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Marketing Science

Опубликовано на портале: 17-11-2003
Taylor Randall Marketing Science. 1998.  Vol. 17. No. 4. P. 356-380. 
Рассматривается вопрос о том, как вертикальная структура продуктовой линейки влияет на стоимость торговой марки (brand equity). Увеличивается ли стоимость торговой марки от наличия в продуктовой линейке «премиальных» продуктов повышенного качества? И наоборот, уменьшается ли стоимость торговой марки от наличия в нижнем «экономичном» конце продуктовой линейки товаров низкого качества.
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Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
Ganesh Iyer Marketing Science. 1998.  Vol. 17. No. 4. P. 338-356. 
Abstract This paper analyzes how manufacturers should coordinate distribution channels when retailers compete in price as well as important nonprice factors such as the provision of product information, free repair, faster check-out, or after-sales service. Differentiation among retailers in price and nonprice service factors is a central feature of markets ranging from automobiles and appliances to gasoline and is especially observed in the coexistence of high-service retailers and lower price discount retailers. Therefore, how a manufacturer should manage retail differentiation is an important channel management question. Yet, the approach in the existing literature has been to examine channel coordination under the standard "symmetric contracting" assumption that offering a uniform contract to all the retailers in a market will be sufficient for coordination. I bring this assumption into question and ask when is it optimal for the manufacturer to use the channel contract to deliberately induce retail differentiation (even if the retailers were ex-ante identical in their cost and other characteristics). The paper identifies the type of channel contracts that can endogenously induce symmetry as opposed to differentiation among retailers.Next, the paper highlights a type of channel conflict that arises from the very nature of retail price-service competition. A manufacturer might find the retailers to be excessively biased towards price competition at the cost of service provision or vice-versa. The paper establishes when a manufacturer is likely to stimulate greater price as opposed to greater service competition among the retailers.The framework that I develop to address these issues highlights the role of two basic types of consumer heterogeneity. Consumers are heterogeneous in their locations (as in the spatial models of horizontal differentiation) and in their willingness to pay for retail services (as in the models of vertical differentiation). The model al...
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Опубликовано на портале: 30-09-2003
J. Miguel Villas-Boas Marketing Science. 1998.  Vol. 17. No. 2. P. 156-170. 
Abstract When designing a product line, a manufacturer is often aware that it does not control the ultimate targeting of the products in the line to the different consumer segments. While the manufacturers can attempt to influence the target customers through communications in appropriate media, product design, and the choice of channels of distribution, the ultimate targeting is made by a retailer, which might only care about its own interests, and is fully in control of interactions with customers, including how the product is sold and displayed. This occurrence is widespread in numerous markets, for example, frequently purchased consumer products, home appliances, personal computers, automobiles, etc. The audience for this paper includes practitioners and academics who want to better understand how a manufacturer selling through an intermediary can better induce this intermediary to have a targeting strategy consistent with the manufacturer's intentions and be willing to carry the full product line.The paper attempts to find what are the main issues a manufacturer selling through a distribution channel has to worry about when designing the product line. The problem of the product line design for a distribution channel is modeled with the manufacturer, the retailer or several competing retailers, and the consumers. In this way all the three levels of the distribution system are included.The model can be summarized as follows. The manufacturer decides how many products to have in the line and the physical characteristics of each product, quality. Each product may or may not be targeted at a different market segment. The manufacturer decides as well how many market segments to try to target and the prices to charge the retailer for each type of product. Given the product line being offered by the manufacturer, the retailer (or competing retailers) decides which products to carry, the market segments that are going to be targeted, which product to target to each …
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