Опубликовано на портале: 29-09-2003Ram C. Rao Marketing Science. 1990. Vol. 9. No. 4. P. 319-342.
This paper considers the question of how a sales manager should design the optimal compensation scheme for his salesforce when it consists of salespersons of varying selling skills, i.e., when the salesforce is heterogeneous. The manager's problem is to reward the salespersons based on observable, uncertain sales achieved by the salespersons. Under the assumption that both the manager and the salespersons are risk neutral, the optimal compensation scheme is derived. It consists of the manager offering a menu of plans, consisting of a quota, a payment for meeting quota, and a constant commission rate for sales above or below quota. Such schemes using constant commission rates are also called menus of linear plans. Salespersons choose the quota which best suits them, achieve sales, and are then rewarded based on their actual performance. This scheme, variants of which are often observed in practice, is shown to be optimal for sales environments characterized by commonly encountered sales response functions, and a large class of frequency distributions of selling skills in the salesforce. The problem is solved using the methods of principal-agent models. The key differences in managing homogeneous and heterogeneous salesforces are highlighted. Finally, the paper discusses the issues involved in practically implementing the optimal compensation scheme.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-09-2003Rajiv Lal Marketing Science. 1990. Vol. 9. No. 4. P. 299-319.
In this paper, we explore the role of franchising arrangements in improving coordination between channel members. In particular we focus on two elements of the franchising contract, namely, the royalty structure and the monitoring technology. We begin with a simple analysis where a manufacturer distributes its product through a retailer and the retail demand is affected by the retail price and the service provided by the retailer. In this context we show that neither royalty payments nor monitoring are needed for full coordination. We then extend the model to allow for free riding by franchisees and show that although monitoring helps affect the behavior of the franchisees, royalty payments are still unnecessary to coordinate the activities of the franchisor and the franchisees. Finally, we show that in environments where factors affecting retail sales are controlled by both the franchisor and the franchisee, royalty payments provide the necessary incentives for the franchisor while monitoring systems are used to ensure that franchisees also behave in the best interest of the channel. Our general results are found to be consistent with those in Brickley and Dark ( 1987 ) and Norton (1988), who conclude that franchising is affected by principal-agent problems. Our theory finds special support in the work of Lafontaine ( 1988 ) where it is concluded that the incidence of franchising is related to cost of monitoring and the importance of franchisor investments.
Опубликовано на портале: 29-09-2003Kelvin J. Lancaster Marketing Science. 1990. Vol. 9. No. 3. P. 189-212.
Demand for variety may arise from a taste for diversity in individual consumption and/or from diversity in tastes even when each consumer chooses a single variant. The full degree of variety potentially demanded will not, in general, be supplied because scale economies (even to a small degree) mean that the potential welfare or revenue gain from greater variety must be balanced against the lower unit production costs with fewer variants. The economics of product variety consists essentially in analysing the effect of this balance in different situations, and comparing the degree of product variety for different market structures with each other and with the optimum. The survey commences with the work on market structures with single product firms (generalized monopolistic competition), tracing modern developments in both the Chamberlinian and Hotelling traditions. The latter has been particularly fruitful, due to the expansion of the original locational ideas into virtual spaces in product characteristics. The emphasis in recent work on product variety has been on multiproduct firms in both monopolistic and oligopolistic structures, including strategic market preemption. Although most work has been in a full information context, there have been advances in product variety under imperfect information (either by consumers to properties of the firms' products or firms as to consumers' demands). (Product Differentiation; Product Variety; Monopolistic Competition; Oligopoly)