Journal of Marketing Research (JMR)
Опубликовано на портале: 16-11-2003
Tridib Mazumdar
Journal of Marketing Research (JMR).
2000.
Vol. 37.
No. 2.
P. 246-259.
Концепция референтной цены получила широкое распространение в маркетинге. В недавнем
обзоре литературы по данной проблеме Kalyanaram and Winer (1995) отметили существование
двух альтернативных точек зрения на формирование референтной цены. Согласно первой
точке зрения, потребители запоминают цены, с которыми они столкнулись при совершении
предшествующих покупок, и поэтому, приступая к новым покупкам, они имеют представление
о том, сколько они должны заплатить за тот или иной бренд. Так как потребители полагаются
на свою память о прошлых ценах на товар, то данная референтная цена называется «внутренней
референтной ценой» (IRP – internal reference price). Согласно другой
точке зрения, референтная цена формируется в период покупки, на основании наблюдаемых
цен (например, цен, указанных на ценнике) на другие бренды непосредственно в момент
покупки. Согласно данной точке зрения, внешняя информация во время совершения покупки
определяет цену, которую потребитель согласен заплатить за товар. Этот тип референтной
цены называется «внешней референтной ценой» (ERP, external referent price).



Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
Marcel Corstjens
Journal of Marketing Research (JMR).
2000.
Vol. 37.
No. 3.
P. 281-292.
: In this article, the authors study the role of a store brand in building store
loyalty through a game theoretic analysis. In a market in which a segment of consumers
is sensitive to product quality and consumers' brand choice in low-involvement packaged
goods categories is characterized by inertia, the authors show that quality store
brands can be an instrument for retailers to generate store differentiation, store
loyalty, and store profitability, even when the store brand does not have a margin
advantage over the national brand. In addition, this loyalty argument does not apply
for the 'cheap and nasty' private label strategy. Such a private label policy, on
the contrary, reinforces rather than reduces price competition among stores. Indeed,
the quality of the store brand must be above a threshold level to create this opportunity.
It also follows that quality store brands, when carried by competing retailers, can
be an implicit coordination mechanism that enables all the retailers to become more
profitable. Finally, a quality store brand policy is profitable only if a significant
portion of shoppers buys the national brand. This surprising result establishes the
complementary roles of store brands and national brands. The former create store
differentiation and loyalty, whereas the latter enable the retailer to raise prices
and increase store profitability. The authors provide empirical support for their
thesis by using evidence from Europe and household-level scanner panel data from
the United States and Canada.


Опубликовано на портале: 29-09-2003
Mark B. Houston
Journal of Marketing Research (JMR).
2000.
Vol. 37.
No. 1.
P. 1-16.
When a buyer firm and a supplier firm plan to transact, what factors drive their
choice of mechanism to govern the relationship? Focusing on contract-governed versus
joint venture-governed relationships, the authors present a theoretical framework
that specifies the conditions that make one or the other form of relationship structure
more appropriate. This study was designed to address potential limitations regarding
measurement, financial consequences, and context in the extant literature. The authors
employ measures derived from Standard & Poor's Compustat financial database and an
overall measure of firm reputation to examine empirically differences in firm characteristics
across the two types of relationships. To examine the financial consequences of relationship
structure, the authors use event-study techniques that tie stock price reactions
to the governance mechanism choice. The results suggest that buyers and suppliers
are more likely to form a joint venture (versus simple contract) when (1) the supplier's
degree of asset specificity is high, (2) monitoring the supplier's behavior is difficult,
and (3) the supplier has a poorer reputation. The authors find that vertical joint
ventures (between buyers and suppliers) are economically similar to contracts, to
the extent that abnormal wealth gains go solely to the supplier firms. Horizontal
joint ventures (partners are at the same level of the value chain), however, provide
bilateral, synergistic wealth gains. The results suggest that buyers and suppliers
can use joint ventures to reduce certain governance problems rather than to gain
synergies.


Опубликовано на портале: 29-09-2003
Florian Zettelmeyer
Journal of Marketing Research (JMR).
2000.
Vol. 37.
No. 3.
P. 292-309.
The author shows how firms' pricing and communications strategies may be affected
by the size of the Internet: Firms have incentives to facilitate consumer search
on the Internet, but only as long as the Internet's reach is limited. As the Internet
is used by more consumers, firms' pricing and communications strategies on the Internet
will mirror the strategies they pursue in a conventional channel. Firms can increase
their market power by strategically using information on multiple channels to achieve
finer consumer segmentation. The author suggests directions the Internet might take
and derives managerial implications. The findings generalize to other channels that
enable firms to segment consumers and inform them at low cost.


Опубликовано на портале: 29-09-2003
Marnik G. Dekimpe
Journal of Marketing Research (JMR).
2000.
Vol. 37.
No. 1.
P. 47-60.
The authors propose a new methodology called the 'coupled-hazard approach' to study
the global diffusion of technological innovations. Beyond its ability to describe
discontinuous diffusion patterns, the method explicitly recognizes the conceptual
difference between the timing of a country's introduction of the new technology (the
so-called implementation stage; Rogers 1983) and the timing of the innovation's full
adoption in the country (the confirmation stage). To illustrate the method, the authors
apply it to the global diffusion of digital telecommunications switches across more
than 160 countries.

