsive, generic, complex and risky, and transformative. These strategies can be distinguished in terms of the following characteristics of innovations: technical and user uncertainty, user differentiation and product quality specialization, organizational competence destruction, use of codified knowledge, and the complexity of the knowledge base. Firms with different kinds of governance structures and organizational capabilities pursue these innovation strategies to varying degrees in different institutional environments. As a result, institutional differences between market economies lead to variations in innovation strategies and patterns of innovative performance.
Опубликовано на портале: 24-03-2008
Richard Whitley
Organization Studies.
2003.
Vol. 24.
No. 5.
P. 667-695.
The development of competitive competences in firms involves the generation of core
employee commitment to collective problem solving and the development of firm-specific
capabilities. Such commitment is often gained through authority sharing and providing
organizational careers that reward contributions to organizational problem-solving
routines and goals. However, firms vary considerably in how authoritative coordination
of economic activities (both within and between companies) is achieved, and in the
extent and scope of organizational careers. These differences affect their development
of coordinating, learning and reconfigurational organizational capabilities. Owners
and managers are encouraged to adopt varying degrees of authority sharing with groups
of employees and business partners, and to invest in organizational careers to varying
extents, by different institutional frameworks. In particular, variations in states'
coordinating roles, the strength of business associations, the market for corporate
control and the organization of training systems affect firms' delegation of discretion
and career types. As a result, firms in different institutional frameworks develop
distinctive kinds of capabilities that influence how they compete in different sectors
and technologies.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
Journal of Financial Economics.
2008.
Vol. 88.
No. 3.
P. 430-465..
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
The New Comparative Economics [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Simeon Djankov, Edward Ludwig Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
Journal of Comparative Economics.
2003.
Vol. 31.
No. 4.
P. 595-619.
In recent years, the field of comparative economics refocused on the comparison of capitalist economies. The theme of the new research is that institutions exert a profound influence on economic development. We argue that, to understand capitalist institutions, one needs to understand the basic tradeoff between the costs of disorder and those of dictatorship. We apply this logic to study the structure of efficient institutions, the consequences of colonial transplantation, and the politics of institutional choice.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-12-2009
Gary G. Hamilton, Nicole Woolsey Biggart
American Journal of Sociology.
1991.
Vol. 96.
No. 4.
P. 999-1006 .
The Political in the Era of Globalization and Finance: Focus on Some Régulation School Research [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 25-03-2008
Robert Boyer
International Journal of Urban and Regional Research.
2000.
Vol. 24.
No. 2.
P. 274-322.
This article analyses macroeconomic developments of the 1990s in the light of recent propositions from régulation theory. These are concerned, firstly, with taking into account interdependencies between the political and economic spheres, with notions of the complementary nature and hierarchy of institutions, with the endogeneity of transition from growth to crisis and with the position of the nation-state in a situation of greater international interdependence. Thus, they go on to demonstrate that ‘globalization’ relates, above all, to finance and is more the expression of a political project than of economic determinism. The extension of market adjustments has simply not led to the recovery of dynamic efficiency. The viability of various forms of capitalism depends greatly on the international configuration and on the political strategies of the various governments. Finally, the viability of a finance-dominated or, perhaps, a property-owning growth regime may prove problematic, as much from a theoretical as from an empirical point of view.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008
Martin Höpner, John W Cioffi
Politics & Society.
2006.
Vol. 34.
No. 4.
P. 463-502.
A striking paradox underlies corporate governance reform during the past fifteen
years: center-left political parties have pushed for pro-shareholder corporate governance
reforms, while the historically pro-business right has generally resisted
them to protect established forms of organized capitalism, concentrated corporate
stock ownership, and managerialism. Case studies of Germany, France, Italy, and
the United States reveal that center-left parties used corporate governance reform
to attack the legitimacy of existing political economic elites, present themselves
as
pro-growth and pro-modernization, strike political alliances with segments of the
financial sector, and appeal to middle-class voters. Conservative parties’
established
alliances with managers constrained them from endorsing corporate governance
reform.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-11-2008
Martin Höpner, Lothar Krempel
Competition and Change.
2004.
Vol. 8.
No. 4.
P. 339-356.
One of the key features of the German model of capitalism is a dense network of relationships between large companies, often referred to as "Deutschland AG" (Germany Incorporated) in pub-lic discussions. This article analyzes the structure, history of, and current developments in the German company network. What kind of network structure did the largest German companies establish? In which stages did it evolve? Is it eroding? And, if so, why?
The Regulation of Labor [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 05-11-2008
Juan C. Botero, Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer
Quarterly Journal of Economics.
2004.
Vol. 119.
No. 4.
P. p1339-1382.
We investigate the regulation of labor markets through employment, collective relations, and social security laws in 85 countries. We find that the political power of the left is associated with more stringent labor regulations and more generous social security systems, and that socialist, French, and Scandinavian legal origin countries have sharply higher levels of labor regulation than do common law countries. However, the effects of legal origins are larger, and explain more of the variation in regulations, than those of politics. Heavier regulation of labor is associated with lower labor force participation and higher unemployment, especially of the young. These results are most naturally consistent with legal theories, according to which countries have pervasive regulatory styles inherited from the transplantation of legal systems.
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