Journal of Political Economy
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Опубликовано на портале: 02-11-2007John Y. Campbell, John H. Cochrane Journal of Political Economy. 1999. Vol. 107. No. 2. P. 205-251.
We present a consumption-based model that explains the procyclical variation of stock prices, the long-horizon predictability of excess stock returns, and the countercyclical variation of stock market volatility. Our model has an i.i.d. consumption growth driving process, and adds a slow-moving external habit to the standard power utility function. The latter feature produces cyclical variation in risk aversion, and hence in the prices of risky assets Our model also predicts many of the difficulties that beset the standard power utility model, including Euler equation rejections, no correlation between mean consumption growth and interest rates, very high estimates of risk aversion, and pricing errors that are larger than those of the static CAPM. Our model captures much of the history of stock prices, given only consumption data. Since our model captures the equity premium, it implies that fluctuations have important welfare costs. Unlike many habit-persistence models, our model does not necessarily produce cyclical variation in the risk free interest rate, nor does it produce an extremely skewed distribution or negative realizations of the marginal rate of substitution
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007Daron K. Acemoglu, Jörn-Steffen Pischke Journal of Political Economy. 1999. Vol. 107. No. 3. P. 539-572.
In the human capital model with perfect labor markets, firms never invest in general skills and all costs of general training are borne by workers. When labor market frictions compress the structure of wages, firms may pay for these investments. The distortion in the wage structure turns "technologically" general skills into de facto "specific" skills. Credit market imperfections are neither necessary nor sufficient for firm-sponsored training. Since labor market frictions and institutions shape the wage structure, they may have an important impact on the financing and amount of human capital investments and account for some international differences in training practices.