Marketing Science
Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2003
Chen Yuxin, James D. Hess
Marketing Science.
1999.
Vol. 18.
No. 3.
P. 208-230.
Ритейлеры давно осознали, что для привлечения
покупателей в магазин некоторые категории товаров важнее других. Повышение совокупной прибыльности магазина требует
очень тщательного подхода к отбору категорий продаваемых товаров для привлечения
в магазин наиболее выгодных покупателей. Однако традиционные бухгалтерские критерии
прибыльности товарной категории не подходят для принятия подобных решений, так как
они не учитывают влияния одной категории товаров на прибыльность других
в одном магазине.
Опубликовано на портале: 04-12-2003
Peter M. Guadagni
Marketing Science.
1983.
Vol. 2.
No. 3.
P. 203-239.
Авторы используют мультиномиальную логистическую статистическую модель (multinomial
logit model) для прогнозирования выбора потребителями конкретного бренда из нескольких
брендов, имеющихся в продаже. Модель опробована и откалибрована на данных о покупках
различных брендов упаковок молотого кофе в супермаркетах в течении 32 недель. В качестве
независимых переменных, объясняющих выбор покупателей, в числе прочих, используются
показатели предпочтения какого-то бренда, предпочтения определенного размера упаковки, присутствие/отсутствие
специальных рекламных акций в магазине, регулярная розничная цена, размер
скидки при распродаже. Авторы установили, что коэффициенты этих переменных статистически значимы.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-09-2003
William Boulding
Marketing Science.
1993.
Vol. 12.
No. 2.
P. 144-167.
In this paper we develop a model relating market share to average costs. We start
with a theoretical model of the factors that affect the firm's average cost curve,
partitioning these factors into (a) measurable firm and competitive environment characteristics,
and (b) unobserved factors that are either fixed, random, or follow a first-order
autoregressive process. We then link this theoretical model to an empirical model
in which we specify three average cost equations for the organizational areas of
purchasing, production, and marketing. Main effects for initial (lagged) market share
position, as well as their interactions with factors characterizing the firm's competitive
environment, represent the variables of key theoretical interest in our equations.
We estimate these equations using PIMS data, and control for fixed, contemporaneous,
and autoregressive unobservable factors. Our results suggest that market share can
often lead to market power in the form of lower average costs. However, the firm's
operating environment greatly moderates the effect of market share on average cost.
In particular, we find that market share position only leads to lower average costs
when the organizational unit operates in a competitive environment that gives it
both motivation and ability to realize power from its market share position.
An Empirical Analysis Of The Relationship Between Brand Loyalty And Consumer Price
Elasticity [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 29-09-2003
Lakshman Krishnamurihi
Marketing Science.
1991.
Vol. 10.
No. 2.
P. 172-284.
This empirical paper explores the relationship between consumer brand preference
or loyalty and price elasticity in purchase behavior. This behavior is conceptualized
as resulting from two distinct but related decisions, namely a brand choice decision
and a purchase quantity decision. We argue that loyal consumers will be less price
sensitive in the choice decision than nonloyal consumers. However, this direction
is expected to be reversed in the quantity decision with loyal consumers expected
to be more price sensitive than nonloyal consumers. We model the choice and quantity
decisions jointly using the limited dependent variable framework described in Krishnamurthi
and Raj. The data used are diary panel data on a frequently purchased product class
from BURKE and caffeinated ground coffee scanner data from IRI. We show that loyals
are less price sensitive than nonloyals in the choice decision but more price sensitive
in the quantity decision. Managerial implications of the differing elasticities are
discussed.
Опубликовано на портале: 04-12-2003
Alain V. Bultez, Frank M. Bass
Marketing Science.
1982.
Vol. 1.
No. 4.
P. 371-379.
Описание снижения маржинальных издержек по мере аккумулирования
производственного опыта с помощью кривой опыта привело к появлению динамических моделей
ценообразования.
Оптимальные стратегии ценообразования зависят от динамических характеристик
функций спроса и издержек. Автoры формулируют динамическую модель
ценообразования, в которой функция спроса, первоначально предложенная в работе Басса
(Bass, 1980, Функция спроса, основанная на модели диффузии инноваций), сочетается
с функцией издержек, основанной на кривой опыта. В результате авторы выводят оптимальную
многопериодную модель ценообразования, в соответствии с которой оптимальная цена
на продукт всегда ниже, чем оптимальная миопическая (близорукая, статическая) цена.
Авторы демонстрируют алгоритм динамического программирования, с помощью которого
они сравнивают чистые приведенные прибыли, полученные при оптимальном динамическом
многопериодном ценообразовании и прибыли, полученные при миопическом ценообразовании.
Результаты этого исследования для некоторых будут весьма неожиданными и без сомнения
интересны для менеджеров.
Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2003
Taylor Randall
Marketing Science.
1998.
Vol. 17.
No. 4.
P. 356-380.
Рассматривается вопрос о том, как вертикальная структура продуктовой линейки
влияет на стоимость торговой марки (brand equity). Увеличивается ли стоимость торговой
марки от наличия в продуктовой линейке «премиальных» продуктов повышенного
качества? И наоборот, уменьшается ли стоимость торговой марки от наличия в нижнем
«экономичном» конце продуктовой линейки товаров низкого качества.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-09-2003
Ram C. Rao
Marketing Science.
1990.
Vol. 9.
No. 4.
P. 319-342.
This paper considers the question of how a sales manager should design the optimal
compensation scheme for his salesforce when it consists of salespersons of varying
selling skills, i.e., when the salesforce is heterogeneous. The manager's problem
is to reward the salespersons based on observable, uncertain sales achieved by the
salespersons. Under the assumption that both the manager and the salespersons are
risk neutral, the optimal compensation scheme is derived. It consists of the manager
offering a menu of plans, consisting of a quota, a payment for meeting quota, and
a constant commission rate for sales above or below quota. Such schemes using constant
commission rates are also called menus of linear plans. Salespersons choose the quota
which best suits them, achieve sales, and are then rewarded based on their actual
performance. This scheme, variants of which are often observed in practice, is shown
to be optimal for sales environments characterized by commonly encountered sales
response functions, and a large class of frequency distributions of selling skills
in the salesforce. The problem is solved using the methods of principal-agent models.
The key differences in managing homogeneous and heterogeneous salesforces are highlighted.
Finally, the paper discusses the issues involved in practically implementing the
optimal compensation scheme.
Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
Ganesh Iyer
Marketing Science.
1998.
Vol. 17.
No. 4.
P. 338-356.
Abstract This paper analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels
when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such as the
provision of product information, free repair, faster check-out, or after-sales service.
Differentiation among retailers in price and nonprice service factors is a central
feature of markets ranging from automobiles and appliances to gasoline and is especially
observed in the coexistence of high-service retailers and lower price discount retailers.
Therefore, how a manufacturer should manage retail differentiation is an important
channel management question. Yet, the approach in the existing literature has been
to examine channel coordination under the standard "symmetric contracting" assumption
that offering a uniform contract to all the retailers in a market will be sufficient
for coordination. I bring this assumption into question and ask when is it optimal
for the manufacturer to use the channel contract to deliberately induce retail differentiation
(even if the retailers were ex-ante identical in their cost and other characteristics).
The paper identifies the type of channel contracts that can endogenously induce symmetry
as opposed to differentiation among retailers.Next, the paper highlights a type of
channel conflict that arises from the very nature of retail price-service competition.
A manufacturer might find the retailers to be excessively biased towards price competition
at the cost of service provision or vice-versa. The paper establishes when a manufacturer
is likely to stimulate greater price as opposed to greater service competition among
the retailers.The framework that I develop to address these issues highlights the
role of two basic types of consumer heterogeneity. Consumers are heterogeneous in
their locations (as in the spatial models of horizontal differentiation) and in their
willingness to pay for retail services (as in the models of vertical differentiation).
The model al...
Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2003
Eugene W. Anderson, Claes Fornell
Marketing Science.
1997.
Vol. 16.
No. 2.
P. 129-147.
Существует широко распространенное мнение, что фирмы должны стремиться улучшить одновременно
свою производительность и удовлетворенность покупателей. Однако есть основания
предполагать, что эти две цели не всегда совместимы. Например, фирма может добиться
краткосрочного повышения производительности труда посредством сокращения персонала.
Однако эта мера может поставить под угрозу будущие прибыли фирмы, если удовлетворенность
потребителей зависит от мотивированности персонала. Таким образом, существует потенциальный
конфликт между удовлетворенностью потребителей и производительностью труда в таких
отраслях, как авиаперевозки, банковское дело, образование, гостиничный и ресторанный
бизнес. Усилия руководства по повышению производительности могут навредить удовлетворенности
покупателей.
Опубликовано на портале: 04-12-2003
Steven M. Shugan, John R. Hauser
Marketing Science.
1983.
Vol. 2.
No. 4.
P. 319-361.
Анализируется ситуация появления на рынке нового конкурентного
продукта. Рассматриваются необходимые действия фирмы по защите своих интересов: изменение маркетинговых (рекламных) расходов и цен на свои продукты.
Цель статьи – дать менеджерам практически выполнимые
рекоммендации относительно оборонительной стратегии фирмы.
Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
Erin Anderson
Marketing Science.
1989.
Vol. 8.
No. 4.
P. 310-324.
Recently, increasing attention has been paid to the question of how to build stable,
long-term relationships between manufacturers and members of conventional channels.
This descriptive field study concerns a basic requirement for building long-term
relationships, which is the expectation by a marketing intermediary that the relationship
will last. Hypotheses about the continuity of relationships are developed from the
literature on social exchange, bargaining, and negotiation. These hypotheses are
framed as a simultaneous equation system, which is estimated via three-stage least
squares on a sample of 690 relationships (dyads) involving manufacturers and their
independent sales agents (manufacturers' representatives). Results substantially
support the model, highlighting the importance of interpersonal relationships in
insuring the continuity of the dyad.
Development and implementation of a segment selection procedure for industrial product
markers [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
Mitzi Montoya-Weiss
Marketing Science.
1999.
Vol. 18.
No. 3.
P. 373.
Develops and illustrate a systematic segment solution procedure that models the trade-offs
among evaluation criteria and organizational resource constraints. Managers and academic
researchers as target audience; Segment selection as the critical link between the
segment formation and resource allocation purposes.
Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
Vijay Mahajan
Marketing Science.
1995.
Vol. 14.
No. 3.
P. G79-G89.
Discusses the managerial applications of the diffusion model which represents a pattern
or regularity in new products and services. Conditions for the application of the
model; Pattern of adoption of new products and services; Application of the model
to the forecasting of the timing prior to product introduction.
Direct Marketing, Indirect Profits: A Strategic Analysis of Dual-Channel Supply-Chain
Design [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
Chiang Wei-yu Kevin
Marketing Science.
2003.
Vol. 49.
No. 1.
P. 1-21.
The advent of e-commerce has prompted many manufacturers to redesign their traditional
channel structures by engaging in direct sales. The model conceptualizes the impact
of customer acceptance of a direct channel, the degree to which customers accept
a direct channel as a substitute for shopping at a traditional store, on supply-chain
design. The customer acceptance of a direct channel can be strong enough that an
independent manufacturer would open a direct channel to compete with its own retailers.
Here, direct marketing is used for strategic channel control purposes even though
it is inefficient on its own and, surprisingly, it can profit the manufacturer even
when no direct sales occur. Specifically, we construct a price-setting game between
a manufacturer and its independent retailer. Direct marketing, which indirectly increases
the flow of profits through the retail channel, helps the manufacturer improve overall
profitability by reducing the degree of inefficient price double marginalization.
While operated by the manufacturer to constrain the retailer's pricing behavior,
the direct channel many not always be detrimental to the retailer because it will
be accompanied by a wholesale price reduction. This combination of manufacturer pull
and push can benefit the retailer in equilibrium. Finally, we show that the mere
threat of introducing the direct channel can increase the manufacturer's negotiated
share of cooperative profits even if price efficiency is obtained by using other
business practices.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-09-2003
Rajiv Lal
Marketing Science.
1990.
Vol. 9.
No. 4.
P. 299-319.
In this paper, we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination
between channel members. In particular we focus on two elements of the franchising
contract, namely, the royalty structure and the monitoring technology. We begin with
a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer
and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by
the retailer. In this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring
are needed for full coordination. We then extend the model to allow for free riding
by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the
franchisees, royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities
of the franchisor and the franchisees. Finally, we show that in environments where
factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee,
royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring
systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the
channel. Our general results are found to be consistent with those in Brickley and
Dark ( 1987 ) and Norton (1988), who conclude that franchising is affected by principal-agent
problems. Our theory finds special support in the work of Lafontaine ( 1988 ) where
it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring
and the importance of franchisor investments.
|
|