Всего статей в данном разделе : 365
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Helen Short, Kevin Keasey Journal of Corporate Finance. 1999. Vol. 5. No. 1. P. 79-101.
Given the governance issues arising from the separation of ownership from control, the ability to align managerial and shareholder interests via the managerial ownership of equity is an important topic of inquiry. The findings of the primarily US based literature suggest that management is aligned at low and possibly high levels of ownership but is entrenched (pursuing self interests) at intermediate ownership levels. This paper extends the US based literature in a number of important ways. First, the analysis is extended to the UK where there are important differences, as compared to the US, in the governance system. A comparative analysis of key differences between the US and UK governance systems suggest that management should become entrenched at higher levels of ownership in the UK. Some of the reasons for this suggestion are that in the UK management do not have the same freedom as their US counterparts to mount takeover defenses and institutional investors in the UK are more able to co-ordinate their monitoring activities. The empirical results of the paper confirm that UK management become entrenched at higher levels of ownership than their US counterparts. Second, the results from extending the analysis to consider different measures of firm performance and a more generalized form of the relationship confirm the general finding of the US literature of a non-linear relationship between firm performance and managerial ownership.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Mark R. Huson, Paul H. Malatesta, Robert Parrino Journal of Financial Economics. 2004. Vol. 74. No. 2. P. 237-275.
We examine CEO turnover and firm financial performance.Accounting measures of performance relative to other firms deteriorate prior to CEO turnover and improve thereafter. The degree of improvement is positively related to the level of institutional shareholdings, the presence of an outsider-dominated board, and the appointment of an outsider (rather than an insider) CEO.Turnover announcements are associated with significantly positive average abnormal stock returns, which are in turn significantly positively related to subsequent changes in accounting measures of performance.This suggests that investors view turnover announcements as good news presaging performance improvements.
MRP II история и современность [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 23-12-2005Дмитрий Андреевич Гаврилов Директор ИС. 2003. № 3.
Данная статья посвящена истории появления и современному развитию стандарта MRP II. Автор отмечает, что на первом этапе развития стандарта решалась задача формирования календарной программы потребности в комплектующих изделиях, сырье и материалах на основе зарегистрированной потребности в готовой продукции, с учетом наличного складского запаса, и приводит пример ее решения. Следующим шагом стала реализация возможности анализировать загрузку производственных мощностей и учитывать ресурсные ограничения производства – технология CRP (Capacity Requirements Planning), представленная на рис. 2. Автор также рассматривает массивы исходных данных, необходимые для работы механизма CRP. Следующим после MRP/CRP шагом по пути развития стандарта MRP стало создание технологии Замкнутый цикл MRP (Closed-loop MRP). Автор анализирует отличия MRP I/CRP от Closed-loop MRP и поясняет их схемой на рис. 3. Позднее появляется стандарт MRP II, важнейшей функцией которого является обеспечение всей необходимой информацией тех, кто принимает решения в сфере управления финансами. В статье на рис. 4 представлена структура планового механизма в стандарте MRP II и характеристика его модулей.Следующий шаг эволюции систем планирования потребности в ресурсах известен под названием Планирование ресурсов предприятия (Enterprise Resource Planning, ERP), краткая характеристика которого приведена в статье.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Benjamin Maury, Anete Pajuste Journal of Banking & Finance. 2005. Vol. 29. No. 7. P. 1813-1834.
This paper investigates the effects of having multiple large shareholders on the valuation of firms. Using data on Finnish listed firms, we show, consistent with our model, that a more equal distribution of votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. This result is particularly strong in family-controlled firms suggesting that families (which typically have managerial or board representation) are more prone to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholder. We also show that the relation between multiple blockholders and firm value is significantly affected by the identity of these blockholders.
Опубликовано на портале: 15-11-2007Sigurt Vitols Competition and Change. 2004. Vol. 8. No. 4. P. 357-374.
In comparative political economy it has become commonplace to distinguish between two types of corporate governance systems. In shareholder systems, influence over company management is concentrated with institutional investors holding small percentages of companies' shares. In stakeholder systems, influence is shared between large shareholders, employees, the community and suppliers and customers. This paper contributes to the literature addressing recent changes in the German variant of the stake-holder system by proposing a few new concepts. On the level of institutions, it is argued that the stakeholder system is not being replaced by a shareholder system in Germany. Rather, an augmented stakeholder system is emerging through the inclusion of institutional investors in the old stakeholder coalition of interests. On the level of practice, it is argued that negotiated shareholder value is being adopted in Germany. This German variant of shareholder value is distinct from Anglo-American practice because major changes implementing shareholder value must be negotiated within the augmented stakeholder coalition. As a result, performance incentives for employees tend to be less strong than is the case in the USA and UK.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-04-2007Morris G. Danielson, Jonathan M. Karpoff Journal of Corporate Finance. 1998. Vol. 4. No. 4. P. 347-371.
We document a large and broad-based increase in the use of corporate governance provisions in the late 1980s. As a result, most large publicly traded firms have complex governance structures. This violates an assumption implicit in many empirical studies that provision use is mutually independent. While overall provision use is not systematically related to industry grouping, the uses of some types of provisions are correlated. Most notably, supermajority vote requirements, classified boards, and shareholder meeting requirements tend to be used in concert. Firms reincorporating to Delaware tend to eliminate cumulative voting, and coverages by certain types of state antitakeover laws are correlated. We also find that firms with poison pills tend to have relatively high institutional ownership, low managerial ownership, and a high proportion of independent directors.
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Michael Useem, Andy Zelleke Corporate Governance: An International Review. 2006. Vol. 14. No. 1. P. 2-12.
American boards of directors increasingly treat their delegation of authority to management as a careful and self-conscious decision. Numerically dominated by non-executives, boards recognize that they cannot run the company, and many are now seeking to provide stronger oversight of the company without crossing the line into management. Based on interviews with informants at 31 major companies, we find that annual calendars and written protocols are often used to allocate decision rights between the board and management. Written protocols vary widely, ranging from detailed and comprehensive to skeletal and limited in scope. While useful, such calendars and protocols do not negate the need for executives to make frequent judgement calls on what issues should go to the board and what should remain within management. Executives still set much of the board’s decision-making agenda, and despite increasingly asserting their sovereignty in recent years, directors remain substantially dependent upon the executives’ judgement on what should come to the board. At the same time, a norm is emerging among directors and executives that the latter must be mindful of what directors want to hear and believe they should decide.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Kenneth A. Kim, Pattanaporn Kitsabunnarat, John R. Nofsinger Journal of Corporate Finance. 2004. Vol. 10. No. 3. P. 355-381.
We examine the operating performance of Thai firms after they go public. Overall, we find that their performance declines. We then explore the relationship between managerial ownership and the change in firm performance. We find that firms with ‘low’ and ‘high’ levels of managerial ownership experience positive relationships between managerial ownership and the change in performance (alignment-of-interest hypothesis), while firms with ‘intermediate’ levels of managerial ownership exhibit a negative relationship between managerial ownership and the change in performance (entrenchment hypothesis). Examining the operating performance of IPO firms from an emerging market and finding a curvilinear relationship between managerial ownership and the post-IPO change in performance represents two significant contributions to the IPO literature.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Maciej Dzierzanowski, Piotr Tamowicz Corporate Ownership & Control. 2004. Vol. 1. No. 3. P. 20-30.
With the company-level data on listed and unlisted companies we analyse ownership and control of Polish corporations. We find that voting control in listed corporations is remarkably concentrated with the median size of the largest block amounting to 39,5%. A sustainable concentration trend has been observed over the whole last decade. Other companies and individuals/families (mostly founders) dominate among the largest block-holders of Polish corporations. Banks' involvement in control is below common expectations. It is also observed that-especially in smaller firms-managerial ownership is quite large. Frequently, managers are also the company founders and first or second largest block-holder. The extent of ownership and control separation is very modest with dual-class shares being the most popular device to leverage control over ownership; control through subsidiaries is applied to a lesser extent. The presence of large blockholders in listed corporations puts the minority rights and conflict of interests among stakeholders on the top of the policy agenda. Our analysis shows that the Polish capital market may be in desperate need of improvement in this respect.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Harold Demsetz, Belen Villalonga Journal of Corporate Finance. 2001. Vol. 7. No. 3. P. 209-233.
This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multi-dimensional and also is treated as an endogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate control problem this way. We find no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This finding is consistent with the view that diffuse ownership, while it may exacerbate some agency problems, also yields compensating advantages that generally offset such problems. Consequently, for data that reflect market-mediated ownership structures, no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance is to be expected.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Steen Thomsen, Torben Pedersen Strategic management journal. 2000. Vol. 21. No. 6. P. 689-696.
The paper examines the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in 435 of the largest European companies. Controlling for industry, capital structure and nation effects we find a positive effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value (market -to- book value of equity) and profitability (asset returns), but the effect levels off for high ownership shares. Furthermore we propose and support the hypothesis that the identity of large owners—family, bank, institutional investor, government, and other companies—has important implications for corporate strategy and performance. For example, compared to other owner identities, financial investor ownership is found to be associated with higher shareholder value and profitability, but lower sales growth. The effect of ownership concentration is also found to depend on owner identity.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang, Woochan Kim Journal of Corporate Finance. 2006. Vol. 12. No. 3. P. 660-691.
This paper contributes to a new literature on the factors that affect firms’ corporate governance practices. We find that regulatory factors are highly important, largely because Korean rules impose special governance requirements on large fi rms (assets > 2 trillion won). Industry factors, firm size, and firm risk are also important. Other firm-specifi c factorsonly modestly affect governance even when they are statistically signifi cant. This suggests that many Korean fi rms do not choose their governance to maximize share price. Among firm specific factors, the most significant are size (larger firms are better governed) and firm risk (riskier firms are better governed). Long-term averages of profitability and equity finance need are significant, where short-term averages are not. This is consistent with “sticky governance,”in which firms after their governance slowly in response to economic factors.
Опубликовано на портале: 22-03-2007Harilaos Mertzanis Econometrica. 2001. Vol. 9. No. 89.
This article presents the reasons which led the business community in Greece to reconsider existing corporate governance practices of listed corporations in the Athens Stock Exchange, outlines the general rationale for the creation and adoption of specific recommendations for best corporate practice, presents the recommendations in full detail and finally provides suggestions for the required corporate legal reform.
Опубликовано на портале: 12-11-2004Joseph E. Stiglitz Экономическая наука современной России. 2001. № 4. С. 108-146.
Отсутствие в обществе необходимых финансовых и правовых структур, делающих приватизацию эффективной, рассматривается в статье как один из основных факторов, объясняющих неудовлетворительное состояние экономики России в ходе строительства рыночных отношений. Второй важный фактор, как показывается в работе, связан с неадекватной теоретической концепцией фирмы, на которой базировалась идеология реформ, — представлением о фирме как полноправной собственности крупных акционеров при слабом влиянии на деятельность фирмы остальных заинтересованных лиц.
Опубликовано на портале: 25-11-2008Franklin Allen, Mengxin Zhao PKU Business Review. 2007. Vol. 36. No. 7. P. 98-102.
In the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance is concerned with the narrow goal of ensuring that firms maximize the wealth of shareholders. In Japan and some other countries, firms are concerned with a broader group of stakeholders, including employees, suppliers, customers and others as well as shareholders. This article contrasts the Anglo-American system of corporate governance with that in Japan and elsewhere. If markets and institutions are well developed and competitive, Anglo-American corporate governance ensures an efficient allocation of resources. In other circumstances, focusing on a wider range of stakeholders as the Japanese do can be more efficient.