The American Economic Review
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007Benjamin E. Hermalin, Michael Steven Weisbach The American Economic Review. 1998. Vol. 88. No. 1. P. 96.
How can boards be chosen through a process partially controlled by the CEO, yet, in many instances, still be effective monitors of him? We offer an answer based on a model in which board effectiveness is a function of its independence. This, in turn, is a function of negotiations (implicit) between existing directors and the CEO over who will fill vacancies on the board. The CEO's bargaining power over the board-selection process comes from his perceived ability relative to potential successors. Many empirical findings about board structure and performance arise as equilibrium phenomena of this model.
Опубликовано на портале: 13-02-2007Edith Penrose The American Economic Review. 1955. Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 531-543.
There are two approaches to the question of the size of firms. the traditional approsch attempts to explain size in terms of the balance of advantages and disadvantages of being a particular size. Another approach emphasizes the process of growth and treats size as a more or less incidental result of a continuous on -going or "unfolding" process. The author wants here to suggest an alternative growth approach which, in common with the biological variant, insists that a predisposition to grow is inherent in the very nature firms, but which, in contrast, makes growth depend on human motivation.