Journal of Political Economy
1925 1942 1964 1973 1974 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2004 2007
Опубликовано на портале: 12-07-2007
Kathryn L. Shaw, Francine Lafontaine
Journal of Political Economy.
2007.
Vol. 107.
No. 5.
P. 1041-1080.
This paper provides the first systematic evidence on how franchisors adjust their
royalty rates and franchise fees as they gain franchising experience. This evidence
comes from a unique panel data set that we assembled on these monetary contract terms
for about 1,000 franchisors each year for the 1980-92 period.
The evolution of common law [статья]
Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Nicola Gennaioli, Andrei Shleifer
Journal of Political Economy.
2007.
Vol. 115.
No. 1.
P. 43-68.
We present a model of lawmaking by appellate courts in which judges influenced by policy preferences can distinguish precedents at some cost. We find a cost and a benefit of diversity of judicial views. Policy-motivated judges distort the law away from efficiency, but diversity of judicial views also fosters legal evolution and increases the law's precision. We call our central finding the Cardozo theorem: even when judges are motivated by personal agendas, legal evolution is, on average, beneficial because it washes out judicial biases and renders the law more precise. Our paper provides a theoretical foundation for the evolutionary adaptability of common law.
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