Всего статей в данном разделе : 365
Corporate Governance, Ownership Dispersion and Efficiency: Empirical Evidence from Austrian Cooperative Banking [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Gary Gorton, Frank Schmid Journal of Corporate Finance. 1999. Vol. 5. No. 2. P. 119-140.
The ownership structures of firms are endogenous. This makes it difficult to produce w direct evidence on the Berle and Means Berle, A.A., Means, G.C., 1932. The Modern x Corporation and Private Property, New York. hypothesis that corporate governance becomes less efficient as the degree of separation of ownership and control increases. We address this issue by studying Austrian cooperative banking, an organizational form in which the ownership structure is exogenous. We show that firm performance declines as the number of cooperative members increases, corresponding to a greater separation of ownership and control. We also provide direct evidence on another theory that is difficult to test, namely, the efficiency wage hypothesis. We show that the decline in firm performance as the number of shareholders increases is due to an increase in efficiency wages.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007James H. Nelson Journal of Corporate Finance. 2005. Vol. 11. No. 1-2. P. 197-228.
This paper examines the link between firm performance, CEO characteristics and changes in corporate governance practices using an unbalanced panel of 1721 firms from 1980 to 1995. This paper provides the stylized facts about corporate governance practices and details how governance practices have evolved over time. By 1995, the majority of firms had implemented differing types of charter amendments, poison pills or other governance provisions that are potentially harmful to shareholders. Most firms have adopted multiple and even redundant governance provisions. Shareholders are more likely to approve an increase in the power of the boards of directors of better performing firms, while the boards of poorly performing firms are much more likely to initiate governance changes, such as poison pills, that circumvent shareholder approval. I find no relationship between CEO age, tenure or compensation and governance changes.
Corporate Governance Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Stuart L. Gillan, Laura T. Starks Journal of Financial Economics. 2000. Vol. 57. No. 2. P. 275-305.
We study shareholder proposals across a period of substantial activity and 2nd systematic differences both across sponsor identity and across time. To measure the success of shareholder activism, we examine voting outcomes and short-term market reactions conditioned on proposal type and sponsor identity. The voting analysis documents that sponsor identity, issue type, prior performance and time period are important influences on the voting outcome. Proposals sponsored by institutions or coordinated groups appear to act as substitutes gaining substantially more support than proposals sponsored by individuals. The nature of the stock market reaction, while typically small, varies according to the issue and the sponsor identity.
Corporate Governance Reforms: Redefined Expectations of Audit Committee Responsibilities and Effectiveness [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Sandra C. Vera-Munoz Journal of Business Ethics. 2005. Vol. 62. No. 2. P. 115-127.
Comprehensive regulatory changes brought on by recent corporate governance reforms have broadly redefined and re-emphasized the roles and responsibilities of all the participants in a public company’s financial reporting process. Most notably, these reforms have intensified scrutiny of corporate audit committees, whose role as protectors of investors’ interests now attracts substantially higher visibility and expectations. As a result, audit committees face the formidable challenge of effectively overseeing the company’s financial reporting process in a dramatically changed—and highly charged—corporate governance environment. This paper discusses the new expectations of audit committee responsibilities and effectiveness in the wake of corporate governance reforms, key challenges, “whistleblower” provisions and shortcomings, and provides some directions for future research.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Christos Pitelis Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2004. Vol. 12. No. 2. P. 210-223.
We discuss the nature and role of (corporate) governance and (shareholder) value and their implications for (sustainable) economic performance. We critique and build on extant theory to develop a model of the determinants of value-wealth creation at the firm, national and global levels and explore current economic debates on governance and sustainable economic performance in its context. We conclude that (the need for) stakeholder value is derivative from (not opposed to) the concept of sustainable value, that national governance and the nationwide “governance-mix” impact on corporate governance and that national and global economic governance are essential for sustainable global value-wealth creation, and economic performance.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Gerard Charreaux, Phillippe Desbrières Journal of Management and Governance. 2004. Vol. 5. No. 2. P. 107-128.
Unsatisfied with the dominating shareholders’ point of view, that appears to be too limited to build a relevant theory of corporate governance, we propose an enlarged definition of the value which may be called, the stakeholder value. This definition and its associated measure are more suitable for the stakeholder approach to the firm and more relevant to understand the value creation and sharing mechanisms.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Roszaini Haniffa, Mohammad Hudaib Journal of Business Finance & Accounting. 2006. Vol. 33. No. 7-8. P. 1034–1062.
This study investigates the relationship between the corporate governance structure and performance of 347 companies listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) between 1996 and 2000. We found board size and top five substantial shareholdings to be significantly associated with both market and accounting performance measures. In addition, we found a significant relationship between multiple directorships and market performance while role duality and managerial shareholdings are significantly associated with accounting performance. The result is robust with respect to controls for gearing, company size, industry membership and growth opportunities.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Milton Harris, Artur Raviv Journal of Financial Economics. 1988. No. 20. P. 203-235.
In this paper, we derive conditions under which the simple majority voting rule for electing controlling management and one share-one vote constitute a socially optimal corporate governance rule. We also show that other majority rules and/or multiple classes of shares are not socially optimal. Finally we show that an entrepreneur would choose to "issue two securities, one with only cash flow claims and no votes and one with only votes and no cash flow claims, ff this were allowed. This scheme, regardless of the majority rule adopted, is not socially optimal.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Kee H. Chung, Jeong-Kuk Kim Journal of Corporate Finance. 1999. Vol. 5. No. 1. P. 35-54.
Empirical evidence suggests that the voting premium in the Korean securities market is strongly related to the structure of corporate ownership. We find that the premium attached to voting stock is positively and significantly associated with the control value of a block of shares held by minority shareholders. We also find that the premium is negatively related to both the fraction of shares that are voting shares and the market value of equity. Empirical results indicate that private benefits of control in Korea are worth about 10% of the value of equity.
Corporate Reputation in Professional Services Firms: 'Reputation Management Based on Intellectual Capital Management' [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Ignacio Zabala, Goyo Panadero, Luis M. Gallardo, Carlos Martín Amate, Miguel Sanchez-Galindo, Ignacio Tena, Ignacio Villalba Corporate Reputation Review. 2005. Vol. 8. No. 1. P. 59-71.
There is a gap between the market price of a listed company and its book value and the difference between the two values relates in part to the value of the company's intangible assets. Accordingly, proper management of intellectual capital represents a significant improvement in the company's value. At professional services firms, corporate reputation is very closely linked to knowledge management, which is the management of the intangible assets that go to make up its intellectual capital. Deloitte Spain's Corporate Reputation Team has developed a theoretical approach based on the 'tangible treatment' of companies intangible assets, which lays down the following ideas for determining a company's corporate reputation: -- Corporate reputation is determined by the stakeholders 'recognition of a company, ie through their representations that they are aware of and agree with the status and management of the company's intangible assets. -- A company is only interested in what its stakeholders perceive it to be. Accordingly, it must avoid rankings based on the perceptions held by audiences that are not important to it. --The ultimate aim is to control (through a Reputation Score Card) and report on the status and management of intellectual capital in order to obtain recognition from stakeholders. -- The key to a company obtaining a good reputation lies in making its internal and external behavior the same and ensuring that its mission, vision and values are shared by the company and its stakeholders. The most important aspects of the theoretical development are shown in the graphic representation of corporate reputation. Additionally, mathematical formulas are used, not in an attempt to achieve numerical accuracy, but rather to assist comprehension of the reasoning involved.
Corporate reputation management: "living the brand"/Корпоративное управление репутацией: жизнь бренда [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2004Alan Wilson Management Decisions. 2001. No. 2. P. 99-104.
It is recognised that an organization's corporate reputation is affected by the actions of every business unit, department and employee that comes into contact with another stakeholder. However, the means by which employees can be directed or encouraged to "live the brand" is an area which has received relatively limited coverage. This article explores the management actions that are required if employees are to support and enhance the organization's corporate reputation. The study illustrates the pivotal role of staff in the corporate reputation management process and presents ways through which organizations can encourage commitment, enthusiasm and consistent staff behaviour in delivering the brand values.
Опубликовано на портале: 20-12-2005Светлана Гудкова Банковское обозрение. 2005. № 3(69).
С появлением на рынке «коробочных» CRM-продуктов системы управления отношениями с клиентами стали доступнее. Теперь у любого дистрибутора Вы можете приобрести «коробку» и установить у себя данный продукт. Почему же тогда компании-консультанты всерьез занимаются внедрением продуктов, изучая бизнес-процессы клиентов, применяя методологию внедрения, ставя в один ряд «коробочный» продукт и CRM-системы?
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Pierre-Yves Gomez, Harry Korine Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2005. Vol. 13. No. 739. P. 739–752.
Under what conditions do stakeholders consent to a regime of corporate governance? We propose that consent by the governed in corporate governance cannot be satisfactorily explained without reference to the collective value of procedural fairness that underlies markets. Drawing on the social psychology of justice and the political economy of social choice, we highlight the critical role played by democratic procedures in achieving consent by the governed in modern society. This line of reasoning leads us to suggest that the evolution of corporate governance, too, can be understood in terms of Tocqueville's well-known hypothesis that democracy eventually prevails in all spheres of organised activity. Examining the historical record of institutional reform in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States, we find that corporate governance has indeed evolved to make increasing use of democratic procedures. Viewed over the long-term of two centuries of capitalist development, corporate governance is seen to have successively incorporated enfranchisement, separation of powers and representation. In conclusion, we consider the implications of basing the study of corporate governance on the question of stakeholder consent and the practice of corporate governance on the procedures of democracy.
Demystifying the Illusion of the Positive Effects of Ownership Concentration on Corporate Performance [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Yoser Gadhoum, Marie-Helene Noiseux, Daniel Zeghal Investment Management & Financial Innovations. 2005. Vol. 2. No. 4. P. 50-68.
Evidence supporting the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance has been rather contradictory. In this research, we investigate the effects of ownership structure on business performance on a sample of 600 listed Canadian firms. We used a three-phase analysis of variance in which each phase used a different definition of ownership concentration: i) the overall concentration of the five largest shareholders (CONC); ii) the holdings of the largest shareholder (BLC1); and iii) inside shareholders as either managers or directors (BLCI). For each phase, we used cluster analysis and three other concentration cutoff levels (an even-split into thirds, extreme quartiles, and the Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) cutoff) to verify if there is an optimal level of concentration cutoff that may impact the performance. Our results indicate a high level of ownership concentration in Canadian corporations. The Berle-Means widely held corporation is far from universal. Besides, while state control of traded firms is infrequent, family control is common. However, our findings indicate only a weak association between performance measures and ownership concentration levels, except for the return on investment, which shows some improvement with a high level of ownership. Our results confirm those of Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Overall, no evidence is found to support the efficient monitoring hypothesis, since performance cannot be improved by blockholders who seem not only to be entrenched but may benefit from perquisites and on-the-job consumption. This might indicate that large shareholders expropriate minority absentee owners.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Francis Declerck Agribusiness. 1995. Vol. 11. No. 6. P. 523-536.
Focuses on the created value of leveraged buyouts (LBO) in the US Food Industries in the 1980s. Value of LBOs in the food industries in 1989; Analysis of objective of private firms in LBO; Analysis of debt and divestitures.