Financial Analysts Journal
Выпуск N6 за 1996 год
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Michael J. Barclay, Craig G. Dunbar
Financial Analysts Journal.
1996.
Vol. 52.
No. 6.
P. 75-84.
No one wants to trade those who have better information. In markets where trades
have
asymmetric information, however, both informed and uninformed trades must make strategic
trading decisions. Because public announcements can affect the information asymmetry
between traders, these strategic decisions are likely to be most important around
public announcements. How concerned should uniformed trades be about the potential
information asymmetry when trading around public announcements? Surprisingly, whether
for large-block trades or for the entire order flow, there is no evidence that the
uniformed can trade on more favorable terms by varying the timing of their trades
in relation to a quarterly earnings announcement.

