Journal of Applied Corporate Finance
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Michael J. Barclay, Clifford W. Smith
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.
1996.
Vol. 8.
No. 4.
P. 4-17.
In this paper we expand the scope of our earlier study, examining broader facets
of
corporate financial architecture. Here we focus specifically on the maturity and
priority of the firm's debt by looking at 6000 firms during the period 1981-1993.
As in our earlier study, we test three basic explanations of these corporate financing
choices. In addition to the incentive-contracting argument described above, we also
test "signaling" and "tax" explanations. Consistent with our findings, this study
provides strong evidence for the incentive-contracting explanation, but only weak
support for the signaling and tax arguments.


Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Michael J. Barclay, Clifford W. Smith
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.
1999.
Vol. 12.
No. 1.
P. 8-20.
In this paper, we offer our assessment of the current state of the academic finance
profession's understanding of these issues and suggest some new directions for further
exploration. We also offer in closing what we feel is a promising approach to reconciling
the different theories of capital structure.


Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Michael J. Barclay, Clifford W. Smith, Ross L. Watts
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.
1995.
Vol. 7.
No. 4.
P. 4-19.
In this paper we analyze the leverage and dividend choices than 6,700 industrial
corporations over a 30-year period. Our empirical analysis is designed to provide
a basis for assessing the relative importance of the various factors - taxes, contracting
costs (particularly, the financial distress costs and the "free cash flow" benefits
of debt), and signaling effects - in explaining corporate financial behavior. Such
findings can than be used to guide corporate managers in thinking about trade-offs
among different leverage and dividend choices.


The EVA Financial Management System [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 21-06-2006
Don Chew
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance.
1995.
Vol. 8.
No. 2.
In this article, we argue that for many large companies the tops-down, earnings per
share-based model of financial management that has long dominated corporate American
is becoming obsolete. The most serious challenge to the long reign of EPS is coming
from a measure of corporate performance called "economic value added," or EVA. EVA
is by no means a new concept. Rather it is a practical, and highly flexible, refinement
of economists' concept of "residual income"--the value that is left over after a
company's stockholders (and all other important stakeholders) have been adequately
compensated. For companies that aim to increase their competitiveness by decentralizing,
EVA is likely to be the most sensible basis for evaluating and rewarding the periodic
performance of empowered line people, especially those entrusted with major capital
spending decisions. EVA, moreover, is not just a performance measure. When fully
implemented, it is the centerpiece of an integrated financial management system that
encompasses the full range of corporate financial decision-making--everything from
capital budgeting, acquisition pricing, and the setting of corporate goals to shareholder
communication and management incentive compensation. By putting all financial and
operating functions on the same basis, an EVA system effectively provides a common
language for employees across all corporate functions, linking strategic planning
with the operating divisions, and the corporate treasury staff with investor relations
and human resources. We begin by describing the shortcomings of the tops-down, EPS-based
model of financial management. Next we explain the rise of hostile takeovers--as
well as the phenomenal success of LBOs--in the 1980s as capital market responses
to the deficiencies of the EPS model. The EVA financial management system, we go
on to argue, borrows important aspects of the LBO movement--particularly, its focus
on capital efficiency and ownership incentives--but without the high leverage and
concentration of risk that limit LBOs to the mature sector of the U.S. economy. In
the final section, we present the outlines of an EVA-based incentive compensation
plan that is designated to simulate for managers and employees the rewards of ownership.
