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В разделе собрана информация о статьях по экономике, социологии и менеджменту. Во многих случаях приводятся полные тексты статей. (подробнее...)

Journal of Financial Economics

Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
David J. Denis, Diane K. Denis, Atulya Sarin Journal of Financial Economics. 1997.  Vol. 45. No. 2. P. 193-221. 
We report that ownership structure significantly affects the likelihood of a change in top executive. Controlling for stock price performance, the probability of top executive turnover is negatively related to the ownership stake of officers and directors and positively related to the presence of an outside blockholder. In addition, the likelihood of a change in top executive is significantly less sensitive to stock price performance in firms with higher managerial ownership. Finally, we document an unusually high rate of corporate control activity in the twelve months preceding top executive turnover. We conclude that ownership structure has an important influence on internal monitoring efforts and that this influence stems in part from the effect of ownership structure on external control threats.
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Myeong-Hyeon Cho Journal of Financial Economics. 1998.  Vol. 47. No. 1. P. 103-121. 
This paper examines the relation among ownership structure, investment, and corporate value, focusing on whether ownership structure affects investment. Ordinary least squares regression results suggest that ownership structure affects investment and, therefore, corporate value. However, simultaneous regression results indicate that the endogeneity of ownership may affect these inferences, suggesting that investment affects corporate value which, in turn, affects ownership structure. The evidence shows that corporate value affects ownership structure, but not vice versa. These findings raise questions regarding the assumption that ownership structure is exogenously determined, and bring into question the results in studies that treat ownership structure as exogenous.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Robert Comment, G. William Schwert Journal of Financial Economics. 1995.  Vol. 39. No. 1. P. 3-43. 
This paper provides large-sample evidence that poison pill rights issues, control share laws, and business combination laws have not systematically deterred takeovers and are unlikely to have caused the demise of the 1980s market for corporate control, even though 87% of all exchange-listed firms are now covered by one of these antitakeover measures. We show that poison pills and control share laws are reliably associated with higher takeover premiums for selling shareholders, both unconditionally and conditional on a successful takeover, and we provide updated event study evidence for the three-quarters of all poison pills not yet analyzed. Antitakeover measures increase the bargaining position of target firms, but they do not prevent many transactions.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007
Timothy S. Mech Journal of Financial Economics. 1993.  Vol. 34. No. 3. P. 307-334. 
This paper investigates whether portfolio return autocorrelation can be explained by time-varying expected returns, nontrading, stale limit orders, market maker inventory policy, or transaction costs. Evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that transaction costs cause portfolio autocorrelation by slowing price adjustment. I develop a transaction-cost model which predicts that prices adjust faster when changes in valuation are large in relation to the bid-ask spread. Cross-sectional tests support this prediction, but time-series tests do not.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Michael J. Barclay, Clifford G. Holderness, Jeffrey Pontiff Journal of Financial Economics. 1993.  Vol. 33. No. 3. P. 263-291. 
The greater the managerial stock ownership in closed-end funds, the larger are the discounts to net asset value. The average discount for funds with blockholders is 14%, whereas the average discount for funds without blockholders is only 4%. This relation is robust over time and to various model specifications that control for other factors that affect discounts. We argue that blockholders receive private benefits that do not accrue to other shareholders and that they veto open-ending proposals to preserve these benefits. We support this argument by documenting a range of potential private benefits received by blockholders in closed-end funds.
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Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Michael J. Barclay, Clifford G. Holderness Journal of Financial Economics. 1989.  Vol. 25. No. 2. P. 371-395. 
We analyze the pricing of 63 block trades between 1978 and 1982 involving at least 5% of the common stock of NYSE or Amex corporations. These blocks are typically priced at substantial premiums to the post-announcement exchange price. We argue that the premiums, which average 20%, reflect private benefits that accrue exclusively to the blockholder because of his voting power. The premiums paid by both individual and corporate block purchasers increase with firm size, fractional ownership, and firm performance. Individuals pay larger premiums for firms with greater leverage, lower stock-return variance, and large cash holdings.
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Опубликовано на портале: 06-11-2008
Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2007.  Vol. 84. No. 2. P. 299-329 . 
We investigate cross-country determinants of private credit, using new data on legal creditor rights and private and public credit registries in 129 countries. Both creditor protection through the legal system and information-sharing institutions are associated with higher ratios of private credit to gross domestic product, but the former is relatively more important in the richer countries. An analysis of legal reforms shows that credit rises after improvements in creditor rights and in information sharing. Creditor rights are remarkably stable over time, contrary to the hypothesis that legal rules are converging. Finally, legal origins are an important determinant of both creditor rights and informationsharing institutions. The analysis suggests that public credit registries, which are primarily a feature of French civil law countries, benefit private credit markets in developing countries.
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Опубликовано на портале: 03-12-2007
Patricia M. Dechow, Richard G. Sloan Journal of Financial Economics. 1997.  Vol. 43. No. 1. P. 3-27. 
This paper examines the ability of naive investor expectations models to explain the higher returns to contrarian investment strategies. Contrary to Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), we find no systematic evidence that stock prices reflect naive extrapolation of past trends in earnings and sales growth. Building on Bauman and Dowen (1988) and La Porta (1995), however, we find that stock prices appear to naively reflect analysts' biased forecasts of future earnings growth. Further, we find that naive reliance on analysts' forecasts of future earnings growth can explain over half of the higher returns to contrarian investment strategies
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 02-10-2003
Michael J. Barclay, Jerold B. Warner Journal of Financial Economics. 1993.  Vol. 34. No. 3. P. 281-305. 
We examine the proportion of a stock's cumulative price change that occurs in each trade-size category, using transactions data for a sample of NYSE firms. Although the majority of trades are small, most of the cumulative stock-price change is due to medium-size trades. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that informed trades are concentrated in the medium-size category, and that price movements are due mainly to informed traders' private information.
ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 25-10-2007
Kenneth R. French, Richard Roll Journal of Financial Economics. 1986.  Vol. 17. No. 1. P. 5-26. 
Asset prices are much more volatile during exchange trading hours than during non-trading hours. This paper considers three explanations for this phenomenon: (1) volatility is caused by public information which is more likely to arrive during normal business hours; (2) volatility is caused by private information which affects prices when informed investors trade; and (3) volatility is caused by pricing errors that occur during trading. Although a significant fraction of the daily variance is caused by mispricing, the behavior of returns around exchange holidays suggests that private information is the principle factor behind high trading-time variances.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 03-10-2003
Michael Bradley, Anand Desai, E.Han Kim Journal of Financial Economics. 1988.  Vol. 21. No. 1. P. 3-40. 
This paper documents that a successful tender offer increases the combined value of the target and acquiring firms by an average of 7.4%. We also provide a theoretical analysis of the process of competition for control of the target and empirical evidence that competition among bidding firms increases the returns to targets and decreases the returns to acquirers, that the supply of target shares is positively sloped, and that changes in the legal/institutional environment of tender offers have had no impact on the total (percentage) synergistic gains created but have significantly affected their division between the stockholders of the target and acquiring firms.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 06-10-2004
Lakshmi Shyam-Sunder, Stewart C. Myers Journal of Financial Economics. 1999.  Vol. 51. No. 2. P. 219-244. 
This paper tests traditional capital structure models against the alternative of a pecking order model of corporate financing. The basic pecking order model, which predicts external debt financing driven by the internal financial deficit, has much greater time-series explanatory power than a static tradeoff model, which predicts that each firm adjusts gradually toward an optimal debt ratio. We show that our tests have the power to reject the pecking order against alternative tradeoff hypotheses. The statistical power of some usual tests of the tradeoff model is virtually nil.
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него ресурс содержит гиперссылку на сайт, на котором можно найти дополнительную информацию
Опубликовано на портале: 07-02-2003
B. Cornell Journal of Financial Economics. 1981.  Vol. 9. No. 1. P. 103-8. 
Examines the role of consumption in asset pricing. Collapse of a multi-beta capital asset pricing model into a single-beta model where betas are computed with respect to aggregate consumption; Role of consumption betas; Derivation of a single-beta pricing equation; Stationarity of the consumption betas; Inclusion of the covariance of the asset's return with aggregate real consumption. (Из Ebsco)
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 02-11-2007
Gregory N. Mankiw, Stephen P. Zeldes Journal of Financial Economics. 1991.  Vol. 29. No. 1. P. 97-112. 
Only one-fourth of U.S. families own stock. This paper examines whether the consumption of stockholders differs from the consumption of non-stockholders and whether these differences help explain the empirical failures of the consumption-based CAPM. Household panel data are used to construct time series on the consumption of each group. The results indicate that the consumption of stockholders is more volatile than that of non-stockholders and is more highly correlated with the excess return on the stock market. These differences help explain the size of the equity premium, although they do not fully resolve the equity premium puzzle
ресурс содержит полный текст, либо отрывок из него
Опубликовано на портале: 29-10-2008
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer Journal of Financial Economics. 2008.  Vol. 88. No. 3. P. 430-465.. 
We present a new measure of legal protection of minority shareholders against expropriation by corporate insiders: the anti-self-dealing index. Assembled with the help of Lex Mundi law firms, the index is calculated for 72 countries based on legal rules prevailing in 2003, and focuses on private enforcement mechanisms, such as disclosure, approval, and litigation, that govern a specific self-dealing transaction. This theoretically grounded index predicts a variety of stock market outcomes, and generally works better than the previously introduced index of anti-director rights.
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