Journal of Financial Economics
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Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Hamid Mehran
Journal of Financial Economics.
1995.
Vol. 38.
No. 2.
P. 163-184.
An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected
manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive
compensation, and also suggests that the form rather than the level of compensation
is what motivates managers to increase firm value. Firm performance is positively
related to the percentage of equity held by managers and to the percentage of their
compensation that is equity-based. Moreover, equity-based compensation is used more
extensively in firms with more outside directors. Finally, firms in which a higher
percentage of the shares are held by insiders or outside blockholders use less equity-based
compensation.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Jun-Koo Kang, Anil Shivdasani
Journal of Financial Economics.
1995.
Vol. 38.
No. 1.
P. 29-58.
We examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms during top executive
turnover in Japanese corporations. Consistent with evidence from U.S. data, the likelihood
of nonroutine turnover is significantly related to industry-adjusted return on assets,excess
stock returns, and negative operating income, but is not related to industry performance.
The sensitivity of nonroutine turnover to earnings performance is higher for firms
with ties to a main bank than for firms without such ties. Outside succession in
Japan is more likely for firms with large shareholders and a main bank relationship.
We document performance improvements subsequent to nonroutine turnover and outside
succession.
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