Journal of Political Economy
1925 1942 1964 1973 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2007
Опубликовано на портале: 24-01-2007
Jeremy I. Bulow, Donald John Roberts
Journal of Political Economy.
1989.
Vol. 97.
No. 5.
P. 1060-1090.
The authors show that the seller's problem in devising an optimal auction is virtually
identical to the monopolist's problem in third-degree price discrimination. More
generally, many of the important results and elegant techniques developed in the
field of mechanism design can be reinterpreted in the language of standard microeconomic
theory. They illustrate this by considering the problem of bilateral exchange with
privately-known values.
