Journal of Banking & Finance
Опубликовано на портале: 12-02-2007Varouj Aivazian, Ying Ge, Jiaping Qiu Journal of Banking & Finance. 2005. No. 29. P. 1459-1481.
This paper examines empirically the quality of the governance mechanisms of Chinese state-owned enterprises from 1994–1999, a period marked by substantial changes in policies affecting the governance structure of these firms. It shows that the restructuring of these enterprises according to corporate law improved the effectiveness of their governance system. Specifically, restructuring strengthened the links between manager turnover and firm performance. The results indicate that firm performance was significantly and negatively related to manager demotion for incorporated state-owned enterprises, while this relationship was insignificant for unincorporated enterprises. They also indicate that manager turnover was a viable incentive mechanism for improving future enterprise performance.
Опубликовано на портале: 14-06-2006Benjamin Maury, Anete Pajuste Journal of Banking & Finance. 2005. Vol. 29. No. 7. P. 1813-1834.
This paper investigates the effects of having multiple large shareholders on the valuation of firms. Using data on Finnish listed firms, we show, consistent with our model, that a more equal distribution of votes among large blockholders has a positive effect on firm value. This result is particularly strong in family-controlled firms suggesting that families (which typically have managerial or board representation) are more prone to private benefit extraction if they are not monitored by another strong blockholder. We also show that the relation between multiple blockholders and firm value is significantly affected by the identity of these blockholders.
Опубликовано на портале: 16-06-2006Kevin J. Stiroh, Adrienne Rumble Journal of Banking & Finance. 2005.
Potential diversification benefits are one reason why US financial holding companies are offering a growing range of financial services. This paper examines whether the observed shift toward activities that generate fees, trading revenue, and other non-interest income has improved the performance of US financial holding companies (FHCs) from 1997 to 2002. We find evidence that diversification benefits exist between FHCs, but these gains are offset by the increased exposure to non-interest activities, which are much more volatile but not necessarily more profitable than interest-generating activities. Within FHCs, however, marginal increases in revenue diversification are not associated with better performance, while marginal increases in non-interest income are still associated with lower risk-adjusted profits. The key finding that diversification gains are more than offset by the costs of increased exposure to volatile activities represents the dark side of the search for diversification benefits and has implications for supervisors, managers, investors, and borrowers.