Эксоцман
на главную поиск contacts
В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Journal of Financial Economics

Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Milton Harris, Artur Raviv Journal of Financial Economics. 1988.  No. 20. P. 203-235. 
In this paper, we derive conditions under which the simple majority voting rule for electing controlling management and one share-one vote constitute a socially optimal corporate governance rule. We also show that other majority rules and/or multiple classes of shares are not socially optimal. Finally we show that an entrepreneur would choose to "issue two securities, one with only cash flow claims and no votes and one with only votes and no cash flow claims, ff this were allowed. This scheme, regardless of the majority rule adopted, is not socially optimal.
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Michael J. Barclay, Clifford W. Smith Journal of Financial Economics. 1988.  Vol. 22. No. 1. P. 61-82. 
Theories of corporate payout policy do not explain the observed form of distributions to shareholders. Although open-market repurchases appear to have tax advantages, cash dividends are overwhelmingly chosen. We argue that there are costs associated with open-market-repurchase programs, since they provide managers with opportunities to use inside information to benefit themselves at stockholders' expense. We offer evidence suggesting that bid-ask spreads widen around repurchase announcements, as predicted by our analysis. Since these costs of repurchases do not arise with cash dividends, our analysis implies that repurchases do not dominate cash dividends for making distributions to shareholders.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2004
Brad M. Barber, John D. Lyon Journal of Financial Economics. 1997.  Vol. 43. No. 3. P. 341-372. 
We analyze the empirical power and specification of test statistics in event studies designed to detect long-run (one- to five-year) abnormal stock returns. We document that test statistics based on abnormal returns calculated using a reference portfolio, such as a market index, are misspecified (empirical rejection rates exceed theoretical rejection rates) and identify three reasons for this misspecification. We correct for the three identified sources of misspecification by matching sample firms to control firms of similar sizes and book-to-market ratios. This control firm approach yields well-specified test statistics in virtually all sampling situations considered.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
John S. Howe, Tie Su Journal of Financial Economics. 2001.  Vol. 61. No. 2. P. 227-252. 
Managers can decide to reduce a warrant's exercise price. A reduction in exercise price can induce exercise (a conversion-forcing reduction) or not (a long-term reduction). Conversion-forcing firms show an abnormal return of -1.53% on the announcement day but they perform well over the three years following the announcement. This finding suggests that the funds raised from warrant exercise are invested in profitable projects. Long-term reductions show an abnormal return of -1.15% on the announcement day. These firms also perform well following the reduction, which suggests that the lower exercise price restores managerial incentives.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Philip G. Berger, Eli Ofek Journal of Financial Economics. 1995.  Vol. 37. No. 1. P. 39-65. 
In this article estimates diversification's effect on firm value by imputing stand-alone values for individual business segments. Comparing the sum of these stand-alone values to the firm's actual value implies a 13% to 15% average value loss from diversification during 1986-1991. The value loss is smaller when the segments of the diversified firm are in the same two-digit SIC code. We find that overinvestment and cross-subsidization contribute to the value loss. The loss is reduced modestly by tax benefits of diversification.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Michael J. Barclay Journal of Financial Economics. 1987.  Vol. 19. No. 1. P. 31-44. 
This study examines the ex-dividend day behavior of common stock prices before the enactment of the federal income tax. On ex-dividend days during the pre-tax period, stock prices fell, on average, by the full amount of the dividend. The data are consistent with the hypothesis that (i) investors in the pre-tax period value dividends and capital gains as perfect substitutes and (ii) the differential taxation of dividends and capital gains has since caused investors to discount the value of taxable cash dividends in relation to capital gains.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Christopher Polk, Owen Lamont Journal of Financial Economics. 2002.  Vol. 63. No. 1. P. 51-77. 
Does corporate diversification reduce shareholder value? Since firms endogenously choose to diversify, exogenous variation in diversification is necessary in order to draw inferences about the causal effect. We examine changes in the within-firm dispersion of characteristics, or "diversity." Following the inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis, we examine investment diversity. We find that exogenous changes in diversity, due to changes in industry investment, are negatively related to changes in firm value. Thus diversification destroys value. This finding is not caused by measurement error. We also find that exogenous changes in industry cash flow diversity are negatively related to changes in firm value
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Owen Lamont, Christopher Polk Journal of Financial Economics. 2002.  Vol. 63. No. 1.
Does corporate diversification reduce shareholder value? Since firms endogenously choose to diversify, exogenous variation in diversification is necessary to draw inferences about the causal effect. We examine changes in the within-firm dispersion of industry investment, or "diversity". We find that exogenous changes in diversity, due to changes in industry investment, are negatively related to firm value. Thus diversification destroys value, consistent with the inefficient internal capital markets hypothesis. Measurement error does not cause this finding. We also find that exogenous changes in industry cash flow diversity are negatively related to firm value
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 17-04-2007
Hamid Mehran Journal of Financial Economics. 1995.  Vol. 38. No. 2. P. 163-184. 
An examination of the executive compensation structure of 153 randomly-selected manufacturing firms in 1979-1980 provides evidence supporting advocates of incentive compensation, and also suggests that the form rather than the level of compensation is what motivates managers to increase firm value. Firm performance is positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers and to the percentage of their compensation that is equity-based. Moreover, equity-based compensation is used more extensively in firms with more outside directors. Finally, firms in which a higher percentage of the shares are held by insiders or outside blockholders use less equity-based compensation.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Claudio Loderer, Kenneth Martin Journal of Financial Economics. 1997.  Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 223-255. 
We examine the relation between managers' financial interests and firm performance. Since the relation could go in either direction, we cast the analysis in a simultaneous equations framework. For firms involved in acquisitions, we find that acquisition performance and Tobin's Q ratios affect the size of managers' stockholdings. We find no evidence, however, that larger stockholdings lead to better performance. Perhaps management is effectively disciplined by competition in product and labor markets. Alternatively, it may not be necessary for top executives to own stock to be residual claimants. And finally, higher ownership might multiply the opportunities to appropriate corporate wealth.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 18-04-2007
Jun-Koo Kang, Anil Shivdasani Journal of Financial Economics. 1995.  Vol. 38. No. 1. P. 29-58. 
We examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms during top executive turnover in Japanese corporations. Consistent with evidence from U.S. data, the likelihood of nonroutine turnover is significantly related to industry-adjusted return on assets,excess stock returns, and negative operating income, but is not related to industry performance. The sensitivity of nonroutine turnover to earnings performance is higher for firms with ties to a main bank than for firms without such ties. Outside succession in Japan is more likely for firms with large shareholders and a main bank relationship. We document performance improvements subsequent to nonroutine turnover and outside succession.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 22-06-2006
David Yermack Journal of Financial Economics. 2003.  Vol. 40. No. 2. P. 185-211. 
The author presents evidence consistent with theories that small boards of directors are more effective. Using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation, he finds an inverse association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991. The result is robust to numerous controls for company size, industry membership, inside stock ownership, growth opportunities, and alternative corporate governance structures. Companies with small boards also exhibit more favorable values for financial ratios, and provide stronger CEO performance incentives from compensation and the threat of dismissal
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 01-10-2003
Fisher Black Journal of Financial Economics. 1974.  Vol. 4. No. 1. P. 337-52 . 
Outlines models of capital market equilibrium when there are explicit barriers to international investment. Taxes levied on holdings of assets in one country by residents of another country; Deviation of asset prices from the predictions of the world capital asset pricing.
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Lubos Pastor, Robert F. Stambaugh Journal of Financial Economics. 2002.  Vol. 63. No. 3. P. 351-380. 
Authors construct optimal portfolios of equity funds by combining historical returns on funds and passive indexes with prior views about asset pricing and skill. By including both benchmark and nonbenchmark indexes, authors distinguish pricing-model inaccuracy from managerial skill. Modest confidence in a pricing model helps construct portfolios with high Sharpe ratios. Investing in active mutual funds can be optimal even for investors who believe managers cannot outperfofm passive indexes. Optimal portfolios exclude hot-hand funds even for investors who believe momentum is priced. Our large universe of funds offers no close substitutes for the Fama-French and momentum benchmarks.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию ресурс содержит прикрепленный файл
Опубликовано на портале: 05-10-2004
Clifford W. Smith Journal of Financial Economics. 1986.  Vol. 15. No. 1-2. P. 3-29. 
This paper reviews the theory and evidence on the process by which corporations raise debt and equity capital and the associated effects on security prices. Findings from related transactions are used to test hypotheses about the stock price patterns accompanying announcements of security offerings. Various contractual alternatives employed in security issues are examined; for example, rights or underwritten offers, negotiated or competitive bid, best efforts or firm commitment contracts, and shelf or traditional registration. Finally, incentives for underpricing new issues are analyzed.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию